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This thesis analyzes the design and effect of Mentor-Protégé Programs (MPPs) used in 
contingency contracting to achieve security and stability, the two objectives of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. It clarifies COIN operations and the attributes of 
contingency contracting for COIN effects. The Afghan Mentorship Program (AMP), an 
initiative that achieved some success, is analyzed as an expeditionary MPP to meet future 
counterinsurgency operations, disaster recovery, operational sustainment and security 
transition to local governments. Developed and operated at Bagram Regional contracting 
office in Afghanistan, from January–July of 2011, AMP is compared and contrasted 
against five U.S. government MPPs that are related to defense and foreign operations in 
current use. 
This paper seeks to integrate successful Mentor-Protégé Program elements with 
operational doctrine and guidance. The successful integration of policy and features will 
achieve favorable procurement outcomes capable of meeting military, security and 
economic objectives. This paper does not address the validity of COIN, only the 
prerequisites necessary for continued execution of the contingency contracting COIN 
mission. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. HISTORY .........................................................................................................4 
C. PURPOSE .........................................................................................................4 
II. METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................8 
1. Process of Literature Review ..............................................................8 
2. COIN ...................................................................................................10 
3. Clear-Hold-Build................................................................................10 
a. Clear ........................................................................................11 
b. Hold .........................................................................................12 
c. Build ........................................................................................12 
4. Phase Zero Contracting Operations.................................................13 
a. Phases of Notional Operational Planning .............................13 
b. Strategic and Integrative Planning for Contingency and 
Expeditionary Operations .......................................................16 
5. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance ........................................17 
6. COIN Guidance Effects .....................................................................19 
7. Problems from COIN ........................................................................21 
C. INTERVIEWS................................................................................................22 
1. Interview Selection Process ...............................................................23 
a. Selection Criteria.....................................................................23 
2. Key Positions ......................................................................................24 
3. Interview Questions ...........................................................................24 
4. Summary of Interviews .....................................................................25 
a. Purpose ....................................................................................25 
b. Interview Questions and Responses .......................................25 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ......................................................................33 
1. Small Business Development Programs–CONUS ...........................33 
2. Expeditionary Contracting Command–OCONUS .........................34 
a. Background .............................................................................35 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...........................................................................37 
III. MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ MODELS IN COIN CONTRACTING DOCTRINE .....39 
A. OVERVIEW OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE ......................39 
B. COIN CONTRATING...................................................................................39 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................39 
2. Contingency Contracting ..................................................................40 
3. COIN Contracting Guidance ............................................................42 
a. Money as a Weapon System....................................................42 
b. Commander’s Emergency Response Program ......................44 
 viii 
c. Afghan First 886 Policy ..........................................................45 
C. COIN OPERATIONS ....................................................................................46 
D. OVERVIEW OF HISTORY .........................................................................49 
E. REGIONALIZED CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN 
AFGHANISTAN ............................................................................................53 
1. RC-East Bagram Air Base ................................................................53 
2. Summary .............................................................................................54 
a. Early Contracting ....................................................................54 
b. Phases One and Two ...............................................................55 
c. Contingency Contracting in 2006...........................................56 
d. Evolution of Contracting in Afghanistan ..............................57 
e. CENTCOM Contracting Command .......................................58 
3. Regional Command–East ..................................................................59 
a. TF101 ......................................................................................59 
b. TF-1CAV .................................................................................59 
IV. SUCCESSFUL MPP MODELS................................................................................61 
A. MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS ..........................................................61 
1. Small Business Administration .........................................................61 
a. Benefits of the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program ......................62 
b. Benefits to Protégés .................................................................62 
c. Benefits to the Mentors ...........................................................63 
d. Eligibility for the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program ..................63 
e. Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship ....................63 
2. Department of Defense ......................................................................64 
a. Benefits of the DoD Mentor-Protégé Program ......................65 
b. Benefits to Protégés .................................................................66 
c. Benefits to the Mentors ...........................................................66 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program ..........................67 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship ......67 
3. Department of State ...........................................................................68 
a. Benefits of the DOS Mentor-Protégé Program ......................69 
b. Benefits to Protégés .................................................................69 
c. Benefits to the Mentors ...........................................................70 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program ..........................70 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship ......71 
4. U.S. Agency for International Development....................................71 
a. Benefits of the USAID Mentor-Protégé Program .................72 
b. Benefits to Protégés .................................................................73 
c. Benefits to the Mentors ...........................................................73 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program ..........................74 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship ......75 
5. Department of Homeland Security...................................................76 
a. Benefits of the DHS Mentor-Protégé Program .....................77 
b. Benefits to Protégés .................................................................77 
c. Benefits to the Mentors ...........................................................78 
 ix 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program ..........................78 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship ......79 
B. COMPARISON OF FIVE MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS ............81 
1. Protégé Eligibility...............................................................................81 
2. Mentor Eligibility ...............................................................................81 
3. Benefits for Mentors ..........................................................................82 
4. Affiliation and Joint Venture ............................................................82 
5. Multiple Protégés ...............................................................................83 
6. Multiple Mentors ...............................................................................83 
7. Reporting ............................................................................................83 
V. CASE STUDY: THE AMP EXPERIENCE ............................................................85 
A. TASK ...............................................................................................................85 
B. PURPOSE .......................................................................................................85 
C. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................89 
1. Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan ...........................................90 
2. Afghan Mentorship Program............................................................90 
3. Vendor Tournaments.........................................................................90 
4. Joint Ventures ....................................................................................91 
5. Craftsman Program ...........................................................................91 
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ......................................................92 
1. Assumptions........................................................................................92 
a. Knowledge of Contracting ......................................................92 
b. Contingency Contracting ........................................................92 
c. Contingency Contracting Officers..........................................92 
d. Development of Contingency Contracting Guidance ............92 
e. Contingency Contracting Core Competencies .......................93 
2. Limitations ..........................................................................................95 
a. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance ..............................95 
b. COIN Guidance One Task at a Time .....................................96 
c. Personnel Strength ..................................................................98 
d. Institutional Knowledge and Organizational Experience .....98 
E. AFGHANS BUILDING A BETTER AFGHANISTAN .............................98 
F. AFGHAN MENTORSHIP PROGRAM ....................................................101 
G. VENDOR TOURNAMENTS ......................................................................103 
H. JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERING PROGRAM ...........................106 
I. CRAFTSMAN PROGRAM ........................................................................107 
J. CONCLUSION ON AMP ...........................................................................112 
K. EVALUATION CRITERIA .......................................................................113 
1. Evaluation Criteria ..........................................................................116 
2. Agency Mentor-Protégé Programs .................................................116 
a. Advantages ............................................................................116 
b. Disadvantages........................................................................118 
3. Afghan Mentorship Program..........................................................120 
a. Advantages ............................................................................120 
b. Disadvantages........................................................................121 
 x 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION .............................123 
A. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................123 
B. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................125 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................128 
APPENDIX A. SEC. 886: ENHANCED AUTHORITY TO ACQUIRE 
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES PRODUCED IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN ......................................................................................................131 
APPENDIX B. DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENT 
SECTION 854 OF THE JOHN WARNER NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007 .................................................................133 
APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF FEDERAL MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ 
PROGRAMS ............................................................................................................135 
APPPENDIX D. COMISAF’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CONTRACTING 
GUIDANCE ............................................................................................................137 
APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN ...................................................139 
APPENDIX F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 4205.01 DOD 
SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAMS .........................................................................145 
APPENDIX G. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WHAT ARE 
RULES GOVERNING THE SBA’S MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ PROGRAM? .......147 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................151 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Full Spectrum Operations (after Department of the Army, 2009). ..................11 
Figure 2. Illustration of Notional Operation Plan Phases (after Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2011) ................................................................................................................15 
Figure 3. Warfighter Notional Operational Plan Phases (from Yoder et al., 2013) ........17 
Figure 4. Integration Cell Architecture (from Blake, 2012)............................................52 
Figure 5. SCO–Afghanistan as of 14 Jun 11. Location of RAs. .....................................54 
Figure 6. Comparison of Five Mentor-Protégé Programs (from Pilireo Mazza, 2012) ..80 
Figure 7. Proposed Clause 952.211–0001—Afghan Manufacturing Requirement 
(Sep 2010) (from DOA, 2010) .......................................................................100 
Figure 8. Initial Authorization and Schedule of Afghan Mentorship Program at 
Bagram Regional Contracting Center (from DOA, 2011) .............................102 
Figure 9. Tier I Vendor Competition Pool < $25K  (from BRCC COIN Contracting 
Brief, 2011) ....................................................................................................104 
Figure 10. Tier II Vendor Competition Pool $25–50K (from BRCC COIN 
Contracting Brief, 2011) ................................................................................105 
Figure 11. Bagram Air Field Afghan Women-owned Business Shura Held July 7, 
2011................................................................................................................106 
Figure 12. Craftsman Initiative–AMP Training Presentation (from BRCC COIN 
Contracting Brief, 2011) ................................................................................108 
Figure 13. Korean Vocational Training Center and COIN Contracting Presentation 
(from BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011) ................................................110 
Figure 14. MPPs versus AMP Comparative Analysis ....................................................115 
Figure 15. Sec. 886. Enhanced Authority to Acquire Products and Services Produced 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (from 10 USC § 2302, 2008) ..................................131 
Figure 16. Designation of Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Support) (ADUSD(PS)) to Implement Section 854 of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 (from Young, 2007) ........133 
Figure 17. Comparison of Federal Mentor-Protégé Programs (from Pilireo Mazza, 
2012) ..............................................................................................................135 
Figure 18. COMISAF’S Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance (from Petraeus, 
2010) ..............................................................................................................137 
Figure 19. Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations in Iraq or 
Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008)...................................................139 
Figure 20. Department of Defense Directive 4205.01 DoD Small Business Programs 
(from Lynn, 2009) ..........................................................................................145 
Figure 21. Small Business Administration, What Are the Rules Governing the SBA’s 
Mentor/Protégé Program? (from 13 CFR § 124.520) ....................................147 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABBA Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan 
ACC Army Contracting Command 
AFARS Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
AFICA Air Force Installation Contracting Agency 
AJV Afghan Joint Venture 
AMC Army Materiel Command 
AMP Afghan Mentorship Program 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
AO area of operations 
AOR area of responsibility 
BRCC Bagram Regional Contracting Center 
C2 command and control 
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned 
CCO contingency contracting officer 
CCR Central Contractor Registration 
CCSP contingency contracting support plan 
CENTCOM Central Command 
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force 
C-JTSCC CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 
C-JTSCC I/A CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 
Iraq/Afghanistan 
COCOM combatant command 
COIN counterinsurgency 
COM chief of mission 
COMISAF Commander of International Security Assistance Force 
CON contracting 
CONUS continental United States 
 xiv 
COR contracting officer representative 
COWCIA Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
CP Craftsman Program 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSR counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction 
DAIWA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
DCGS Deputy Commanding General for Support 
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOS Department of State 
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 
ECC Expeditionary Contracting Command 
EPLS Excluded Parties List System 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FM field manual 
FOB forward operating base 
FY fiscal year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GCC Geographic Combatant Command 
GS General Schedule 
HN host nation 
HNSF host-nation security forces 
HUBZone historically underutilized business zone 
IIP Indian Incentive Program 
IMCOM Installation Management Command 
IO information operations 
IRB Institution Review Board 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JARB Joint Acquisition Review Board 
JCC-I Joint Contracting Command–Iraq 
JCC I/A Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan 
 xv 
JCCS Joint Contingency Contracting System 
JCIP Joint Center in Parwan 
JFC joint force commander 
JFUB Joint Facilities Utilization Board 
JV joint venture 
KO contracting officer 
KOICA Korean International Cooperation Agency 
KVTC Korean Vocational Training Center 
LOE line of effort 
LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
MAAWS Money as a Weapon System 
MAAWS-A Money as a Weapon System–Afghanistan 
MICC Mission and Installation Contracting Command 
MILDEP Military Department 
MNF–I Multi-National Force–Iraq 
MPP mentor-protégé program 
MRC Minority Resource Center 
NAICS North American Industry Classification System 
NAMSA NATO Maintenance Supply Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO nongovernmental organization 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
O senior officer 
OCONUS outside the continental United States 
OCS Operational Contract Support 
OE operational environment 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OHA Office of Hearings and Appeals 
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OPLAN operational plan 
ORCA Online Representations and Certifications Application 
OSBP Office of Small Business Programs 
OSDBU Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 
 xvi 
PIRS Past Performance Information Retrieval System 
PM program manager 
PTAC Procurement Technical Assistance Center 
PVO private voluntary organization 
RCC regional contracting center 
RC-East Regional Command East 
RIP relief in place 
SAM System for Award Management 
SAT simplified acquisition threshold 
SB small business 
SBA Small Business Act/Small Business Administration 
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 
SCO-A Senior Contracting Official−Afghanistan 
SDB small disadvantaged business 
SDVOB service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses 
SIGAR Special Investigator General Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGIR Special Investigator General Iraq Reconstruction 
SOTF special operations task force 
SPOT Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker 
STTR Small Business Technology Transfer Program 
TCN third-country national 
TOA transfer of authority 
TTP tactics, techniques and procedures 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USAF United States Air Force 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USF-I United States Forces–IRAQ 
USFOR-A United States Forces–Afghanistan 
USSF United States Special Forces 
VOSB veteran-owned small businesses 





The author would like to thank his advisors, Maxim Kidalov and CDR Matthew 
Jacobs, for their invaluable guidance and commitment in accomplishing this thesis. 
He would also like to thank Mr. E. Cory Yoder and Brian Hudgens for sharing 
their knowledge of contingency contracting and procurement processes, respectively, 
while providing assistance in the development of a vision and path forward for this thesis. 
The author would also like to thank the following acquisition professionals for 
their patience, sharing their experiences and providing clarity in the area of leadership 
throughout the research period for this thesis: MG (ret.) Darryl Scott, former deputy 
director of Defense Business Transformation Agency and current corporate vice president 
of Contracts and Pricing; The Boeing Company, VA; RDML (ret.) Nicholas Kalathas, 
former deputy director of Contingency Contracting, Washington, DC; MG Camille 
Nichols, commander of the United States Army Installation Management Command 
(IMCOM) at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX; BG Casey Blake, commander at Air 
Force Installation Contracting Agency (AFICA), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Air Force for Acquisition, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; BG Stephen B. Leisenring, 
deputy director of the National Contracting Organization, Directorate of Contracting for 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Washington, DC; and COL Debra 
Daniels, military deputy to the technical director of Edgewood Chemical Biological 
Center (ECBC), joining us by way of VTC from Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 
 xviii 





In 2006, Lieutenant General (LTG) Karl W. Eikenberry was the commander of 
the Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan and at the helm of the U.S.-led effort to 
combat terror and thwart the insurgency in Afghanistan. As a supporter of the Army’s 
new Counterinsurgency Manual, JP 3–24, formed as joint doctrine with the Marine 
Corps, Eikenberry championed the policies captured by General David Petraeus (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013). The counterinsurgency doctrine was meant to quell the terrorist 
stranglehold on Afghanistan and allow prosecution of malfeasant characters. Today, 
Lieutenant General (retired) Eikenberry states that the doctrine failed. 
Charging that the design and application of COIN in Afghanistan was a failure, 
Lieutenant General (retired) Eikenberry has a legitimate claim. His conclusion comes 
from personal experience gained as a facilitator of COIN doctrine. Having worked with 
the commanders of the ground forces during the U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan, 
Eikenberry stated that it was too little too late (Weaser, 2012). In Eikenberry’s June 2012 
interview with Stanford Daily reporter Natasha Weaser, he expressed that an unemotional 
study of the civil-military application of U.S. COIN doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
necessary to tailor the future application of counterinsurgent policy for problems of 
instability in countries and situations that matter (Weaser, 2012). 
This thesis does not challenge his perspective, but proposes that the design and 
implementation of COIN and contracting for effects were a failure. Upon further 
examination, this paper identifies Mentor-Protégé Programs, based on the U.S. Small 
Business Act (SBA) models, as a tool that may have increased the potential of COIN to 
alleviate elements of instability and threats to security that were brought about by the 
military, political and economic COIN operations. The COIN strategy in Afghanistan 
was not a failure, just poorly designed and executed. This challenge to LTG Eikenberry’s 
opinion is one that requires refined discourse. 
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According to a 2013 with a former Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 
(JCC-I/A) commander, LTG Eikenberry was fully vested in a plan to integrate 
contracting activities into the COIN strategy. As the senior combined forces commander, 
he was banking on the assured success of the newly formed counterinsurgency doctrine 
laid out in JP 3–24.  He stated 
[Eikenberry] was already thinking that in order to stabilize the situation, 
he had to be able to demonstrate that progress was not only military and 
diplomatic, but it was also economic, you know, that the lives of ordinary 
Afghans needed to be better for the coalition forces being there. (Personal 
communication with former JCC IA Commander, October 2013) 
In personal communications with the former commander of the JCC-I/A, a senior 
contracting professional said 
I knew that the campaign planners had no real concept of how contracting 
could contribute to a COIN fight in Iraq. The multinational forces 
headquarters, they had inherited a lot of [contracting] missions, but they 
didn’t necessarily see them yet as an integrated part of the COIN strategy. 
As Eikenberry charged the senior contracting commander with establishing an 
Afghan First program, similar to those under Small Business Act used in the U.S., it 
became apparent that the integration of contingency contracting was of the utmost 
importance for his COIN strategy. He was in his sixth week on the job when LTG 
Eikenberry asked him, “Well, why can’t I have an Afghan First program that is kind of a 
set aside similar to small business set aside program?” This statement shows his clear 
understanding of how U.S. funds could help him shape his operational objective. 
Eikenberry served at the highest levels of government, both as a senior military 
leader and diplomatic statesmen. His time as a senior leader in both areas of government 
service was fully immersed in the “War on Terrorism.” LTG Eikenberry gambled that the 
COIN strategy would work. However, in hindsight, Eikenberry’s recollection would be a 
bit more critical of COIN. In a Foreign Affairs journal interview with former Ambassador 
Karl W. Eikenberry in September/October 2013 issue, Eikenberry charges that U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan was a failure. In the article titled “The Limits 
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of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other Side of the COIN,” Eikenberry 
states that the COIN strategy rested on but missed the mark of three crucial assumptions: 
 The COIN goal of protecting the population was clear and attainable and 
would prove decisive. 
 The higher level of foreign assistance and support would substantially 
increase the Afghan government’s capacity and legitimacy. 
 A COIN approach by the United States would be consistent with the 
political-military approach preferred by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.  
Addressing U.S. COIN strategy and its inability to deliver the political, economic 
and social objective, Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry worked hand-in-hand with 
his U.S. military counterparts to include General Patraeus and subordinates to fully 
integrate the counterinsurgency strategy and address not only the military security of 
Afghanistan, but also the political and economic aspects of instability in nation building. 
In order to protect the population, “we would have had to create an accountable 
government with focus on nation building strategies” (Weaser, 2012). His perspective of 
COIN would change as his role shifted from warrior to diplomat. In retrospect, 
Eikenberry qualifies after seven years to provide an epilogue on U.S. investments in 
COIN strategy. Opposed to these three assumptions are basic challenges that threatened 
political, economic and military stability and security of Afghanistan. 
There is a belief that to maximize economic assistance provided to the Afghan 
government, the political goals of participants should have been polarized from the 
inception of the operation, echoing the common theme of countless reports from the 
Special Investigator General Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGIR & SIGAR). 
Marauding Taliban, narcotraffickers, corrupt government officials and local police have 
greatly influenced an unstable mixture of complex tribal ethnic violence in Afghanistan. 
Ambassador Eikenberry saw the delivery of key essential public services, as a 
nationalistic objective, which should have permeated the civil-military agenda, rigidly 
tied to the success of Afghan elected officials. Civil authorities should have been fiscally 
bound and politically ridiculed for failing to achieve improvements in security, 
governance, rule of law, and educational and economic standards. But both at the national 
and regional levels, we failed. 
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B. HISTORY 
Small business is the backbone of our economy, and the United States 
government has made great efforts to expand financial and economic opportunities for 
small and disadvantaged businesses. Simultaneously, efforts by the Department of 
Defense to meet security and stability policy objectives date back to the installment of the 
Marshall Plan in Europe. Domestically and internationally, the socioeconomic 
development programs for small and local business economies have been disconnected. 
The U.S. military and other agencies have tried to use acquisitions, through contracting 
programs, to synchronize six crucial areas: personnel, doctrine, training, policy, practice 
and legal authorities. Through an enhanced understanding of contracting, coordination 
and the utilization of these inherently related areas, experienced acquisition professionals 
are capable of marring current political and economic policy objectives together in order 
to placate the otherwise compounding effects of recent international conflicts. Currently, 
Congress and military leadership mandate that the armed services must be proficient and 
effective at small and local business contracting for the purpose of counterinsurgency, 
stabilization and reconstruction (CSR) in disaster and contingency operations. Without 
equal and adequate emphasis placed on developing proficient personnel, suitable 
doctrine, sufficient training and clear policy that is practiced under legal authority, the 
acquisition professional cannot be expected to accomplish the task of building economic 
security and stability into the foundation of a new nation (Kidalov, 2013). 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the design and effect of the Afghan 
Mentorship Program. Through a three-pronged process involving a literature review of 
COIN and contracting objectives, interviews conducted with senior contracting officials 
and a comparative analysis of five governmental agencies using SBA-like Mentor-
Protégé Programs, it will show the effectiveness of AMP and the impact on security and 
stability in the Bagram area of operations (AO). As an expeditionary Mentor-Protégé 
Program, AMP has the ability to be exported to other contingency contracting 
environments and achieve favorable counterinsurgency effects for the warfighter. 
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In 2009, the Commander of International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) 
and U.S. forces focused the COIN contracting strategy on two objectives, defining COIN 
operations and the attributes of contingency contracting for COIN effects. Since the 
COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance was a new concept, the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) Contracting Commander quarried acquisition professionals within the 
organization to address methods for achieving contracting for effects. The intent was to 
develop a policy of decentralized execution for the improvement of organizational 
knowledge and experience necessary to achieve this new requirement. The Afghan 
Mentorship Program (AMP) was one such method. As an expeditionary Mentor-Protégé 
Program, it has been identified as a way for contingency contracting professional to 
implement contracting into COIN operational objectives. It has certain future applications 
in disaster relief operations, such as Katrina, in the continental United States (CONUS) or 
earthquake recovery in Haiti, outside the continental United States (OCONUS). 
Developed at the Bagram Regional Contracting Center (BRCC) in Afghanistan, 
AMP was a program of five initiatives that operated from January to July of 2011. It was 
focused on promotion and integration of Afghan products, vendor partnering and 
mentorship of local and small businesses. The establishment of vendor tournaments 
expanded competition within the vendor pool, reduced barriers for new vendors to enter 
the market and spurred new Afghan business growth. The AMP program at BRCC 
introduced contingency contracting as one possible avenue to support COIN operational 
objectives. Successfully executed COIN objectives integrated multiple civil-military 
elements and a number of tasks that were required to establish security and stability 
within a country (JCS, 2013). COIN contracting would not be possible without 
establishing its own best practices through application of policy and doctrine. This would 
require intelligent interpretation of the COMISAF COIN guidance and skillful execution 
of ad hoc programs to accomplish its intent. The Afghan Mentor-Protégé Program 
utilized existing resources and human capital to achieve this goal. In its short run, it was 
able to achieve same favorable procurement practices that could be implemented for 
future COIN contracting objectives. 
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The methodology that has been used for this thesis utilizes a three-pronged 
approach to formulate my findings and determination. The first approach used a literature 
review of COIN in order to design and effect contingency contracting best practices. 
Next, interviews were conducted with several senior contracting officials that served in 
positions of high command in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations within 
the CENTCOM areas of responsibility (AOR). The intent of the interviews was to 
capture and compare organizational knowledge and policy guidance at different times 
within the contingency contracting organization. This second-prong approach provided 
the broadest cross section of professional contracting knowledge and tools available to 
the contingency contracting community. Finally, a comparative analysis of Mentor-
Protégé Programs operated by differing government agencies showed alternative methods 
for managing both small and large businesses during contingency operations. 
The first prong of this methodology distills COIN, clear-hold-build operations, 
contingency contracting guidance and their relationships. Next, a review of the 
COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance and the effects that General Petraeus hoped to 
achieve help provide clarity of the numerous momentous tasks, a total of eleven, he 
charged all stakeholder involved in the acquisition process to follow. Finally, the last 
areas of exploration were the problems related to contracting, as defined by several 
published sources. This concludes the literature review. 
The second prong of this methodology to be examined was the organizational 
knowledge and lessons learned from the interviews with seven senior contracting 
officials. Having served within the CENTCOM area of responsibility, each interviewee 
brought a wealth of organizational knowledge and contracting experience, which has 
helped to shape contingency contracting policy and guidance in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Each senior leader brought their own unique mission and set of 
circumstances to the subject directed interviews. Regardless of position in which they 
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served, either in JCC-I/A, CENTCOM Contracting Command or CENTCOM Joint 
Theater Support Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (C-JTSCC I/A), all individuals 
that agreed to participate in the subject directed interviews focused their responses on the 
organizational knowledge, policy and guidance of their respective command. 
The third prong of this methodology was a comparative analysis of existing 
Mentor-Protégé Programs of five governmental organizations. The Small Business 
Administration, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) have utilized MPPs to bolster small business development, build 
economic stability within the U.S. economy and foster small business security CONUS. 
When compared, achievements and drawbacks of the five agency MPPs become 
apparent. 
Each of the three-pronged approaches identified in the methodology develops 
context and enumerates the challenges of the COIN contracting mission. AMP is a viable 
tool to assist the acquisition professional with some of the challenges they may face. 
Developing actionable policy guidance at the leadership levels is crucial to facilitate 
COIN contracting as an operation mission. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Process of Literature Review 
While conducting a literature review of counterinsurgency contracting, it is 
important to understand that research on the subject is limited and will require greater 
attention with academic scrutiny of COIN. A broader approach to COIN and access to 
this premise is the proposition of clear-hold-build. Writings on the subject expound on 
the nature of low-level operations to achieve COIN objectives and the operational and 
tactical effectiveness of contingency contracting support. Also known as an ink spot or 
oil spill tactic, this is just one classic approach to a COIN strategy.  A review of the 
COIN doctrine and the areas in which COIN strategy is used was necessary to determine 
what could be considered effective COIN contracting tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
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Understanding the areas where contingency contracting can be implemented in COIN is 
just as important as assessing how to improve the support of operational objectives. 
The first step of understanding COIN is to comprehend the guidance, policies and 
best practices to achieve the desired effect. Behind the overarching concept of clear-hold-
build is the proactive effort of clearing a contested area through security operations to 
provide stability. Next, by holding that territory, through execution of offensive 
operations in the defense, it is essential to isolate the population from insurgent sway. 
The process of build is the final phase, which involves political, economic, 
developmental and governance-related activities to increase government legitimacy and 
deny insurgent access to the local population. Without access to the people, the 
insurgency loses their link to the people and relevance. With no support in the kinetic 
battle space, insurgents can be defeated. If successful, clear-hold-build allows the 
government to increase the territory under its control. According to the most common 
simile, government control spreads like oil or ink-spots across absorbent paper. The 
insurgents, meanwhile, lose both physical space and their link to the population, without 
which they are gradually rendered irrelevant or are simply defeated. 
During the initial phase of the 2009–2010 surge, efforts were made to implement 
this clear-hold-build tactic. In southeastern Afghanistan, insurgents in key populated 
areas were encouraging to leave by publically announcing prospected offensive 
operations. Next, the U.S. and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) conducted 
continuous operations in those populated and outlying areas in order to deny insurgents 
access to them and prevent their return. Finally, the U.S. and ANSF have taken steps to 
train and increase Afghan security forces, maintain law and order, and allow Afghans to 
build normal lives (Lubold, 2010). For the most part, it worked and the offensive was 
anticlimactic. Insurgents either left or went into hiding as the U.S. and coalition forces 
arrived. This helps to point toward the coalition’s shift from an emphasis on killing 
insurgents to protecting the population. 
Next, by observing COIN contracting guidance from its infancy and following it 
through mature application on the battlefield, it is possible to gain a clear concept of the 
commander’s desired effects by exercising contracting in COIN operations. Lastly, to 
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mitigate risk and improve the integration of COIN contracting into the task force 
commander’s operational vocabulary, its problems must be exposed. As COIN 
contracting is a novel concept, this thesis will be adding to future literary research on the 
subject. 
2. COIN 
By November 2013, the concept of COIN had evolved and matured. Boldly 
entitled, Counterinsurgency, JP 3–24 was a representation of what the Army and Marine 
Corps had learned about COIN over four years. Clear-hold-build had evolved from a 
tactic to implement COIN to one of several approaches to introduce a planned COIN 
strategy. Another thing that had changed was responsibility for development and 
execution. The DOS chief of mission (COM) has now been designated as the lead for 
COIN efforts. Counterinsurgency has become primarily a political struggle incorporating 
a wide range of activities by both the host nation (HN) and the U.S. governments. 
Establishment of security just happens to be one of the more important activities. 
Coordination with the HN government is essential to the success of the COM and when 
operational environments do not favor civilian agency lead, the joint forces commander 
must be conscious of his ability and prepared to lead the unified effort for effective 
COIN. 
3. Clear-Hold-Build 
The concept of clear, hold, build is a counterinsurgency approach that was 
modeled on the Department of the Army 2009 concept for full spectrum operations, as 
seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Full Spectrum Operations (after Department of the Army, 2009). 
Within COIN operations, clear-hold-build is one tactic to achieve the end state of 
counterinsurgency operations, an end state which is that a legitimate HN government can 
deliver effective governance to its populace, whereby eliminating the root causes of 
insurgent activity and precluding or eradicating the insurgency, as a whole. 
A clear-hold-build operation is a full spectrum operation that combines 
offense (finding and eliminating the insurgent), defense (protecting the 
local populace) and stability (rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the 
legitimacy of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the 
area) operations. Each phase—clear, hold, and build—combines offensive, 
defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees. In the clear phase, 
offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive 
operations are emphasized; and in the hold phase stability operations are 
preeminent. (DOA, 2009, p. 17) 
a. Clear 
A tactical mission task, clear is offensive in nature and describes the process and 
action required by a commander to remove all enemy forces from an assigned AOR. This 
can be accomplished by eliminating organized pockets of resistance with force, (killing 
or capturing insurgent combatants) or by forcing opposition forces and leaders to 
withdraw (Department of the Army, 2001). Clear is effective when initiated by 
conducting the tactical tasks patrol, ambush and targeted raids. It can culminate into 
operational tasks, such as cordon-and-search or clear-in-zone missions. Followed by 
defensive and stability operations, the gains that were made through clear operations 
must be maintained so that conditions are set for future activities. The process of 
conducting periodic patrols to deny, identify, disrupt, eliminate or expel insurgents is 
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vital to establishing areas of isolation that secure and protect the population, while cutting 
off external support for escaped insurgents. Security and government forces representing 
the HN authority are employed to kill or capture escaping insurgents and establish 
legitimate rule of law in the eyes of the population. 
b. Hold 
Hold is a defensive task in nature and the most challenging to achieve. It requires 
all lines of effort (LOE) across the operations working in unison to recruit, organize, arm 
and train local security and paramilitary forces before integrating them into operations 
against the insurgents. After the zone is clear of insurgents, COIN forces establish a 
presence in the area of operations by assigning troops to hamper their ability to return. 
Counterinsurgent forces must be adequate in size to secure the local population, defeat 
guerilla forces and not place undue strain on the populace. Ideally, host-nation security 
forces (HNSF) execute operations in support of or as part of the clear-hold-build strategy. 
For the task of hold, security of the population and continuously reestablishing the 
legitimacy of the HN government signifies success. Anything less could be considered a 
defeat. This phase is dependent on defensive operations, although offensive and stability 
objectives are a significant part of the operations. During the hold phase, lines of effort 
include establishment of civil control, support for HNSF, governance support, restoration 
of essential services, economic and infrastructure development, and information 
engagement. 
c. Build 
In the build phase of clear-hold-build operations, programs are designed to 
remove insurgent root causes. The two main objectives are to improve the lives of the 
people and strengthen the governance of the host nation. Stability operations dominate 
this phase, with many vital activities organized and conducted by nonmilitary authorities. 
Building support for the HN government is in progress and requires protecting the local 
population. Host nation security forces and other governmental agencies assume the 
primary responsibility of security during this phase. As insurgent intimidation, coercion 
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and reprisals risk undermining support for counterinsurgent efforts; it is crucial that the 
populace believe they are secure. 
The concept of clear-hold-build as a tenet of COIN took hold in Field Manual 
(FM) 3–24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Entitled Foundations of Counterinsurgency, 
Chapter 3, Section IV, identifies clear-hold-build operations as a foundational prime to 
counterinsurgency fundamentals. The 3–24 culminates on clear-hold-build in Chapter 5, 
Section I, Offensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency, where clear-hold-build 
operations encompass offensive applications. By Chapter 7, Stability Operations 
Considerations in Counterinsurgency, clear-hold-build operations have morphed into 
actions that support the civil-military objectives of security, control and stability for the 
establishment of legitimate governance. Even as the framework of clear-hold-build has 
varying methods of implementation, it also has varying periods of application. To 
understand these periods, an analysis of each phase within COIN must be made (DOA, 
2009). 
4. Phase Zero Contracting Operations 
a. Phases of Notional Operational Planning 
Exercising the Yoder, Nix and Long model of Strategic and Integrative Planning 
for Contingency and Expeditionary Operations, as seen in Figure 2, this section will 
discuss the phases of COIN and identify the importance of contingency contracting. 
Contracting in an expeditionary environment has been a support function, which military 
operations have depended on since the civil war. With each successive conflict, the 
importance of contracting has increased proportionately. Treated as an auxiliary support 
capability, contracting has served as an afterthought, never fully developed as a part of 
the strategic and operational planning process. Often, units have been in the process of 
executing vital missions when tactical requirements surface. For protracted engagements, 
such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, self-sustainment considerations were secondary 
as operational requirements for basic services were overlooked. A rush to have 
contracting fill the operational support void creates underlining issues like fraud, waste 
and abuse. 
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The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (COWCIA), 
the SIGIR and SIGAR, Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) have published reports on fraud, waste and abuse, identifying the 
end result of poor oversight. Many elementary services that were once part of organized 
capabilities are ineffective as a result of inadequately managed government contracts. An 
absence of sound planning and effective contract integration has resulted in numerous 
failures investigated by the government. Participants executing sound contract integration 
and planning must take efforts to assimilate contracting at all levels. Yoder, Long and 
Nix provide a core capability review to assist with this requirement. 
Phase Zero, generally known in Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) 
planning arenas as the shaping phase, is adopted by the Operational Contract Support 
(OCS) community as the planning and exercising phase. Traditional military jargon 
defines Phase Zero as shaping. Phase Zero contracting in the integrative strategic 
planning arena is the advance planning, exercising and rehearsal of robust contracting 
support plans designed to complement the GCC’s deliberate contingency planning 
process. Realistically, the contracting community and the warfighter have the same vision 
for Phase Zero—get the plans in place, rehearse, validate and update them to reflect 
current realities (Yoder, Long, & Nix 2013). 
Phase I (Deter) includes activities that demonstrate “joint force capabilities and 
resolve” in response to an adversary’s undesirable actions. Actions include preparation 
for deployment, deployment and shows of force designed to influence an adversary’s 
decision-making process (Yoder et al., 2013). 
Phase II (Seize Initiative) begins the “application of appropriate joint force 
capabilities” to “delay, impede or halt an adversary’s initial aggression.” This phase sets 
the conditions for the successful implementation of Phase III (Dominate) (Yoder et al., 
2013). 
Phase III includes actions designed to “break the enemy’s will… or, in noncombat 
operations, to control the operational environment” (Yoder et al., 2013). 
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Phase IV (Stabilize) is “required when there is no fully functional legitimate civil 
governing authority” and joint forces must perform limited local governance and other 
activities to allow for a restoration of stability and a return to normalcy. This phase may 
require joint force cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations or other civilian agencies (Yoder et al., 2013). 
Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) includes the provision of “joint force support to 
legitimate civil governance” in theater as well as assistance with the provision of 
essential services to local populations. It usually includes redeployment operations, 
especially of combat forces, as well as the planning for transition back to Phase Zero or 
steady-state operations (Yoder et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of Notional Operation Plan Phases 
(after Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) 
Reaching the end state for COIN requires the conduct of a wide array of 
operations over a protracted period. Consequently, the planning of COIN operations 
normally provides for related phases implemented over the same time. Phases are not 
linear and do not represent a clear-cut distinction in reality. Phasing is intended to help 
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commanders visualize and think through their COIN operations. In order to accomplish 
this, they must define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space and purpose. 
The primary benefit of phasing is it assists in systematically achieving objectives that 
cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical 
sequence. Phases should represent natural subdivisions of the campaign or intermediate 
operational objectives. To distinguish shifts in focus, transitions between phases are 
designed to be triggered by the counterinsurgent force, often accompanying changes in 
command relationships. 
b. Strategic and Integrative Planning for Contingency and Expeditionary 
Operations 
Expeditionary contracting is not new, but the extent to which military operations 
depend on contracting has increased in scope and magnitude. Contracting has not been 
fully integrated into the Department of Defense planning and execution process. The 
military depends on contracting for many of the elementary services that were once 
considered self-sustaining. It is the absence of effective contract planning and integration 
of sound accountability practices that is displayed in numerous external reports extolling 
the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of government contracting. Quarterly and annual 
reports by SIGIR and SIGAR, GAO, CRS and COWCIA have identified fraud, waste and 
abuse as a result of shortcomings in oversight. However, Yoder, Long and Nix use Figure 
3 (Yoder, 2013) to identify some strides that have been made to assimilate contracting at 
the strategic level. 
Still, according to the final report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011), the DoD lacks a program for developing a core 
“comprehensive planning and execution capability” (Yoder et al., 2013). As the focus of 
the 2011 COWCIA report, outright fraud of the executing participants was the result of a 
lack of planning and sound contract integration. This loss of efficiency and lack of 




Figure 3.  Warfighter Notional Operational Plan Phases (from Yoder et al., 2013) 
5. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance 
In September 2010, Commander, International Security Assistance Force and 
United States Forces-Afghanistan, General David H. Petraeus, issued his COMISAF 
COIN Contracting Guidance for commanders. In it, Petraeus identifies the purchases 
made for construction, goods and services as a dual function road. First, contingency 
contracting is a road to Afghan prosperity, bolstering economic growth, stability, and 
goodwill toward the Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). The contracts that are awarded to Afghan firms generate Afghan employment, 
and assist in the development of a sustainable Afghan economy for goods and services. 
Second, they are part of a road that leads us home, as success and prosperity for the 
Afghan people bridge the completion of our mission. However, contracting with 
powerbrokers who exclude individuals “outside their narrow patronage networks or are 
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perceived as funneling resources to one community at the expense of another” has a 
negative effect on the Afghan perception and hinders our efforts and our mission 
(Petraeus, 2010). 
As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) heads of state and governments 
gathered at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 agreed to rationalize the functions and 
programs within the NATO agencies and consolidate them, Gen. Petraeus charged his 
subordinate unit commanders to make contracting “commander’s business.” In response 
to troop swells and increased unit rotational needs, CENTCOM contracting centers 
throughout Afghanistan were inundated with new and previously invalidated contracting 
requirements. It seemed that the counterinsurgency contracting guidance fell on deaf ears 
as regional contracting centers (RCCs) shifted into overdrive, writing and awarding 
contracts. 
The COMISAF’s COIN guidance placed the responsibility of achieving eleven 
tasks on the shoulders of the task force and unit commanders. With the assistance of 
contingency contracting professionals, regional commands were to implement COIN 
contracting to shape combat operations. Activities were now directed to make contracting 
commander’s business, because our lives depend on it. Those tasks were spelled out in 
this order (Petraeus, 2010): 
 Understand the role of contracting in counterinsurgency. 
 Hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products and build Afghan capacity 
(Potentially influenced by 886). 
 Know whom you are buying from. 
 Exercise responsible contracting practices. 
 Integrate contracting into intelligence, plans and operations. 
 Consult and involve local leaders. 
 Develop new partnerships. 
 Look beyond cost, schedule and performance. 
 Invest in oversight and enforce contract requirements. 
 Act—Make this a priority now. 
 Get the word out—Tell your success stories to all that will listen. 
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6. COIN Guidance Effects 
Counterinsurgency operations and contingency contracting intersect at the 
unbalanced, intersection of our wants versus our needs. From the prospective of the 
contracting officer, the tactical unit commander on the ground is placed in situations of 
intensity where a sense of urgency transforms every want into an absolute need. For the 
operational command, focused on the strategic objective of the theater commander or 
COCOM, the sky is the limit in terms of what it is willing to approve as a need for the 
warfighter on the ground. To truly understand the impact of the COMISAF guidance 
placed on commanders and CCOs, it is necessary to contextualize contingency 
contracting as counterinsurgency operations will drive needs requirements.  
Many OCONUS contingency operations occur in countries with underdeveloped 
economies, little to no vendor base and are filled with individuals who may not be 
conducive to a U.S. or multinational presence. This is to be expected and planned for in 
order to mitigate the risk of conducting business with nefarious individuals. Often, the 
CCO is presented with the challenge of finding or developing a vendor base to support 
the operational needs of U.S. forces. Without a clear pool of small businesses to contract 
and conduct business with, the CCO is forced to look outside of the local economy in 
order to build support and capacity. Developing a reliable vendor base in the regional 
location of needed support becomes an objective itself. If local businesses do exist in a 
region of operation, most are often ill-equipped to meet the demands of operational units. 
As each unit deploys with some form of organic support capability, not all units 
are created equal. Based upon each unit’s mission, equipment, personnel or troops count, 
operational terrain/environment and time expected to accomplish that mission, the 
standard operational support requirement will vary from unit to unit. 
In a hostile, sometimes dangerous, and mostly austere environment, any 
additional threat or escalation of force protection within that environment could upset a 
tenuous balance and increase the likelihood of failure for contracted support. It suffices to 
say that the contracting of logistical supply and service support can be extremely crucial 
to a unit’s operational success. The cost of that contracted support can exuberant in 
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proportion to the austerity and hostility with in the region of operation. Any increase in 
the number of personnel or units most be factored into the support cost equation. 
Commanders must be aware that as they attempt to execute the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) or other projects within the COIN contracting guidance, 
utilizing the Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) handbook in Afghanistan, an 
unknown number of resourced requiring activities competing for the finite resources will 
simultaneously drive up the value and subsequent cost of those resources. 
Afghanistan has presented many of the same challenges as other areas in which 
we conduct contingency and emergency operations, in terms of crime and corruption. In 
an atmosphere fraught with power players, one can almost expect to be confronted with 
individuals requiring patronage in the form of bribes and kickbacks. Extortion and 
criminal intimidation are also forms of corruption encountered on a regular occurrence. 
In a January 6, 2011, Washington Post article, entitled “Corrupt leaders trump Taliban,” 
Pamela Constable chronicles the rise and repatriation of Ghulam Haider Hamidi. A 
Northern Virginia accountant, born in Afghanistan, left more than 30 years ago after the 
communist revolution and Soviet invasion. 
After raising a family, seven children and 14 grandchildren, and at the nudging of 
his oldest daughter, he returned to Afghanistan to become mayor of his native city in 
southern Afghanistan. Hamidi, “a personable and loquacious man of 63,” has been 
criticized as a facilitator of corruption by former Kandahar businessman, Naseem Sharifi, 
now living in California. Hamidi is “a man of several faces,” states Sharifi (Constable, 
2011). He maintains that the mayor is against those warlords who jeopardize the profits 
of the bigger warlords. While Hamidi fails to rebuke his detractors, he does, however, 
counter with the statement that “the Taliban put their bombs, but more than 50 percent of 
the violence comes from these corrupt people, the ones who sit with you and smile.” He 
is convinced that he is doing a good job as mayor, stating, “I may have made 50 or 100 
enemies, but I am making 800,000 people happy.” As has been conspicuously mentioned 
in passing, Hamidi is a childhood friend of the Karzai family. Although he governs in the 
region, he does not dare to openly walk the streets. The influence of Taliban and its 
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leadership may be more violent and vocal. Tribal council elders, members of national and 
local politico and foreign business interests are no less cutthroat. 
7. Problems from COIN 
The problem that has arisen from the COIN contracting guidance is that 
commanders fail to differentiate between operation conflict and operational crisis. By 
default, all requirements became necessary to counter the ensuing operational crisis. Prior 
to the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance, commanders were forced to rely on the 
experience and guidance of contracting activities. Regardless of footprint size, the 
executers stayed within the scale, scope and magnitude of their operational proficiencies. 
The COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance, in essence, tasked commanders to create an 
internal mechanism for channeling their contracting requirements. 
Combatant commanders took it as a blank check to develop their own contracting 
organizations. The identification of stakeholders, validation of procurement requirements 
and assessment of contracting methodologies were all areas strongly encouraged by the 
regional and theater contracting authorities. However, the “knee-jerk reaction” resulted in 
coercive influence over contracting authorities throughout Afghanistan. This influence 
was extremely disruptive and often resulted in the execution of unnecessary steps during 
the contracting process. Outside of their lanes, commanders inadvertently created 
competition among their subordinate units for resources. Battalion and company 
commanders worked to find alternative resources, creating a black market of suppliers, 
increasing numbers of unauthorized commitments and lengthening contracting award 
times, as contingency contracting officers worked overtime to undo the mess made as a 
response to the guidance. The buzzword was Afghan first, and the practice of infusing the 
local economies was implemented at every level. There was a blatant disregard for the 
charge of knowing who we were buying from and exercising responsible contracting 
practices that integrate contracting into the intelligence, plans and operations of units 
being supported. We saw the need and took charge, through centralized policy and 
decentralized execution, developing programs improving the effects of contracting for the 
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warfighter. One such model of success was the Afghan Mentorship Program. This thesis 
will answer three key questions: 
 What should be the place of the Mentor-Protégé Program in COIN 
contracting doctrine? 
 What are the forms of Mentor-Protégé Program that exist? 
 Was AMP effective in achieving the COIN objectives, establishing 
doctrine and best practices? 
C. INTERVIEWS 
Subject directed interviews with former JCC IA, current CENTCOM Contracting 
leadership and personnel provides an indication of the knowledge and implementation of 
contingency contracting policy and programs with a positive impact on 
counterinsurgency operations. Eight senior leaders who have served in some capacity 
have been interviewed using a list of eight questions to determine a general consensus of 
organizational policy and institutional knowledge relative to Mentor-Protégé Programs 
and the effectiveness to COIN contracting practices. 
All interviewees were provided with a copy of the proposed questions below. The 
purpose of providing a proposed list of questions was to allow for pre-interview 
screening, as well as provide the senior leaders with an opportunity to earmark or 
highlight specific questions of interest. The intent of the pre-interview list is to re-
establish, in many cases, a comfortable level of familiarity with the proposed topics of the 
interview, as many of the leaders have not served within the CENTCOM organization for 
several years. 
The key positions of leadership that were requested and granted interviews for 
this thesis were the CENTCOM Contracting Commander, the Deputy Commander, the 
Senior Contracting Official—Iraq, the Senior Contracting Official—Afghanistan and 
other senior civilian contracting officials. The nature of the information collected does 
not contain human studies research and has been deemed cleared by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Institution Review Board (IRB). The identities of all 
interviewees have been de-identified for the purpose of ensuring that data collected for 
this thesis remains strictly organizational. 
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1. Interview Selection Process 
a. Selection Criteria 
All interviewees were selected among senior contracting leadership based on the 
leader’s previous or current position of authority to develop and implement contracting 
policy, provide guidance within the COCOM’s theater of operation and overall 
contracting command authority. For the purpose of ensuring continuity of institutional 
knowledge and situational awareness, all interviewees selected were regionally aligned 
with CENTCOM. Having served in this COCOM, the interviewee may have served with 
the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan, CENTCOM Contracting Command or 
Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. 
Crucial to their selection was their understanding of the organizational 
knowledge, their individual level of contracting experience and previous policy 
implementation. Some positions and criteria were not considered as key factors for the 
selection of certain interviewees. Factors not considered were regionalized command 
relationships with combatant commands, United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) 
and International Security Assistance Force tenant units’ manning strengths and logistical 
footprints, previous theater specific knowledge and the timing of surge troops to theater. 
All are extremely important factors, but consideration may have had an unsatisfactory 
influence on the implementation and execution of organizational contracting policy. 
The IRB has determined that, based on the focus of this thesis, the research 
questions listed below are organizational knowledge- and policy-centric, and do not 
constitute from human subject research. The nature of the research questions is grounded 
in the practices of CENTCOM Contracting Command and the organization policies that 
formulated its organizational culture. This is something that cannot be attributed to one 
single command or individual within the organization. 
There were eight senior military contracting leaders selected for interview for 
their organizational knowledge, contracting guidance and policy authority. Six elected to 
participate. Four civilian acquisition professionals were also selected for interview. There 
 24 
were no responses from the civilian personnel selected for interview. All acquisition 
professionals interviewed served in the designated time period of 2006–2012. 
2. Key Positions 
For the purpose of forming a more congruent prospective of the organizational 
knowledge and policy guidance pervasive with the command, only key positions within 
the contracting organizations were solicited for interview. These positions are as follows: 
 Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan Commander 
 CENTCOM Contracting Commander 
 Senior Contracting Official Iraq/Afghanistan 
 Multi-National Command Afghanistan 
3. Interview Questions 
In an effort to identify the relative knowledge and understanding of Mentor-
Protégé Programs and their benefits and drawbacks, all questions were either 
organizational or policy centric. There was a conscious decision to use a subject directed 
method, whereby, the interviewer and subject utilize a formal list of questions, as a 
context for the interview; however, the subject is provided adequate latitude to expand 
the discussion. In this case, the eight questions used are listed below. 
 What is the organizational command structure of CENTCOM Contracting 
in Afghanistan? 
 How did CENTCOM Contracting apply the COMISAF 
Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance, dated 08 SEP 2010? 
 What positions within the organization of CENTCOM Contracting 
assisted in the development of the contingency contracting policy in 
Afghanistan? Was it AOR specific? 
 What tools or models existed within the organization to implement the 
policy? 
 What priorities did CENTCOM Contracting give to mentor-protégé 
models? 
 What was the CENTCOM Contracting Command plan to achieve 
implementation of the 886 policy? 
 What were the criteria used by the organization to measure the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the COMISAF guidance? 
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 How do the 886 policy and the mentor-protégé model benefit the 
warfighter? 
4. Summary of Interviews 
a. Purpose 
The purpose of this summary is to achieve a consolidation of COIN contracting 
knowledge, organizational knowledge, and policy and guidance executed by contracting 
professionals in Afghanistan. The summary of interviews is a general assessment of the 
organizational knowledge and operational experience of acquisition professionals 
executing contingency contracting support in the CENTCOM Contracting Command 
AOR. This summary focused on the eight, previously mentioned, organizational and 
policy based questions. Subjected directed interviews were conducted with six senior 
military contracting leaders that may have served with JCC-I/A, CENTCOM Contracting 
Command, CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) or 
other contingency contracting commands in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2012. The 
interview questions were developed to create a common operating picture. As a 
consolidated contracting organization with multiple acquisition levels, it was necessary to 
encourage the interviewees to respond to all eight questions. Each interview was a 
subject-directed forum where the interviewee was allowed to interoperate, select and 
respond to any of the eight organizational questions. Some quotes have been taken from 
the interviews as examples of general responses to the questions. All six interviews had 
minor deviations from the interview’s original questions. During the interviews, however, 
the deviances frequently benefited the interview process. 
b. Interview Questions and Responses 
(1) What is the organizational command structure of CENTCOM Contracting 
in Afghanistan? The general organizational command structure of JCC-I/A, CENTCOM 
Contracting and C-JTSCC in Afghanistan were in a constant state of flux. The way that 
the contingency contracting organization was structured was in direct relation to the 
phases of war and the operational support during that phase. In the early part of the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the JCC-I/A commander changed the organizations structure 
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four times from 2006 to 2008 in order to facilitate contracting support as the mission of 
ISAF and the combatant commander’s objectives. In some cases, contracting authorities 
were embedded with combat brigade and division staffs. The co-location of five regional 
contracting offices within the regional task force commanders’ areas of operations would 
result in a realignment of effects-based contracting, need over want. Due to the volume 
and complexity of missions tasked to the required activities, commanders relied on an 
infusion of CERP funded projects to win the hearts and minds of the people. 
By 2009, application of the Money as a Weapon System–Afghanistan (MAAWS-
A), as a guide for effects-based contracting, had become a successful tool with 
commanders. Capable of spending up to $500K on each CERP project without 
contracting officer oversight, the two common measures of effectiveness for the program 
were the number of projects funded and the value of total dollars paid through CERP. 
Unit commanders had limited oversight of those projects. In some cases the DoD was 
funding insurgent activities. The CENTCOM Contracting Commander was successful in 
growing the organization to 14 contracting offices in Afghanistan, tackling quantity and 
complexity issues. By August 2010, required activities were demanding their own 
contracting officers and CENTCOM had 17 contracting offices around Afghanistan. Each 
subsequent commander reorganized the structure of CENTCOM Contracting Command 
or the prioritization of contracting activities. As with all wars, the troops on the ground 
dictate the support necessities. The priority of contracting support was frequently driven 
by the regional command and the phase of operation its warfighters were currently in. 
Flexibility and reorganization was an ongoing requirement. 
[W]e went from 13 Regional Contracting Centers to 4 major centers with 
subordinate offices, again, to organize that ANSF—the International 
Security Assistance Force and ANSF organizational structure as they were 
drawing down and moving and also [to] provide that economy of scale so 
we were operating more like we would operate in steady state. The other 
thing we did, as I mentioned, was we also put advisors out at the Afghan 
National Army corps where these regional contracting centers existed to 
allow that interface and [to] train, advise and assist methodology between 
us and them. 
I reorganized a C-JTSCC cell that was focused on buying commodities to 
support, you know, large-scale requirements from U.S. forces to 
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integrating that commodity cell into a general support-contracting cell that 
was focused on not only commodities for U.S. forces, but also those 
commodities requirements that we were executing in support of the ANSF 
transition. (Personal communication with former C-JTSCC Commander, 
November 2013) 
(2) How did CENTCOM Contracting apply the COMISAF 
Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance, dated 08 SEP 2010? Application of the 
COMISAF Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance dated 08 SEP 2010 by the 
CENTCOM Contracting Command was direct and centralized. The regional contracting 
centers—decentralized—were able to execute within the intent of the COIN contracting 
guidance. Two issues that ran concurrent and amplified the short comings of ad hoc 
contracting support during the operational and sustainment phases of war in Afghanistan 
were 1) the minimal level certification and experience of contracting officers (KOs) and 
2) a lack of continuity due to so many one year tours. As noted by one senior contracting 
official, we had been contracting in Afghanistan for one year, eleven different times. 
Each interview took some corrective action to screen for certified contracting personnel. 
An inability to marry personnel and position resulted in creating methods that would later 
be developed by CENTCOM Contracting to achieve the new COMISAF COIN 
contracting objectives. 
General McChrystal, trying to get his priorities—he absolutely understood 
the power of our purse and how purchasing power could help him make 
some of his goals. (Personal communication with former CENTCOM 
Contracting Commander, October 2013) 
General Petraeus was facilitating me starting that command under 
CENTCOM’s flag versus USF-I’s flag. He picked right up on the initiative 
that General McChrystal had started and so I wrote the CENTCOM–COIN 
guidance for General Petraeus. (Personal communication with former 
CENTCOM Contracting Commander, October 2013) 
(3) What positions within the organization of CENTCOM Contracting 
assisted in the development of the contingency contracting policy in Afghanistan? Was it 
AOR specific? Within CENTCOM Contracting, the commander development 
contingency contracting policies in Afghanistan were similar to those used in Iraq. The 
problem is that Iraq had a more robust vendor pool. The business market was mature and 
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companies were capable of delivery. Section 886, in the Afghan First Policy, was 
implemented into contract solicitations to encourage and build small business capacity in 
Afghanistan. Host nation businesses would be given a “leg-up” on foreign and third-
country nation businesses. Section 886 in Iraq, given the developed nature of business 
organization, was a success. In the task force commander’s AOR, the Iraqi First Policy 
was met with open arms, good success and great enthusiasm. In Afghanistan, location, 
security, tribal affiliation and many other factors can affect the success of commander’s 
guidance. 
[B]ecause we had certain authorities—wartime contracting authorities and 
the support of the major commanders and the ability to tailor solutions, I 
think all of that came together to allow a guy like (LtCol) Chris (Maine) 
and yourself (Maj Walter H. Dunn) to shape a program that got at the 
intent and goals of the Afghan government in support of the (00:10:51) 
senior mission commander. (Personal communication with former 
CENTCOM Contracting Commander October 2013) 
(4) What tools or models existed within the organization to implement the 
policy? As indicated earlier, much of the in-country guidance was ad hoc, issued by the 
C3 commander or from the Senior Contracting Official in Afghanistan (SCO-A). 
CENTCOM Contracting Command posted a contracting officers’ toolbox on the C3 
restricted website. As for any one of the interviewees having experience dealing with 
COIN, inquiries as whether subjects had knowledge of what tools or models existed 
within the organization to implement the policy were met with a resounding “no.” Until 
September 2010, COIN and contracting were strangers. After the issuance of the 
COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance, effects-based contingency contracts would 
remain to this day embedded with COIN. There in were no SBA-like Mentor-Protégé 
Programs being administered and NATO Maintenance Supply Agency programs could 
not cross-pollinate. 
(5) What priorities did CENTCOM Contracting give to mentor-protégé 
models? The notion of a mentor-protégé model was a concern to CENTCOM Contracting 
Command and Mentor-Protégé Programs began to receive priority during the time frame 
of 2010–2012. According to the results of the interviews, mentor-protégé models were 
and afterthought. It was the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance and the task to make 
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it the contracting commanders business when it became a priority. Some of the comments 
with former contracting leaders denote that priority. 
I gave priority to creative, innovative approaches to meeting the intent of 
the COMISAF policy. I wouldn’t say that I mandated that every office 
have a Mentor-Protégé Program. Every office had to have a program 
where we were actually expanding our vendor-base and maturing that 
vendor-base; I’d say mentor-protégé was just one approach to doing it. 
I mean, that was really the initiative (mentor-protégé) so they could have 
longer-term partners and develop people that they could be—what would 
be reasonable. There was some effort we did in LOGCAP (Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program) which is not quite the same, but in LOGCAP we, 
um, did pay a KBR in Iraq and Fluor in Afghanistan, to run training skills 
program[s] for small companies, so we were obviously paying their costs 
because it was a cost contract and we were, at the time that I left—we just 
didn’t get that matured very far, it was very, very difficult to modify that. 
So those are ideas that we think we could have put in place to try to use 
LOGCAP; to get off of LOGCAP was my other goal that I was working 
very hard. (Personal communication with former CENTCOM Contracting 
Commander, October 2013) 
[W]e had to do briefings to General Allen, the COMISAF. I had an Army 
one-star who’d worked over on the ISAF side and we collaborated weekly 
on how we were developing Afghan capacity and that involved the 
mentor-protégé and I called out the Afghan National Trucking—that was a 
big piece of that, but more intimately through the Afghan Business 
Advisors that were hiring to bring into those respective RCCs. (Personal 
communication with former SCO-A, October 2013) 
A mentor-protégé construct, that only works if you go into it with the idea 
that we’re going to do things differently, not the way we’ve always done 
them. 
[T]his great stuff of mentor-protégé and helping the Afghans become great 
businesses and all that and doing all these great things—while all you guys 
were working all these projects in Afghanistan, I was working just as hard 
trying to get you the right people out of Iraq who had construction 
contracting capabilities that aren’t going to be needed anymore because 
they aren’t doing anything else in Iraq and send them to Afghanistan. 
[I]t’s very tough to create a good Mentor-Protégé Program when you have 
protégés that are really—they’re fronts for somebody who has figured out 
how to make money off the system. Corruption is such an integral part of 
the Afghan business climate and the climate in most third world 
countries—business climate—corruption and paying people off is always 
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there. (Personal communication with former CENTCOM Contracting 
Commander, November 2013) 
Their role was going to help really facilitate better implementation of that 
program through outreach, obviously, and education of more vendors so 
we could do a wider swath. So, again, I–I, um, I don’t know—nobody else 
was doing it to the extent that you were doing it, but we were 
implementing elements in the COMISAF guidance because that was how I 
was trying to operate the command. (Personal communication with former 
CENTCOM Contracting Commander, October 2013) 
(6) What was the CENTCOM Contracting Command plan to achieve 
implementation of the 886 policy? The CENTCOM Contracting Command’s plan to 
implement the Afghan First 886 set-aside policy progressively changed as the contracting 
support situation changed in Afghanistan. Initially, the practice was to award as many 
contracts to Afghan-owned businesses as possible. The restrictions on its implementation 
were contained in the definition of the policy itself. As the command leadership changed, 
new interpretations and greater constraint of the policy were implemented. According to 
886, an Afghan-owned business had to be 51% Afghan owned, must mine. Some 
contracting officers many foreign-owned businesses were using Afghan-owned 
businesses as fronts to win set-aside contracting under 886. As new leadership toiled to 
correct these problems, revisions of the 886 Policy were inevitable. The general 
conclusion is that with each organizations shift, CENTCOM Contracting made a 
concerted effort to prioritize use of the 886 policy. 
So when they set up Task Force 2010 in late ’10, 2010, one of the 
indicators was how successful were we at neutralizing the CPNs and 
isolating them and any nefarious characters. So that was one—that was 
one measurement [to] neutralize the bad guys; isolate them while 
developing the Afghans who really wanted to work hard for a better 
Afghanistan. So one of the things we, we would do was we would—we 
would break out individual commodities like, “how much under Afghan 
First were we going in terms of—of services? How were we doing with 
commodities? How many Afghan—under 886 it had to be mined, 
manufactured and developed in Afghanistan and serviced by Afghanistan. 
It couldn’t be an ex-pat coming in that said, from England, for example, 
and said, “I’m going to hire all Afghans to do it.” That didn’t meet the 
letter and intent of 886, it had to be mined, manufactured or produced in 
Afghanistan. (Personal communication with former SCO-A, October 
2013) 
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We used to have something like that in the language in defining an Afghan 
company under 886, but it got taken out while I was over there. (Personal 
communication with former C-JTSCC Commander, November 2013) 
(7) What were the criteria used by the organization to measure the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the COMISAF guidance? There was limited 
investment in the development of measureable criteria for how well the organization 
implemented the COMISAF COIN contracting guidance. The greater challenge for 
regional contracting commanders was decoding the centralized guidance while figuring 
out how to execute the intent or spirit of the guidance, in a decentralized manner without 
additional resources. Evaluation of the implementation was a bridge that was uncrossed. 
In February of 2011, the Bagram Regional Contracting Center COIN contracting officer 
engaged the CENTCOM Contracting commander, BG Nichols and BG Phipps, Deputy 
Commanding General for Support (DCGS) for TF 101st with a solution. In addition to 
defining the criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the AMP program, the BRCC 
COIN contracting officer identified the intelligence value of the program as a data 
collection tool for personal and professional performance. AMP was a force multiplier 
capable of delivering relevant financial information on all Afghan-owned businesses, 
creating traceable fiscal transparency. The utility of having the ability to catch insurgent 
financiers became the primary measure of effectiveness, rather than trying to measure the 
implementation of a policy. 
Alright, so the same question, um, the Counterinsurgent Contracting 
Guidance? We really were responsible for helping put together the Annex 
on this and how we were going to actually employ the Commander’s 
intent for counterinsurgency, but counterinsurgency involved more than 
just not doing business with bad guys or nefarious characters or folks who 
were aligned with corruption patronage networks that were funding the 
Taliban. So Task-Force 2010, I don’t know if you’re familiar with them. 
But that was the economic intelligence piece that worked very, very 
closely with us as well as the classic intelligence G2 or J2 operations there 
in theater and even in the rear at CENTCOM and this was really, really 
different. This was actually a real force multiplier for us because we 
wanted to make sure we were doing business with the right contractors, 
the right Afghans—the Afghans that were very much interested in 
developing their country because, unlike Iraq where we were 
reconstructing Iraq—and I had two tours in Iraq, Afghanistan it as starting 
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from scratch and we had an illiteracy rate of about 70%. It was probably, 
you know, in the bottom 5% of all nations globally in terms of its 
economic prowess and rate of literacy. So we were dealing with this—this 
was not an easy task because we had to convince them, through our 
counterinsurgency, that we were there for their best interests. We were 
there to develop Afghan business, which we did about 70% of all of our 
awards for services and for commodities and for minor works construction 
went to Afghans under the Afghan First Policy. (Personal communication 
with former SCO-A, October 2013) 
CERP—while it doesn’t fall under the FAR—it is bound by the statutory 
construct that prohibits it from being spent on U.S. forces. That’s bound 
more in that manner than it is through the NATO conventions. CERP was 
a U.S. fund—is a U.S. fund—given to the commander to affect the COIN 
guidance and the COIN outcomes. So, the regulatory binding of how 
CERP was executed came from the MAAWS-A, Money as a Weapon 
System manual, as well as the COMISAF COIN Guidance. One of the 
things that we put into the MAAWS-A in its revision was our C-JTSCC 
capacity to oversee that and to limit it. (Personal communication with 
former C-JTSCC Commander, November 2013) 
(8) How do the 886 policy and the mentor-protégé model benefit the 
warfighter? The Afghan First 886 policy and mentor-protégé model were a significant 
benefit to the warfighter, according to four of the six senior contracting leaders 
interviewed. The benefits were passed on the warfighter in the form of reductions in the 
cost of goods and services, better quality of service and decreased delivery time. The 886 
set-aside assisted the local economy with needed economic consideration, infusing 
increased business interest and opportunity by looking beyond cost, delivery and 
schedule. The mentor-protégé model fostered business opportunities that allowed many 
of its struggling participants to gain a foothold in a highly competitive market. By 
reducing the contract award time, shortening the delivery time of goods and services, and 
expanding the local vendor pool, the cost to the government was reduced. However, the 
consolidated answer is that more knowledge and training needs to be conducted on U.S. 
based mentor-protégé models to impress the thought of MPPs in the minds of acquisition 
professionals. 
So we were maturing companies for enduring through the money and 
project. We were improving the infrastructure and those were the other 
non-kinetic mission sets that were given and also the hope that through the 
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money—our purchasing power—that we were actually reducing kinetic. 
That was sort of tangential, there’s so many things that would go into that, 
it would be hard to say, “how much did our Mentor-Protégé Program, how 
much did COIN contracting affect that?” (Personal communication with 
former CENTCOM Contracting Commander, October 2013) 
But if you really want to do it right in the future, if you really want to take 
the best of that mentor-protégé in the United States and try to apply it in a 
third-world country in a contingent operation, you do so at your own peril 
unless you really have command backing at the very highest level. 
(Personal communication with former CENTCOM Contracting 
Commander, November 2013) 
The mentor-protégé process was less about contracting, broadening the 
Afghan vendor base and doing better business with better people than it 
was about working with Afghan advisors at different ministry levels to 
develop their capacity to take over the contracting requirements to support 
[the] ANA (Afghan National Army) and [the] ANP (Afghan National 
Police) as we transition the stability and security of battle space to the 
Afghan forces. (Personal communication with MNCA official, October 
2013) 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Small Business Development Programs–CONUS 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 19 provides guidance to the 
acquisition professional regarding best practices and how to contract with small business. 
This section gives contracting officers suggestive guidance on best practices for 
acquisitions when dealing with small businesses. One of the most commonly used 
practices is the development of mentoring programs, which help contracting 
professionals and small businesses provide operational contracting support for many 
governmental agencies. For the purpose of this thesis, the comparative analysis will 
analyze the Mentor-Protégé Programs of the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 
Development, and Department of Homeland Security. Relatively restricted by the FAR, 
these agencies and their acquisition professionals are given great latitude during times of 
emergency. 
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In the case of disaster and humanitarian relief operations like hurricanes, floods 
and earthquakes, based on geographic location and whether the President declares the 
operation a contingency, the FAR guidance becomes quite liberal. The rules guiding 
whom the government can contract with and what can be purchased become convoluted. 
In situations where basic logistical support for assistance personnel become the priority, 
who we are buying from is less important than the reality that supplies may be scarce and 
meeting the demand is paramount to life, limb or sight. Professionals are provided this 
liberality in these circumstances. 
The CENTCOM Contracting Command test case, the Afghan Mentorship 
Program is one particular Mentor-Protégé Program that will be analyzed as well. It was 
instituted as a small business development initiative and the only MPP program 
established in an operational contingency contracting environment. A comparative 
analysis will be conducted of small business Mentor-Protégé Programs. This includes 
those used in the United States by the five governmental agencies previously mentioned 
and any that may be used outside of the U.S. to determine the benefits and drawbacks to 
both the mentor and the protégé. 
2. Expeditionary Contracting Command–OCONUS 
The difference between successful execution and failed ambition is experience. 
The contingency contracting and logistical support footprint created by the requirements 
of the operational units in theater made it necessary for contracting support activities to 
develop a plan and reengage the warfighters with an executable option. That option was 
to create some form of a small business model to manage the development and 
broadening of the existing vendor base. 
On behalf of SCO-A, the integration cell and Regional Command–East (RC-East) 
conducted an immediate assessment to determine where the potential shortfalls existed. 
Certainly in the broader context of the assessment it was clear that the kinetic and non-
kinetic battlespaces were poorly integrated; there was a lack of cogent, integrated 
planning and programming, which resulted in poor “cradle-to-grave” visibility on theater 
requirements—and too many requirements were not meeting schedule, thus not achieving 
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desired COIN effects or maneuver force support needs. These shortfalls become more 
exacerbated given the current climate of budget constraints (Blake, 2012). 
a. Background 
Upon review of the introduction, the reader may have come to the conclusion that 
that COIN operations have a distinct probability of interruption without some form of 
contracted support and that no small business development program exists to support 
contingency contracting activities OCONUS. This generates two questions with very 
distinct solutions. First, are contingency contracting activities equipped to provide 
adequate contracting support for counterinsurgent operations? Is there a model of a small 
business development program that exists to accomplish COIN contracting OCONUS? 
Could it be relevant in CONUS contingency environments? 
This thesis explains how a small business development program, known as the 
Afghan Mentorship Program answers both questions by achieving the COMISAF 
objectives, exceeding the Senior Contracting Official−Afghanistan expectations and 
becoming a small business development model through a six (6) month proof of concept 
test program. 
In order to answer these two questions, “why is AMP, a small business 
development program, so important to COIN contracting in contingency environments?” 
and “what models are relevant?” we have to take into consideration the much broader 
question, “why is COIN contracting in a contingency environment so important and how 
does it support the warfighter mission?” This is a not a particularly complex question; 
however, it does come with a long history and myriad of definitions and explanations. 
According to FM 100–10–2 Contracting support on the battlefield, published in 1999, 
contingency contracting is defined as “the process by which essential supplies and 
services needed to sustain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the U.S. 
Government” (Department of the Army, 1999). This often encompasses emergency 
contracting requirements—such as on the battlefield or in response to disaster relief—
either of which might occur within and outside of the continental United States. 
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Contingency contracting is often the most expedient method of mobilizing, transporting 
and deploying goods, services and military personnel to disaster stricken areas. 
When analyzing the importance of contingency contracting, I prefer Fleet 
Admiral E. J. King’s 1942 quote to explain it presence and relevance. Writing a staff 
officer he said, “I don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that Marshall is always 
talking about, but I want some of it.” In short, he helped to frame the importance of 
contingency contracting. As a rapid and efficient logistical alternative, contracting in an 
expeditionary environment is in many cases, the only lifeline for the warfighter. 
Dispelling the notion that contracting is not a logistical function, in most cases it is the 
life support that gives our warfighter a winning edge.  
In FM 100–10–2, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki believed that the 
Army’s primary mission was to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win. 
Clearly stated, contracting plays a key role in the Army’s ability to support this mission. 
It provides a responsive alternative to increasing the number of support forces necessary 
to perform the mission with the understanding that contracting support can be used to 
augment the support structure during every phase of an operation.  
The greatest validation for a vendor development program in a contingency 
contracting environment comes in the second paragraph where contracting personnel are 
directed to establish their operations with or near the local vendor base to support 
deployed forces (Shinseki & Hudson, 1999). 
The Department of Defense and other national agencies engaged in national 
defense depend on expeditionary contracting for life support during contingent 
operations. In times of emergency, expeditionary contracting teams are thrust into 
contingent environments, providing critically needed support, in the form of food, water, 
supplies, services and transportation. In the case of hurricane Katrina, in New Orleans in 
2006, and hurricane Sandy, along the New Jersey shore in 2012, the disaster relief 
provided by contingency contracting officers was essential for saving thousands of lives 
and sheltering tens of thousands. 
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Expeditionary and contingency support operations have become synonymous in 
the minds of the acquisition professional. In January of 2010, Haiti was hit by a 
catastrophic earthquake that killed hundreds of thousands of people and left a million or 
more suddenly homeless. 
The work of an organization is never done, and the structure has to be 
continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions. 
—Ralph J. Cordiner 
American businessman 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will answer three important questions about conducting contingency 
contracting operations in support of the warfighter’s counterinsurgency mission of 
stability and security. First, what should be the place of mentor-protégé models in COIN 
contracting doctrine? Second, what successful forms of MPP exist? Finally, was AMP 
effective in achieving COIN objectives, establishing doctrine and best practices? 
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III. MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ MODELS IN COIN CONTRACTING 
DOCTRINE 
A. OVERVIEW OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
COIN doctrine is a fluid concept of joint operational planning that synchronizes 
military and civilian execution in a continuous and simultaneously efforts contain or 
defeat an insurgent force within a host nation. COIN addresses the root causes of 
political, military and economic instability that prevents the HN government from 
providing its people security and a wide range of municipal services. These services are 
deemed vital to establish the legitimacy of the HN government. The Army’s Joint 
Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency is continuously evolving. According to the latest 
edition, as of 22 November 2013, unified action is required to successfully conduct HN, 
U.S. and multinational partners COIN operations and designates the Department of State 
chief of mission as the leader of COIN efforts. When the operational environment (OE) is 
not conducive to a civilian agency lead for the COIN effort within a specific area, the 
Joint Force Commander (JFC) must be cognizant of and able to lead the unified action 
required for effective COIN (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
B. COIN CONTRATING 
1. Introduction 
Structured under the supervision of Army Materiel Command, Army Contracting 
Command and all military installation and expeditionary contracting operations are 
subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. They must provide operational contracting 
support activities in accordance with the expressed policy and guidance of the senior 
contracting official designated authority within acquisition regulation. During times of 
emergency, such as disaster relief response and wartime combat operations, an immediate 
need can only be met with contingency contracting solutions. Dedicated contracting 
professionals are often obligated to look past time, schedule and performance and use 
experience and conventional wisdom to meet the unexpected requirements generated by 
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governmental requiring activities. Operational units and organizations are forced to 
respond beyond their designated capability. 
2. Contingency Contracting 
The Defense Acquisition University defines contingency contracting as the 
acquisition process of buying emergency goods and services, including construction, 
from commercial sources in order to support of immediate response operations in a 
contingency environment. Emergency acquisitions can include contingency contracting 
for disaster relief. Each branch of service within the Department of Defense has a 
contracting command. It can expedite the defense against or recovery from a nuclear, 
biological, chemical or radiological attack, should it occur in on U.S. soil. Contingency 
contracting can also occur in situations where the president declares a state of emergency 
or issues a major disaster declaration (Defense Acquisition University, 2013). 
Designated by the Department of Defense, Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
through Army Contracting Command (ACC) is responsible for the contracting 
acquisitions of goods and service in support of Army units stationed CONUS. In fiscal 
year (FY) 2012, ACC awarded over 227,000 contracts at a value exceeding $74 billion. 
These contracting actions account for nearly 70 percent of the Army’s contract dollars. 
The Mission and Installation Contracting Command, generally known as the MICC, 
provides contracting support for the warfighter across Army commands, installations and 
activities located throughout the continental United States and Puerto Rico. The MICC, 
consisting of 35 field offices and four contracting directorates routinely performs more 
than 50,000 contract support actions. In FY 2012 58,000 contracts were awarded totaling 
more than $6.3 billion, of which $2.9 billion went to small business. Contracting actions 
in support of Army units deployed or stationed OCONUS are processed by the 
Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). Within the ECC there are seven contracting 
support brigades containing eight contingency contracting battalions and 83 contingency 
contracting teams supporting missions and operational training throughout the world. 
Having executed more than 47,000 contracting actions, the estimated worth of ECC’s 
mission was just short of $1.8 billion. 
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Defined in a slightly similar vocabulary, the Defense Contingency Contracting 
handbook, Version 4, October 2012, calls contingency contracting the process of 
contracting, both CONUS and OCONUS, for the support of contingency operations. 
Named here as expeditionary contracting operations, the process involves logistical 
contracting support for major accidents, natural disasters, emergencies and enemy 
attacks, which may involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Often, the 
contingency contracting officer is the professional that is rapidly deployed to rugged, 
austere, contingency environments to establish command and control of the flow of 
actual and expected contracting requirements, while serving as an advisor to the theater 
and operational commanders. 
Governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, each branch of service has a 
subsequent corresponding acquisition guide that governs its procurement policies. For the 
purpose of this report, the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) 
will be referenced for contingency contracting guidance. Contingency contracting is 
typically separated into two geographical categories; those contingency or emergency 
operations conducted within CONUS and those conducted regionally, OCONUS. Based 
on this initial classification under the FAR, two different, yet congruent, sets of 
acquisition guidance may be applied to the similar types of activities. 
The maturity of the economic environment will also dictate the manner in which 
the contingency contracting officer must develop an acquisition strategy and process 
guidelines to meet the needs and contracting requirements of the warfighter. These 
activities often require the most knowledgeable, professional and equipped individuals 
for such missions. Many contingency contracting officers have years of operational 
experience and understand how important the need is for essential logistical support 
during emergencies. Contingency contracting is the glove on the helping hand that lifts 
the vehicle or builds the bridge necessary to cross the needs gap. There is no substitute 
for fielding critical and lifesaving support. In many cases, these supplies of goods and 
services are the only thread of hope for individuals hit hard by severe circumstances in 
devastated geographic regions. Regardless of the many challenges faced in times of 
disaster response, knowing “with whom are we contracting?” and “where those life-
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facilitating, tax payer, dollars going are?” are two of the most frequently asked questions. 
As foregone a conclusion to many in the mists of an attack or tornado on U.S. soil, they 
are at the forefront of the mind of the acquisition professional. Out of this line of thinking 
we must also address a greater question, specific to combat climates, “are contingency 
contracting dollars going to the right individuals or are we funding an insurgency?” 
3. COIN Contracting Guidance 
As counterinsurgent operations have continued to evolve to include other non-
lethal effects, one particular methodology has risen from obscurity. It is the tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTP) of effective employment of money as a weapon system 
on the battlefield, by way of the commander’s emergency response program. This in 
itself has become a notable shift in COIN doctrine. Economic improvements result from 
the proper use of MAAWS in COIN operations (Center, 2011). Also, a better-quality 
understanding of the 886 Policy has helped to facilitate improvement in the COIN 
contracting mission. 
a. Money as a Weapon System 
On November 6, 2003, President George W. Bush signed a congressional 
authorization, known as H.R. 3289, granting operational unit commanders in Iraq 
authority to obligate specified dollar amounts of Operational and Maintenance funding 
for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The intent of CERP was to 
empower local commanders with a non-lethal capability to provide urgent, small-scale, 
humanitarian relief throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent was to make money a 
weapon to establish goodwill, provide the local population with immediate economic 
assistance, and form reconstruction and service projects that the government can sustain 
and deliver. The Department of Defense defines urgent as any chronic or acute 
inadequacy of an essential good or service that in the judgment of the local commander 
calls for immediate action. Prior coordination with community leaders increases goodwill 
(Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009). 
Commanders and their staffs were expected to use sound judgment, while making 
well-coordinated decisions with Department of State officials, national and local 
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leadership before implementing any CERP. This was to avoid any harmful effects that 
might be caused by the sudden infusion of larger sums of cash, which would certainly 
disrupt local economies, creating hyperinflation. With most small-scale projects (less 
than $500,000), CERP is a quick and effective method that provides an immediate, 
positive impact on the local population while other larger reconstruction projects are still 
getting off the ground. The keys to project selection are: 
 Execute quickly. 
 Employ many people from the local population. 
 Benefit the local population. 
 Be highly visible. 
In the form of an August 11, 2008 article by Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, 
published by The Washington Post, money as a weapon system receives its first public 
criticism. Aptly entitled “Money as a weapon,” the article spotlights the relatively 
flexible guidance and loose implementation of tax payer dollars and the growing use of 
American cash as the primary means of winning, or rather buying, the hearts and minds 
of the Iraqi people during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Loosely based on the 2009 handbook 
guidance, the authors depict commanders and soldiers as near Robin Hood-like figures, 
bearing bags of good fortune and running around passing out stacks of American tax 
payer dollars to buy Iraqi goodwill and cheer. 
Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal at the 
urging of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry, issued a co-written white 
paper in mid-2009, which affirmed Ambassador Eikenberry’s commitment to a secure 
and stable Afghanistan through economic development and stability. The Afghan First 
Policy was birthed. Following suit, NATO issued its own Afghan First Policy developed 
by the NATO Economic Committee, which was an agreement reached in December 2009 
by NATO Foreign Ministers. Its intent was to maximize the positive impact of ISAF 
presence in Afghanistan. Formalized in an April 23, 2010 NATO directive, the Afghan 
First Policy would be reaffirmed by Ambassador Eikenberry and the new USFOR-A 
Commander, Army Gen. David Petraeus in July 2010. Dual-hatted, Gen. Petraeus, was 
assigned as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. 
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Forces commander in Afghanistan. In his September 8, 2010, COMISAF’s 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance memo to commanders, contracting 
personnel, military personnel, and civilians of NATO ISAF and USFOR-A, he reiterated 
the commitment to the Afghan First Policy. Citing the U.S. Army’s Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 9–27 Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons 
System from April 2009, the USFOR-A Resource Management Directorate (J8) published 
its Publication 1–06 Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) in support of 
the Afghan First Policy, which had been last updated January 2010. To infuse this 
guidance from the brigade to the company level, the U.S. Army’s CALL published the 
Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System in a handbook in April 2009. 
b. Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
From 2004 to 2011, the Congress appropriated more than $4.1 billion for the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq 
(Bowen, 2013). Commander’s Emergency Response Program and similar programs were 
intended to create sustainable jobs, creating markets for skilled labor and achieving the 
maximum goodwill within a legitimately established, host nation government and not 
fund an insurgency. In the final draft version of FM 3–24, dated June 2006, the term 
CERP would evolve to include the definition and meaning of money as a weapon system. 
The metamorphosis of COIN continued through subsequent versions of FM 3–24, and so 
went the CERP and MAAWS concepts. This new and inclusive meaning would reach its 
germination in the 2009 Commanders MAAWS handbook where it is no longer a facet of 
CERP, but rather becomes an operational tenet of COIN.  
U.S. Senators John W. Warner, Virginia-R, and Carl M. Levin, Michigan-D, were 
identified as the CERP watchdogs, having pressed the Secretary of Defense to review 
CERP regulations and oversight, stating that “we never had in mind that it would be for 
major development.” Referring to the $33 million hotel, office and retail complex at 
Baghdad International Airport, a project that he said is “far exceeding the purpose” of 
CERP (Hedgpeth & Colen, 2008). When asked if Iraq should bear more of the cost of 
rebuilding, Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, who was the vice chief of staff for the U.S. Army and 
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served as commanding general of the Multi-National Corps–Iraq in 2006, said Warner 
had inferred that CERP is intended as a reconstruction program in addition to being a 
weapon to combat the counterinsurgency. Gen. Chiarelli, a champion of CERP and 
MAAWS, mentioned that he and the commanders in the field have all seen incidents of 
violence in many areas decline when CERP investment goes up. Yet Warner, an original 
supporter of CERP funding, believes that it looks like a piggy bank for development 
when it was originally meant to help our troops fight a counterinsurgency and help 
civilians get back on their feet. The article details accounts of more than 26,000 CERP 
records that were reviewed by congressional audit and interviews with warfighters with 
firsthand knowledge of CERP projects. The authors reveal that the intent of the program 
now exceeds the oversight and capabilities for which it was originally conceived. CERP 
is used by units for larger projects that most likely will take years to complete. It is now 
largely divorced from a reasonable size structure needed to handle nation building 
reconstruction projects. 
But where CERP is no longer a perfect implied task for COIN, MAAWS has 
come of age. Providing a non-lethal, shaping effect, the money as a weapon system 
practice used in Afghanistan has had a tremendous influence on the HN population. The 
philosophy and eventual practice developed as a non-kinetic factor, has had a tremendous 
effect when used in conjunction with counterinsurgency guidance. COIN puts money on 
the battlefield, as does contingency contracting. It was only a matter of time before 
someone connected the dots and issued an outline of how COIN contracting intersects 
and supports the counterinsurgency fight. 
c. Afghan First 886 Policy 
By way of a small business set-aside policy, commonly referred to as 886, 
acquisition professionals and commanders would soon be charged with implementing 
contracting as a counterinsurgency tool in Afghanistan. The Afghan First Policy, codified 
in January 2008, directed limitations on the competition of products, services and sources 
developed from Afghans in Afghanistan. Through the National Defense Authorization 
Act publication of Public Law 110–181, Sections 886 for Fiscal Year 2008, the Defense 
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Federal Acquisition authorities mandated that businesses registered as Afghan-owned in 
Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) were given preferential status under 886 
status. All contractors conducting business within the U.S. contracting authority’s area of 
responsibility, the Afghan theater of operation, were required to register their businesses 
online with the JCCS and all employees personal data entered into the registration 
database known as Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) 
(Nolan, 2010). 
The Afghan Mentorship Program was one successful Mentor-Protégé Program, 
which focused on effectively achieving the September 2010 COMISAF COIN 
Contracting Guidance objective of effects-based contracting for the warfighter. After 
conducting numerous interviews with senior contracting professionals, some of whom 
served at the highest leadership positions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I was able to 
conclude that there were no other small-business programs or mentor-protégé models as 
effective as AMP at getting after COIN contracting. 
C. COIN OPERATIONS 
For more than a decade, counterinsurgency operations have been the prime 
objective for combatant commanders, both at the strategic and operational levels. The 
focus of theater of operation and regional commanders has shaped the operational 
missions of countless subordinate tactical commands. Once defined as the 
synchronization of efforts to defeat an insurgent’s activities, counterinsurgent operations 
are an investment of civilian and military authorities acting in consort to sway the support 
of the local populace either for or against the distressed government or its allies 
(Department of the Army, 1994). Gen. David H. Petraeus, with the assistance of John 
Nagl and a host of military academics and literary professionals redefined COIN and how 
we play, fight and win the COIN mission. 
According to the December 2005 Army FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, Chapter 5, 
The nature of counterinsurgency operations, COIN is depicted as a high level of thought, 
or political strategy, which has been dedicated to COIN operations. Stated in the FM, 
COIN requires an applied synchronization of many factors. Any combination of military 
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and paramilitary operations, international political policy, and economic development, 
psychological and civic actions can work in conjunction to impact a nation’s stability. 
Often, successful COIN energies will entail the entwined efforts of civilian agencies, U.S. 
military, and other multinational forces working toward an interdependent vision. These 
efforts focus joint attacks on the basis of delegitimizing the insurgency rather than just 
attacking the insurgent fighters. In a comprehensive approach, all stakeholders work in 
unison addressing the core problems of the host nation, with the HN leadership out front, 
purposefully engaged in the main effort of stabilizing and rebuilding a legitimate, 
functional governing authority. The expectation of all stakeholders is that the HN 
leadership ultimately takes the responsibility of leading as U.S. military and other 
multinational forces withdraw from the limelight.  
For the first time, this publication assertively addresses the elements of COIN 
operations, in an effort to succinctly combine offensive and defensive campaigns by 
incorporating procedures of stability to achieve a secure and stable environment. In 
combination, these two elements promote the growth and sustainment of essential 
services and economic development, both of which happen to be crucial byproducts 
necessary to govern effectively. By studying numerous unsuccessful operations 
conducted against guerrilla activities, Gen. Petraeus and his working group were able to 
narrow the tactics, techniques and procedures of COIN operations into three indistinct 
stages, providing an operational progression for COIN. The stages are identified as: 1) 
stop the bleeding; 2) inpatient care and recovery; and 3) provide outpatient 
care/movement to self-sufficiency, these stages provided a way ahead. 
Successful counterinsurgent operations are identified as having five (5) 
overarching requirements. The first of which is that the U.S. and HN military and 
government leadership develop a plan for attacking the insurgents’ strategy, with the 
intent of focusing their collective effort on bolstering or restoring the legitimacy of the 
government. 
Second, counterinsurgent forces must establish command and control (C2) of 
several areas in which to operate. With host nation forces in the lead, the people must be 
secured in those areas. Without it the support of the local populous cannot be expected. 
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Third, operations must be executed from the areas under the C2 of the HN 
government. This demonstrates the HN’s ability to project strength against insurgent 
control areas, as the host nation works to stabilize the situation and regain control of 
major population centers. Historically, one of the main objectives of an insurgent force is 
the destabilization of populations in densely populated urban areas. 
Fourth, successful counterinsurgent operations have to expand areas of operation, 
to include insurgent controlled areas. It is crucial to the HN government securing and 
supporting the local population to be perceived as “being on the offensive.” This means 
that the insurgent, paramilitary, or politico-administrative apparatus must be rooted out 
and eliminated. 
Lastly, information operations (IO), also known as propaganda campaigning, 
must be employed aggressively to influence public perception and accomplish a 
favorable COIN outcome of HN legitimacy and capabilities. In turn, the objective is to 
create a base of localized and regional support for COIN operations, which shore up 
international support for the operations being executed throughout the HN. Coupled with 
a well-publicized IO campaign spotlighting the insurgencies willingness to use violence 
against the local populous, the goal of discrediting insurgent propaganda becomes 
obtainable. An effective IO campaign should provide a persuasive substitute for the 
counterproductive ideology delivered by means of insurgent rhetoric. 
In a 2011 article entitled “COIN Contracting: the Strategic, Operational, and 
Tactical Implications of the Economic Variable in Counterinsurgency Operations,” MAJ 
Christopher L. Center echoes the sentiments of Dr. Steven Metz, author of the article, 
“New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency.” Metz 
postulates that during conflict, there is a widening of economic activity which 
counterinsurgency operations, to include contracting, should make every attempt to use in 
order to expand competitive markets. MAJ Center seems to agree by quoting Metz, who 
says that “a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy should offer alternative sources of 
identity and empowerment for the bored, disillusioned and disempowered” and that 
“simply providing low-paying, low-status jobs or the opportunity to attend school is not 
enough” (Metz, 2007). A successful plan for economic diversification must plan for 
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COIN contracting in operations, especially in “economies which are dependent on a few 
commodities exports of a single commodity or a few commodities are particularly 
vulnerable to protracted conflict” (Metz, 2007). 
D. OVERVIEW OF HISTORY 
The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an 
opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur 
economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s 
campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of 
international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is 
likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, 
finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, 
and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan. (Petraeus, 2010) 
This statement by General David Petraeus while serving as the COMISAF 
commander would resonate in his COIN contracting guidance and throughout his tenure 
as the contracting support continued to ramp up even as the surge of combat troops in 
Afghanistan had passed it critical point. Multiple congressional and inspector general 
reports had cited contract contracting as a source of funding for insurgent activity in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan. One calumniating statement summarizes the irony of the situation: 
Given that contracting has been identified as a source of corruption, I am 
requesting that all contracts awarded by our international partners be 
disclosed to ensure that neither high government officials themselves nor 
their relatives are unlawfully privileged. (Hamid Karzai, Kabul 
Conference, July 20, 2010) 
When the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs released 
Warlord Inc., it made the Afghan Host Nation Trucking contract, contracting and 
acquisition support in Afghanistan all synonymous with the report’s allegations of 
corruption in the U.S. supply chain. Contract oversight became a high priority target as 
the notorious report branded the prospective contract, worth $2.16 billion, slated to be 
paid out to eight private security contracting firms, is fraught with bribery, corruption and 
a source of financing for Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies. 
The independently published U.S. report analyzed the Warlord Inc. report in a 
July 2010 article, discussing potential causes of failure. Its release may have been aptly 
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timed with the unexpected departure of Gen. McChrystal; however, it also considers a 
lack of oversight as a probable contribution to the corruption and malfeasant activity 
associated with the HNT contract. Picking at the Department of State leadership, the 
article exposes a fundamentally weak defense, diplomacy and development policy for 
Afghanistan set forth by the Secretary of State. Eikenberry’s charge also addresses a 
similar issue with the three “D” policy. 
 Through a series of senior contracting officials, implementation of guidance and 
policy, and considerable Congressional oversight, the court of public opinion has had 
more than ten years to critically analyze and issue numerous articles and exposes on the 
failures of contracting and fiscal oversight. Ultimately, both SIGAR and the GAO have 
the official responsibility of issuing reports analyzing the problems with contracts. In a 
remarkably similar fashion, both reporting agencies acknowledge that government 
contracting in Afghanistan and other wartime environments is considerably more 
different than contracting in peacetime. However, the CRS report R42084, from 
November 14, 2011, neatly boils down the goal of wartime contracting and the “difficulty 
of getting the right good or service, on schedule, and at a fair price” (Schwartz, 2011). 
When analyzing U.S. government obligations from FY 2005 through FY 2011, the CRS 
report identifies that in a “counterinsurgency environment—cost, schedule and 
performance are often secondary to larger strategic goals of promoting security and 
denying popular support for the insurgency” (Schwartz, 2011). 
What begs to differ here is the question, “has the primary goal of defense 
contracting in Afghanistan changed to support the mission?” After obligating more than 
$50 billion, over a period of nearly ten years, for contracts performed primarily in 
Afghanistan, the general response is that contracting will be the planned method to 
establish essential logistic and support services throughout the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of operation, throughout every phases of the campaign. The common 
shortfall is that although contracting is deemed essential for success of the larger, 
strategic mission, until as recent as 2004, commanders, staffs and planner have failed to 
integrate acquisition professionals into the planning cycle. So, we as contracting 
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authorities have been forced to relearn procedural and institutional knowledge, lost as 
each successive combatant commander learns how to integrate effects-based contracting. 
From the establishment of an independent line of operation to the establishment 
regional contracting center to get aftereffects-based contracting, senior contracting 
officials did not sit idly by and watch paint dry. From the contributions of MG Daryl 
Scott, former JCC-I/A commander to MG Camille Nichols and later Rear Admiral 
Nicolas Kalathas, senior contracting officials “wrestled with the bear.” In the words of 
BG Stephen Leisenring, “contingency contracting is a full contact sport. You have to be 
proactive so that the combatant commander knows that you’re there and not just when he 
needs something.” BG Casey Blakes’ paper to the National Contract Management 
Association, entitled “Putting Contracting on the Offensive in Afghanistan” echoes this 
sentiment. In his time as the SCO-A, BG Blake was able to pare down fundamental 
contract planning and execution in Afghanistan. Figure 4 is an example of how 
synchronizing acquisition planning, programming, and budgeting activities were 
effectively aligned with policies and programs, to properly resource kinetic operations 
(Blake, 2012). The non-kinetic implementation of contracting in a particular region can 
have long-term implications in terms of economic stability and physical security within a 
kinetic battle space. 
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Figure 4.  Integration Cell Architecture (from Blake, 2012) 
The importance of the concept was understood and initiated by LTG Eikenberry 
in Afghanistan and Gen. Dempsey in Iraq. An attempt to implement the concept was 
engaged by General McChrystal, but it took a tri-level effort to accomplish the task of 
“making contracting commanders’ business” (Petraeus, 2010). Through the COMISAF 
Commanders guidance, written by BG Camille Nichols, the CENTCOM Contracting 
commander, Gen. Petraeus and USFOR-A Commander, LTG Rodriguez were able to 
synchronize effects-based contracting. It was now understood that the success or failure 
of a regional or maneuver command could depend on how well contracting support was 
executed within the battle space. “General Petraeus was facilitating me starting that 
command under CENTCOM’s flag versus USF-I’s flag, he picked right up on the 
initiative that General McChrystal had started and so I wrote the CENTCOM–COIN 
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guidance for General Petraeus” (personal communication with former CENTCOM 
Contracting Commander, October 2013). Contracting as a force multiplier had matured 
thanks to the bumps and bruises along the way. “Have we been here eleven years or one 
year eleven times” is the phrase that comes to mind from the Blake article (Blake, 2012). 
Even the International Security Assistance Force Commander General Allen, 
commander, recently wrote, “we must improve our contracting practices to ensure they 
fully support our mission.” 
E. REGIONALIZED CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN AFGHANISTAN 
Leadership is the art of getting someone else to do something you want 
done because he wants to do it. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Without a single voice, unity of effort would not be possible. Attribution? 
It was hard to get something executable so what we did is we had to have 
him write something and then I actually got General Rodriguez to write it 
into an OP Order and that was really when the Regional Commanders 
were listening and trying to shape more deliberately their purchasing 
power. In parallel to that, because we could control quite a bit about how 
something was purchased that came to the contracting offices, we were 
doing this Mentor-Protégé Program. (Personal communication with former 
CENTCOM Contracting Commander, October 2013) 
1. RC-East Bagram Air Base 
The AMP program was used prior to the relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority 
(TOA) of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) by the 1st CAV Division Combatant 
Command. Having successfully facilitated contractor transparency through two 
successive units, the SCO-A challenged the RCC and COIN contracting program to 
streamline the RAs contracting support without compromising the existing, no-fail 
operational support contracts coming under review. Locations of those RAs can be seen 
in Figure 5. To assist the RC-East Command with the requirements development process 
the SCO-A established a contracting integration cell with the combatant command. Their 
primary functions was to streamline the development of requirements packages, attend 
the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) and Joint Facilities Utilization Board 
 54 
(JFUB), and assist with requirements validation, as duplicate requirements have clogged 
the acquisition process with multiple copies of the same requirements, resulting in a 
slowdown in contract award. The integration cell was intended to get aftereffects-based 
contracting. 
 
Figure 5.  SCO–Afghanistan as of 14 Jun 11. Location of RAs. 
2. Summary 
a. Early Contracting 
In late 2001 and early 2002, five regional commands (RCs) were established 
under the operational control of one International Security Assistance Force command 
group. Each regional command was headed by an ISAF partner nation. Those RCs were 
identified as RC-Capital, RC-South, RC-North, RC-West and RC-South. Tactically 
significant, every RC was co-located on a military base. Larger operational bases 
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maintained a joint service environment. In order to meet ISAF contingency support 
requirements, the Joint Contracting Command I/A, and later, CENTCOM Contracting 
Command, established regional expeditionary contracting centers to pinpoint the 
requirements activities of each those regional commander. 
Regional Commands and contracting center locations: 
 RC-Capital: Regional Command Capital (France), Kabul 
 RC-South: Regional Command South (The Netherlands) at Kandahar Air 
Base 
 RC-North: Regional Command North (Germany) at Joint Base Mazar-e-
Sharif 
 RC-West: Regional Command West (Italy) at Joint Base Herat  
 RC-East: Regional Command East (United States) at Bagram Air Base 
Located at every RC, the Regional Contracting Centers had near acquisition 
autonomy as the war in Iraq took precedence; contracting support in Afghanistan was an 
afterthought. 
Within a year of U.S. and allied forces stepping on Iraqi soil, the tasks faced by 
the contracting leadership were intimidating. The model of a Joint Contracting 
Command–Iraq (JCC-I) was introduced to meet the challenges of contracting support and 
sustain coalition forces. The priority was the rebuilding of vital Iraqi infrastructure, 
reduction of dependency on LOGCAP and an organizational structure that supports 
theater wide contracting functions. Contracting was getting its own line of operational 
command. Within two years, CENTCOM would consolidated and unite contracting 
efforts in both the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) theaters of operation. 
b. Phases One and Two 
The Journal of Contract Management discusses the “The evolution of contracting 
in Iraq March 2003–March 2005.” A basic summary of the article is that contracting 
operations in Afghanistan have their roots in the evolution of contracting in Iraq. 
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The path toward sustainment contracting continues, but the end is closer today 
than it was yesterday. The contracting journey since March 2003 evolved through two 
distinct phases. In the first phase, pure contingency, the focus was on satisfying urgent 
requirements and ensuring U.S. forces had the supplies, equipment and services needed 
to sustain combat and post-combat operations. As the theater and mission matured, the 
complexity of contracting requirements increased. Emerging challenges and operational 
limitations of the existing contracting structure required a transformation in the way 
business was conducted to meet future requirements and demands. 
That transformation represented a shift to Phase Two, the transition to 
sustainment, where the concept of the JCC-I was introduced and implemented. The JCC-I 
was a new organizational construct for Coalition Joint Task Force Operations, born out of 
necessity to address the challenges in a large, austere theater with limited resources and is 
setting the stage to allow the theater to transition to a cheaper, more efficient 
sustainment-based acquisition strategy. 
Why document this evolutionary process? For military acquisition planners, 
realization, acknowledgement and understanding of transformational events and their 
impact on current and future operations is essential. The military expends too much time 
and effort relearning lessons learned. New tactics, techniques and procedures emerging 
from transformational events need to be taken seriously and be formally integrated into 
service and/or joint doctrine. The transformation of contracting in Iraq is a textbook case 
where this new organization and concept of support needs to be incorporated into joint 
doctrine and not lost in the trash heap of good ideas. 
c. Contingency Contracting in 2006 
In February 2006, Major General (ret.) Daryl Scott, USAF, was the first senior 
contracting official to see the immense role that contracting would play on the futures of 
both wars. Taking command of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, he 
was tasked to make contracting work in both theaters. MG Scott focused his small 
contracting workforce on effects-based contracting by establishing two pilot 886 
programs, the Iraq First and Afghan First Policy acquisition based programs. MG Scott 
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acknowledged that “our greatest contribution to those that will follow in our footsteps is 
to ensure that the lessons learned today are properly incorporated into Joint Doctrine so 
that mistakes and inefficiencies are not repeated in the future” (Defense Contract 
Management Agency [DCMA], 2006). MG Scott’s words speak for themselves. 
The campaign planners had no real concept of how contracting could 
contribute to a COIN fight in Iraq. 
The multinational force headquarters—they had inherited a lot of 
missions, but they didn’t necessarily see them yet as an integrated part of 
the COIN strategy. 
The Combined Force Command Afghanistan Commander (LTG 
Eikenberry) was already thinking about contracting as a COIN instrument. 
He wanted to know why 50 percent of his spend couldn’t go to Afghan 
companies. So, everybody had excuses… the surgeon came in and said, 
“oh, you know, 80 percent of the Afghan population has tuberculosis 
bacteria in their systems, you know, and you don’t want them close to 
your troops here.” The loggies came in and said, “we do all this stuff 
through LOGCAP; run DFACs and we clean up port a potties, that’s all 
LOGCAP.” 
LTG Eikenberry asked, “why can’t I have an Afghan First program that is 
kind of a set aside similar to small business set aside program?” 
General Eikenberry was not going to be denied. He forced the purchase of 
Afghan uniforms for ANA and ANP—by stating “we’re going to buy 
uniforms for the Afghan Security Forces and I want those uniforms 
manufactured in Afghanistan using Afghan materials.” 
Three or four weeks after we started rolling the ball for Afghanistan, 
General Casey called me out in front of the entire MNF-I (Multi-National 
Force–Iraq) staff and said he wanted a set-aside program for Iraq. They 
must have had a conversation. (Personal communication with former JCC 
IA Commander, October 2013) 
d. Evolution of Contracting in Afghanistan 
JCC-I/A’s continued success throughout USCENTCOM shows that it can serve as 
a model for future joint contingency operations of this magnitude. Planning for 
contingencies within the contingency contracting support plan (CCSP) must be 
incorporated early in an operation for acquisition professionals to assess the economic 
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environment and market structures of the operational area in terms of vendor base and 
availability of goods and services. A CCSP ensures contracting receives proper attention 
within logistics plans and the larger operation plan. This analysis must not only assess the 
AORs, but also that of the entire geographic region in order to leverage key suppliers’ 
capabilities during initial stages of operations. The focus then shifts toward building the 
local economy. As JCC-I/A has changed in name and structure, changes were made to 
meet the operational contracting support needs of the warfighter. So to have 
organizational structure, institutional knowledge changed as well. 
e. CENTCOM Contracting Command 
From Jan 2010 to Apr 2011, MG Camille Nichols took charge of the JCC-I/A. 
The first thing she did was change the name and methodology of contracting support. 
MG Nichols’ experience and leadership pointed to a policy of centralized guidance and 
decentralized execution. Initiative, flexibility and autonomy were encouraged attributes. 
In an environment of high operational tempo, increased requiring activity demands and 
persistent turnover rate of acquisition personnel, to be a successful organization, 
CENTCOM contracting needed a strong leader. Although the important lessons of MG 
Scott’s were learned, it would take more time to implement them. Capacity was the order 
of the day and the numbers of RCC were increased during the surge. The two largest 
RCCs were at RC-East at Bagram and RC-South at Kandahar. 
Swollen with ISAF troops and defense contractors from member countries, there 
was no relief in sight. An additional change was necessary in order to keep up with 
basing and operations support. RC south was reorganized when it was split into RC-
South and RC-Southwest. The NATO-led ISAF mission was transitioned to USFOR-A 
for combat support missions and both the ISAF and USFOR-A now fell under the 
responsibility of Gen. David Petraeus, the new COMISAF commander. 
 RC-Southwest: Helmand and Nimroz Provinces 
 RC-South: Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Daykundi Provinces 
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3. Regional Command–East 
a. TF101 
Maj. Gen. John Campbell, 101st Airborne Division commander and commander 
of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 in RC-East first addressed ISAF units during 
a transfer of authority ceremony with Maj. Gen. Mike Scaparotti, Commander of the 
82nd Airborne Division, and his team on June 14, 2010 at Bagram Airfield. The 
RIP/TOA not only symbolized a relinquishment of command by the TF82 commander, 
but a renewed partnership of success between the two divisions. This was the third such 
TOA the two and marked a rendezvous with destiny as CJTF-101 assumed control of 14 
provinces in eastern Afghanistan. 
Remarkably upbeat and confident, Campbell said, “our success is measured by 
our partner’s success and their success isn’t measured by the number of projects or 
missions we conduct, but by the faith and confidence the Afghan people entrust in them” 
(Hardy, 2010). 
MG Campbell optimistically stated, “the coming year is vital to Afghanistan’s 
future, and CJTF-101 will build on past accomplishments to further combined and 
unified action to help facilitate enduring Afghan solutions to Afghanistan’s challenges 
by, with and through its Afghan partners” (Hardy, 2010). 
b. TF-1CAV 
Led by MG Allyn, the 1st Cavalry Division superimposed itself over the top of 
the former operational contracting support command structure. There were no changes in 
how the former RC-East commanded and new commander executed contracting 
requirements and vetting while the AMP program was in operation. 
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IV. SUCCESSFUL MPP MODELS 
A. MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS 
A comparative analysis was conducted of Mentor-Protégé Programs that are used 
by five governmental agencies to determine the benefits and drawbacks to both the 
mentor and the protégé. The agencies that will be reviewed are the Small Business 
Administration, Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency for 
International Development, and Department of Homeland Security. The objective of the 
comparative analysis is to identify the stakeholders, the differences between the roles, 
eligibility requirements for mentors and protégés, overall benefit of the mentor-protégé 
relationship and evaluation criteria and disqualification. The purpose of such an analysis 
is to formulate suggested areas of improvement. Also discussed is the use of the 8(a) 
Program to couple mentor-protégé relationships. The Minority Small Business and 
Capital Ownership Development Program or 8(a) for short, helps small businesses by 
giving them an opportunity to compete in a marketplace where they might ordinarily be 
shut out. Given special status, 8(a) businesses are classified as “small businesses owned 
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” They are 
shepherded through a maze of better business practices and assisted in obtaining and 
performing contracts with executive-branch agencies. Most governmental agencies, as 
seen in Figure 6, recognize the importance of the small business in the U.S. economy and 
actively support 8(a) with Mentor-Protégé Programs of their own (Pilireo, 2012). 
1. Small Business Administration 
Created in 1953, as an independent agency of the federal government, the Small 
Business Administration has the mission of helping Americans start, build and grow 
businesses. The SBA is vital to the maintaining and strengthening the U.S. economy. By 
preserving free and competitive enterprise, the SBA assists through forming partnerships 
with the public and private organizations (i.e., mentor-protégé relationships). Through an 
extensive network of officers, the SBA provides assistance in the form of aid, protection 
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of small business interests and consultations. For the purpose of this thesis the Mentor-
Protégé Program ran by the SBA is of notable interest. 
Offered under the SBA Business Development Program, the Mentor-Protégé 
Program operates within the guidelines of the 8(a) section of the Small Business Act and 
helps to facilitate the capabilities of participants through the Business Development 
Program. Defined as a small, disadvantaged business that is 51% controlled by 
disadvantaged individuals, 8(a) businesses are encouraged by the SBA to develop 
private-sector relationships in order to expand their ability to compete for federal 
government contacts. 
Businesses classified as 8(a) can participant in sole-source contract awards, up to 
the $4 million ceiling for goods and services and $6.5 million for construction and 
manufacturing. As the SBA assists 8(a) firms to build their competitive and institutional 
knowledge, they also encouraged 8(a) businesses to develop joint ventures or industry 
teams to bid and compete on ever increasing acquisition contracts. 
Known as mentor-protégé relationships, small business owners that decide to 
participate in a Mentor-Protégé Program can choose to either join as a mentor or a 
protégé. The SBA Mentor-Protégé Program was designed to encourage approved mentors 
to provide various forms of assistance to eligible 8(a) businesses as protégés. 
a. Benefits of the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program 
The SBA’s Mentor-Protégé Program is a way for all stakeholders, mentor, 
protégé, consumer, general public and government, to receive the full benefit of growth 
within an industry, improved quality and reduced cost. The SBA is empowered to 
develop initiatives that assist socially and economically disadvantaged Americans gain 
access to economic opportunity under the small business guidance in Title 13, Section 
124.520 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
b. Benefits to Protégés 
Under the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program, the protégés gain the benefit of 
technical and management assistance from the mentor’s expertise, resources, technical 
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certifications and capabilities. As the result of its positive performance and good 
standing, protégés can have other assistance made available to them through the Mentor-
Protégé Program. 
c. Benefits to the Mentors 
Under the same guidelines, mentors gain inexperienced subcontractors, but as 
prime contracts, the mentors can enter into joint venture arrangements with protégés to 
compete for government contracts. Mentors can own equity interest of up to 40% in a 
protégé firm to help it raise capital, financial assistance and loans in the form of equity 
and qualify for other SBA programs. 
d. Eligibility for the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program 
For a business to become a protégé in the SBA Mentor-Protégé Program they 
have to have never been awarded a contract under the classification of 8(a). Next, the 
business must be in the developmental stage of the 8(a) Business Development Program. 
Continuing, it should be less than half the size of a standard small business. Finally, the 
business may only have one mentor at a time, it must be current with all reporting 
requirements and be in good standing with the 8(a) Business Development Program. 
A mentor can be a small or large business that may have graduated from the 8(a) 
Business Development Program its self or in transition. The mentor must agree to 
participate in the program for at least a year. It should also have the ability to help the 
protégé during that time. To qualify as a mentor, the business must be in good standing as 
a federal contractor, demonstrate it has been profitable for the last two consecutive years 
and be of stability financial health. Mentors may have more than one protégé, but most 
mentors will only have one protégé. They must have the ability to provide lessons of 
valuable and support the protégé with general knowledge gained through general 
experience of contracting with the government. 
e. Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship 
On an annual basis, the protégé will report accounts and the protégé business 
plans to the SBA from the preceding program year. These protégé reports will provide all 
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technical and management assistance that was provided by the mentor throughout the 
year. If the mentor made investments, developed equity or provided the protégé loans, 
there should be reported as well. When subcontracts have been awarded to the protégé by 
the mentor, the values of each subcontract should also be a part of the report. 
All federal contracts awarded to the mentor-protégé relationship as a joint venture 
(designating each as an 8(a), small business set aside, or unrestricted procurement), the 
value of each contract, and the percentage of the contract performed and the percentage 
of revenue accruing to each party in the joint venture; and a narrative describing the 
success such assistance has had in addressing the developmental needs of the protégé and 
addressing any problems encountered. The protégé must annually certify to the SBA 
whether there has been any change in the terms of the agreement. The mentor must 
annually certify to favorable financial health and good character. The SBA will review 
the protégé’s report on the mentor-protégé relationship as part of its annual review of the 
firm’s business plan pursuant to Sec. 124.403. The SBA may decide not to approve 
continuation of the agreement if it finds that the mentor has not provided the assistance 
set forth in the Mentor-Protégé Agreement or that the assistance has not resulted in any 
material benefits to the protégé. 
2. Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense, Office of Small Business Programs manages three 
programs. The first program is the Mentor-Protégé Program, which is a pilot program the 
DoD expects will encourage prime contractors (mentors) currently doing business with 
the DoD to develop the technical and business capabilities of small disadvantaged 
businesses (SDBs) and other eligible protégés.  
The second is the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small 
Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR), both of which focus business 
opportunities on innovative and talented small technology companies with 
entrepreneurial aspirations that can potentially benefit the U.S. military and strengthen 
our economy. The two programs represent over $1 billion per year in research and 
development funding used to support qualifying small businesses through a competitive, 
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three-phase process. Projects funded through SBIR and STTR serve a DoD need and 
have the potential to commercialize in the broader marketplace. Solicitations are 
conducted periodically throughout the year. 
The third program is the Indian Incentive Program (IIP) is a congressionally 
sponsored program that provides a five percent rebate on the total amount subcontracted 
to an Indian-Owned Economic Enterprise or Indian Organization, back to the prime 
contractor in accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) Clause 252.226–7001. Through the generation of subcontracts to the above 
mentioned entities, the IIP fulfills its purpose as an economic multiplier for Native 
American communities. DoD prime contractors, regardless of size of contract, that 
contain the above referenced clause(s) are eligible for incentive payments. 
a. Benefits of the DoD Mentor-Protégé Program 
This program was begun on October 1, 1991, and was the first federal Mentor-
Protégé Program to become operational. Scheduled to expire in 1994, it has been 
extended repeatedly for the formation of new agreements extended. The most recent 
extensions through FY 2015 and FY 2018 for the reimbursement of incurred costs under 
existing agreements. While the DoD MPP focuses on small businesses performing 
subcontracts and as suppliers on federal contracts, it differs from the SBA’s 8(a) Mentor-
Protégé Program, where its primary objective is on small businesses performing federal 
contracts. In addition, mentors in the DoD program may provide assistance to their 
protégés that is somewhat different than that which mentors may provide to protégés in 
the 8(a) Program. 
Notably, this assistance can be in the form of advance payments, which many 
federal agencies are prohibited from conducting. Also, under federal procurement law, 
progress payments are generally discouraged. Mentors have the freedom to (1) award 
subcontracts on a noncompetitive basis to their protégés; (2) make investments in protégé 
firms in exchange for up to 10% ownership interest in the protégé; (3) loan money and; 
(4) provide assistance in the form of general business management, engineering and 
technical matters, by arranging for small business development centers, procurement 
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technical assistance centers, historically black colleges, universities, and minority 
institutions of higher education to provide assistance to their protégés. 
b. Benefits to Protégés 
The protégés gain the most by the technical, managerial, financial and 
developmental assistance helping their companies grow and preparing them to be prime 
contractors in the future. Protégés not only receive various forms of assistance from their 
mentors, but also may generally retain their status as “small businesses” while doing so. 
If they received similar assistance from entities other than their mentors, they could risk 
being found to be other than “small” because of how the SBA determines size. The SBA 
combines the gross income of the firm, or the number of its employees, with those of its 
“affiliates” when determining whether the firm is small, and the SBA could potentially 
find that firms are affiliates because of assistance such as that which mentors provide to 
protégés. However, SBA regulations provide that “no determination of affiliation or 
control may be found between a protégé firm and its mentor based on the Mentor-Protégé 
Agreement or any assistance provided pursuant to the agreement.” 
c. Benefits to the Mentors 
Among the incentives that the DoD program provides for mentors are 1) 
reimbursement of developmental assistance costs and 2) crediting of unreimbursed costs 
toward applicable subcontracting goals. DoD and the mentor firm may agree that DoD 
will reimburse the mentor for certain advance payments or progress payments made to 
assist protégé firms in performing a subcontract or supplying goods or services under a 
contract. Alternatively, DoD may credit toward the mentor’s subcontracting plan an 
amount equivalent to the amount of unreimbursed assistance that the mentor provides to 
its protégé(s). For example, if a contractor provides $10,000 in developmental assistance 
to its protégé, this $10,000 could count as if it were a $10,000 subcontract awarded to a 
small business. 
Serving as a mentor to an 8(a) firm counts toward any subcontracting 
requirements to which the mentor firm may be subject under Section 8(d) of the Small 
Business Act. Section 8(d) requires that all federal contractors awarded a contract valued 
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in excess of $650,000 ($1.5 million for construction contracts) that offers subcontracting 
possibilities agree to a “subcontracting plan,” which ensures that small businesses have 
“the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in [contract] performance.” In 
addition, in certain circumstances, mentors may form joint ventures with their protégés 
that are eligible to be awarded an 8(a) contract or another contract set aside for small 
businesses. Mentor firms and joint ventures involving mentor firms would otherwise 
generally be ineligible for such contracts because they would not qualify as “small” under 
the SBA regulations. Mentor firms may also acquire an equity interest of up to 40% in 
the protégé firm in order to help the protégé firm raise capital. 
Because mentor firms are not 8(a) participants, they would generally be 
prohibited from owning more than 10–20% of an 8(a) firm. However, their participation 
in the 8(a) Program permits them to acquire a larger ownership share. 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program 
In order for a firm to be a protégé in the DoD MPP it must either meet at least one 
of the SBA 8(a) requirements. It must be a small disadvantaged business, a qualifying 
organization that employs the disabled, a (WOSB), a veteran-owned, service-disabled 
small business (SDVOSB), or located in a historically underutilized business zone 
(HUBZone). 
To be eligible as a DoD mentor, the firm must currently be performing under a 
minimum of one active DoD or another federal agency approved or negotiated 
subcontracting plan, in accordance with FAR Part 19.702. The firm must also be eligible 
for the federal contract award. New mentor applications must be approved and may be 
submitted to and approved by the Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) of the 
perspective defense agency or military service. 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship 
Since 1991, the Department of Defense Mentor-Protégé Program has offered 
substantial assistance to small disadvantaged businesses. Helping them to expand the 
overall base of their marketplace participation has produced more jobs and increased 
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national income. DoD prime contractors are eligible for incentive payments with 
contracts of $500,000 or greater. 
The DoD MPP assists small businesses (protégés) successfully compete for prime 
contract and subcontract awards by partnering with large companies (mentors) under 
individual, project-based agreements. 
Traditionally, these partnerships have delivered a variety of products and services 
specialized in: environmental remediation, engineering services, information technology, 
manufacturing, telecommunications and health care. Recently, new Mentor-Protégé 
agreements have focused on corrosion engineering, information assurance, robotics, 
circuit board and metal component manufacturing. The DoD hopes that future 
agreements will focus on new technology areas such as radio frequency identification 
devices and enhanced security assurance. 
Many mentor firms have made the program an integral part of their sourcing 
plans, while the protégé firms have used their involvement in the program to develop 
much needed business and technical capabilities to diversify their customer base. Our 
protégé participants have established long-term business relationships with providers of 
government and commercial goods and services. 
Successful Mentor-Protégé agreements provide a winning relationship for the 
protégé, the mentor, and the DoD. 
3. Department of State 
The Department of State Mentor-Protégé Program is designed to motivate and 
encourage large business prime contractor firms to provide mutually beneficial 
developmental assistance to small businesses (SB), veteran-owned small businesses 
(VOSB), service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, 
small disadvantaged businesses, and women-owned small business concerns. The 
program is formulated to foster the establishment of successful long-term business 
relationships between State Department large prime contractors and small business 
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subcontractors thereby improving the performance of both. The program is intended to 
strengthen subcontracting opportunities and accomplishments at the State Department. 
a. Benefits of the DOS Mentor-Protégé Program 
The Department of State reaps the benefits of moving from the traditional large 
business prime contractor/small business subcontractor model to a mentor-protégé 
relationship model based on mutual agreement, trust and meaningful business 
development. Benefits to the DOS include, but are not limited to an expanded base of 
qualified small businesses, strengthening subcontracting opportunities and achieving a 
potential increase in small business program goal accomplishments. 
Additionally, mentor-protégé arrangements may provide the DOS with greater 
assurance that a protégé subcontractor will be better able to perform under a contract than 
a similarly situated non-protégé subcontractor. In support of the State Department 
mission, other benefits include: acquiring an expanded base of qualified small businesses, 
strengthening subcontracting opportunities and achieving a potential increase in small 
business program goal accomplishments. 
b. Benefits to Protégés 
The benefits a being a protégé in the DOS MPP have many of the same benefits 
as being a mentor. Protégés can receive technical, managerial, financial or any other 
mutually agreed upon benefit from mentors including work that flows from a government 
or commercial contract through subcontracting or teaming arrangements. The DOS 
mentor-protégé arrangements provide the government with a greater assurance that a 
protégé subcontractor, will have an increased capability to perform under the contract 
than a similarly situated non-protégé subcontractor. Protégés may have up to, but not 
exceeding three mentors with the State Department MPP. 
Furthermore, a protégé’s firm(s) may gain opportunities to seek and perform 
government and commercial contracts through the guidance and support of its mentor 
firm(s) that may not have been available to them without the State Department MPP. 
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c. Benefits to the Mentors 
Department of State mentor-protégé arrangements are good business decisions for 
mentors. They provide the mentor with the opportunity to develop a new set of skills that 
allows the mentor to diversify the firm, achieve compliance and effectively competing for 
DOS contracts. Mentors also have the opportunity to build trusting and loyal 
relationships with multiple protégés. The DOS MPP allows a good mentor to have more 
than one protégé. 
The existence of a mentor-protégé arrangement (under an existing arrangement) 
may be considered by the contracting officer before awarding a contract that requires a 
subcontracting plan and performance. Mentors have the benefit of contracting officer 
involvement in DOS MPPs. Mentor-protégé arrangements can also benefit the mentor 
provided that the government’s reduced risk and greater assurance under a MPP mean 
that a protégé subcontractor will better perform the terms of the contract versus a 
similarly situated non-protégé subcontractor. 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program 
For a small business to be eligible to be protégé under the Mentor-Protégé 
Program it must meet the definition of a small business according to FAR 19.001 and be 
in good standing in the federal marketplace. The same goes for eligible the mentor firms. 
Although mentors may be large or small businesses, we anticipate the majority of 
mentors will be large businesses. These include SBs, HUBZone SBs, SDBs, WOSBs, 
VOSBs and SDVOSBs. The program excludes firms that are on the Federal List of 
Debarred or Suspended Contractors. 
The protégé firm will go through the process of self-identification by attending 
small business outreach events, networking, and marketing its self to larger, successful 
firms. Often they must track those potential mentor firms and offer solutions to their 
problems. Likewise, mentor firms may offer them potential opportunities—usually to 
subcontract to a small business in a set-aside procurement. 
As a mentor, the DOS MPP is open to any firm (large or small) that demonstrates 
the commitment and capability to assist in the development of a small business protégé. 
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The mentor can be a business that has graduated from the 8(a) business development 
program, a firm in the transitional stage of the program, or a small or large business. The 
mentor must also demonstrate that it is a federal contractor in good standing. 
Some of the steps to becoming a mentor-protégé team are first to meet each other. 
Build a business relationship, usually through subcontracting. Then, solidify the 
relationship through a teaming as mentor and protégé. Finally, the mentor-protégé team 
jointly submits an agreement to the State Department Office of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization (OSDBU) for review and approval. The agreement should 
demonstrate the mutually beneficial relationship of the two parties. 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship 
The MPP is reviewed annually for firms that appear on the Federal List of 
Debarred or Suspended Contractors. If a mentor or protégé appears on this list they will 
more than likely be excluded from any further government contracting opportunities. On 
a yearly basis, the program is evaluated to determine how the assistance aligns with the 
protégé’s strategic vision. In that time, the evaluator wants to see a committed 
relationship between both parties, assess the capabilities of the protégé and how they 
interface with the mentor. What they are looking for is stability in the management, 
financial status, and past performance of the protégé. Results of any contract/subcontract 
work between the mentor and protégé is very important, as are the subcontracting 
expectations of both parties. 
4. U.S. Agency for International Development 
The Mentor-Protégé Program operated by USAID also focuses on development 
assistance for 8(a) small businesses. Regardless of whether it is a service disabled 
veteran-owned small business, veteran-owned small business or woman-owned small 
business, the USAID program assists small businesses that have obtained certification in 
the Historically Underutilized Business Zone program. By enhancing the capabilities of 
protégé companies, the assistance provided to enhance the capabilities of the protégé 
firms to perform as prime contractors and subcontractors on USAID procurements. 
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a. Benefits of the USAID Mentor-Protégé Program 
The MPP is designed to motivate and encourage large business prime contractor 
firms to provide mutually beneficial developmental assistance to SBs, VOSBs, 
SDVOSBs, HUBZone SBs, SDBs, and WOSB concerns. 
This program is a community-based effort involving leaders of major firms, 
financial and bonding institutions, contracting associations, purchasing contract 
compliance, small business enterprises and support service organizations. It provides an 
opportunity for the small disadvantaged (protégé) firm to overcome barriers that typically 
inhibit or restrict the success of its business. It encourages major federal prime 
contractors (mentors) to enhance the management and technical capabilities of the 
protégé. The mentor may provide financial assistance in the form of equity investments 
or loans, subcontracts support and assistance in performing prime contracts through 
agreements with protégé firms. 
Overall, the program is designed to produce a broad base of high quality, 
competitive and profitable companies through incremental improvement. It is expected 
that as a result of the program, protégés will experience a greater than industry average 
success rate and realize the growth and profitability objectives of their business plans, as 
well as long-range stability. 
By implementing this program as a component of our small business enterprise, 
USAID will provide a community benefit by strengthening emerging businesses and 
providing them with previously denied opportunities for growth, expansion and increased 
participation in USAID’s economic development. The MPP enables USAID to build 
effective working relationships between leaders of mature established companies and 
emerging small business enterprises in order for the latter to benefit from the knowledge 
and experience of the established mentor firms. Furthermore, the program: 
 Fosters the establishment of long-term, mutually beneficial business 
relationships between USAID and the private sector. 
 Facilitates the ability to acquire an expanded base of qualified small 
businesses that can successfully participate in USAID arena. 
 Strengthens subcontracting opportunities. 
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 Provides greater assurance that a protégé subcontractor will be able to 
perform under a contract than a similarly situated non-protégé 
subcontractor. 
 Enhances USAID’s overall business and economic environments. 
 Mitigates the effects of necessary and justified contract bundling. 
b. Benefits to Protégés 
The program is intended to enhance the capability of the small businesses so that 
they may compete more successfully for federal government contracts. In addition, it 
encourages private-sector relationships and expands SBA’s efforts to identify and 
respond to the developmental needs of the participants. The MPP arrangements enable 
protégés to receive technical, managerial or any other mutually agreed upon benefits 
from mentors including work that flows from a government or commercial contract 
through subcontracting or teaming arrangements. Mentors may also provide financial 
assistance in the form of equity or loans to help it raise capital. 
Successful protégés capitalize on available business development resources, 
educate themselves on government buying needs, and market themselves based on skills 
and ability to meet such needs. Further, protégé firms gain opportunities to seek and 
perform government and commercial contracts through the guidance and support of 
mentor firms that may not have been available to them without the MPP. 
c. Benefits to the Mentors 
For acquisitions that contain the requirement for a subcontracting plan, mentors 
are eligible to receive credit in the source selection and evaluation criteria process for 
mentor-protégé participation. Additionally, a post-award incentive for subcontracting 
plan credit is available by recognizing allowable costs incurred by a mentor firm in 
providing assistance to a protégé firm. Using this credit for purposes of determining 
whether the mentor firm attains a subcontracting plan participation goal applicable to the 
mentor firm under a USAID contract. 
 74 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program 
As a potential protégé, you must meet the established eligibility requirements to 
participate in the Program. A protégé must be in good standing in the 8(a) Program and 
must be current with all reporting requirements. The eligibility requirements are provided 
in 719.273 AIDAR and summarized below: 
 The prospective protégé must be a SB, VOSB, SDVOSB, HUBZone, 
small socially and economically disadvantaged business, or WOSB; 
 The prospective protégé must meet the size standard corresponding to the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code that the 
mentor prime contractor believes best describes the product or service 
being acquired by the subcontract; 
 The prospective protégé must be eligible for award of government 
contracts; and the prospective protégé must not appear on the Federal list 
of debarred or suspended contractor as described in the FAR Subpart 9.4, 
Debarment, Suspension and Ineligibility. 
 Generally, a protégé will not have more than one mentor at a time. 
However, protégés participating in additional Mentor-Protégé Programs 
should maintain a system for preparing separate reports of mentoring 
activity so that the results of the USAID Program can be reported 
separately from other agency programs. 
As a potential mentor, you must meet the established eligibility requirements to 
participate in the program. A mentor can be a business that has graduated from the 8(a) 
Program, a firm in the transitional stage of the program, or a small or large business. 
Regardless of size, you must have the capability to assist the protégé firm and be able to 
make a commitment for at least one year. The eligibility requirements are provided in 
719.273 AIDAR and summarized below: 
 The potential mentor may be either a large or small business entity; 
 The potential mentor must be eligible for award of Government contracts; 
 The potential mentor must be able to provide developmental assistance 
that will enhance the ability of protégés to perform as prime contractors or 
subcontractors; and 
 The potential mentor will be encouraged to enter into arrangements with 
entities with which it has established business relationships. 
 The potential mentor shall not appear on the Federal list of debarred or 
suspended contractor as described in the FAR Subpart 9.4, Debarment, 
Suspension, and Ineligibility. 
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 Informing and reminding mentors and protégés of their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 Attending mentor-protégé meetings to promote effective cooperation and 
participation. 
 Reviewing meeting and progress status reports. 
 Conducting annual performance reviews under the approved MP 
Agreements. 
 Maintaining Program records. 
 Attracting the support of larger corporate sponsors. 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship 
Annual performance reviews will be conducted by the OSDBU/Minority 
Resource Center (MRC) Deputy Director. These performance reviews will focus on the 
progress and accomplishment realized under approved Mentor-Protégé Agreements. The 
mentor-protégé package should include a statement upon submission that both the mentor 
and the protégé will fully comply with all the reporting requirements of the USAID MPP. 
As the mentor, you are required to report on the progress made under each of your 
active Mentor-Protégé agreements annually throughout the term of the agreement. Each 
report is due 30 days after the end of each twelve-month period commencing with the 
start of the agreement. A template for the annual report can be found in Appendix C. 
The protégé will also be required to submit an individually developed annual 
report using the same form. Their report must document the progress made during by the 
prior twelve months in employment, revenues and participation in USAID contracts. The 
protégé report may be submitted as part of the mentor report or submitted separately, and 
is due at the same time as the mentor report. 
Be aware that the OSDBU/MRC Deputy Director places extra emphasis on the 
required annual reports since these reports will be used to determine if the agreement is 
meeting its milestones outlined in the original agreement package, and the effect of the 




mentoring award to the mentoring firm providing the most effective developmental 
support of a protégé. Each year a mentor firm will be invited to present Program 
progress. 
Under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637(d)(4)(E), USAID is authorized to 
provide appropriate incentives to encourage subcontracting opportunities for small 
business consistent with the efficient and economical performance of the contract. This 
authority is limited to negotiated procurements. FAR 19.202–1 provides additional 
guidance. 
Costs incurred by a mentor to provide developmental assistance, as described in 
719.273–8 to fulfill the terms of their agreement(s) with a protégé firm(s), are not 
reimbursable as a direct cost under a USAID contract. If USAID is the mentor’s 
responsible audit agency under FAR 42.703–1, USAID will consider these costs in 
determining indirect cost rates. If USAID is not the responsible audit agency, mentors are 
encouraged to enter into an advance agreement with their responsible audit agency on the 
treatment of such costs when determining indirect cost rates. In addition, contracting 
officers grant mentors evaluation credit under FAR 15.101–1 considerations for 
subcontracts awarded pursuant to their Mentor-Protégé Agreements and their 
subcontracting plans. 
5. Department of Homeland Security 
The Mentor-Protégé Program is designed to motivate and encourage large 
business prime contractor firms to provide mutually beneficial developmental assistance 
to SBs, VOSBs, SDVOSBs, HUBZone SBs, SDBs, and WOSB concerns. The program is 
also designed to improve the performance of contracts and subcontracts, foster the 
establishment of long-term business relationships between large prime contractors and 
small business subcontractors, and strengthen subcontracting opportunities and 
accomplishments through three incentives. 
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a. Benefits of the DHS Mentor-Protégé Program 
The greatest benefit of the DHS Mentor-Protégé Program is that the program is 
designed to motivate large prime contractors doing business with the government to 
provide mutually beneficial developmental support and encouragement to small 
businesses. This Mentor-Protégé Agreement targets business development of protégé 
firms. 
The program is also designed to foster long-term business relationships between 
large and small DHS contractors, to enhance the performance of DHS contracts, while 
prime and subcontracting opportunities are enhanced. DHS sponsors vendor opportunities 
to facilitate potential mentors and protégés networking, which helps firms identify future 
partnering candidates. The department does not match or recommend firms to serve as 
mentors or protégés and approval of DHS MPP agreements do not create joint ventures 
(JVs) between mentors and the protégés. 
The mentor and protégé are eligible for an annual award. The award is presented 
to the mentor-protégé team, which demonstrates teamwork and the mentor that provides 
the most effective developmental support to a protégé. The Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization, in consultation with senior DHS management, will 
solicit nominations from participating mentors and determine the award winner. 
b. Benefits to Protégés 
In addition to the benefits available to mentors, protégés may receive technical, 
managerial, financial, or any other mutually agreed upon benefit from mentors, including 
work that flows from a government or commercial contract through subcontracting or 
teaming arrangements. The assistance could result in significant small business 
development. Further, protégé firms gain opportunities to seek and perform government 
and commercial contracts through the guidance and support of mentor firms that may not 
have been available to them without the Mentor-Protégé Program. 
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c. Benefits to the Mentors 
For acquisitions that contain the requirement for a subcontracting plan, mentors 
are eligible to receive credit in the source selection/evaluation criteria process for mentor-
protégé participation. Additionally, a post-award incentive for subcontracting plan credit 
is available by recognizing costs incurred by a mentor firm in providing assistance to a 
protégé firm and using this credit for purposes of determining whether the mentor firm 
attains a subcontracting plan participation goal applicable to the mentor firm under a 
Homeland Security contract. See Section 1.5 of Program Details. 
For Homeland Security, the benefits of moving from the traditional large business 
prime contractor/small business subcontractor model to a mentor-protégé relationship 
model must be based on mutual agreement, trust and meaningful business development. 
These mentor-protégé arrangements provide DHS a greater assurance that a subcontractor 
that has a mentor-protégé relationship will be able to perform better under a contract 
versus a non-protégé subcontractor positioned likewise. 
There are certain added benefits that support the DHS mission. These include 
acquisition of an expanded base of qualified small businesses, subcontracting 
opportunities are strengthened, justified and necessary contract bundling, which has 
mitigating effects on the goal of achieving a potential increasing in small business 
program accomplishments. 
d. Eligibility for the Mentor-Protégé Program 
For a company to be selected as a protégé, it must be eligible as defined in 
Section 1.2(b) and eligible for receipt of federal government contracts. 
If the protégé may disclose declare to a mentor that it meets the requirements set 
forth in paragraph (a) of this section. A mentor may rely in good faith on the written 
business declarations consistent with the guidance cited in the FAR Part 219.1 by 
potential protégés as evidence of eligibility to participate. 
 Protégés may have multiple mentors. 
 Protégés participating in other federal Mentor-Protégé Programs in 
addition to the DHS’ program should maintain a system to record and 
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track its activities for each agency’s program and/or reporting 
requirements. 
Mentors may have multiple protégés. Mentors participating in other federal 
agencies’ Mentor-Protégé Programs, in addition to the DHS program, should maintain a 
system to prepare separate reports of mentoring activities for each agency’s program. The 
mentor will be encouraged to identify and select: 
 Eligible as defined in Section 1.2(a); 
 A broad base of small business firms whose core competencies support the 
DHS mission; 
 Small business firms with whom the firm has an established business 
relationship. 
e. Annual Evaluation of the Mentor-Protégé Relationship 
Upon completion of analysis of all five Mentor-Protégé Programs, having 
identified four areas of comparison; the benefits of the agency’s program to both the 
mentor and protégé; eligibility for participation as a either a mentor or protégé; 
evaluation criteria and disqualification. 
 Reporting and program review 
 The mentor and protégé will submit Mid-Term Progress Reports (18th 
month) jointly. 
 The mentor and protégé will each submit a Final Report (36th month) 
separately. 
 The protégé will submit a post MPP report annually for two years. 
 Mentor-Protégé business models 
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Figure 6.  Comparison of Five Mentor-Protégé Programs (from Pilireo Mazza, 2012) 
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B. COMPARISON OF FIVE MENTOR-PROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS 
There are nine areas that were used to compare the five U.S. agency Mentor-
Protégé Programs (SBA, DoD, DOS, USAID and DHS). The comparison criteria were 
identified and selected as a basis on mentor-protégé best practices and are the following 
list was taken from a Pilireo Mazza 2012 MPP comparison report. Elements compared 
are listed below: 
 Protégé Eligible  
 Mentor Eligible  
 Benefits for Mentor 
 Joint Ventures 
 Affiliation 
 Multiple Protégés 
 Multiple Mentors 
 Reporting 
1. Protégé Eligibility 
Protégé eligibility varies from agency to agency. The SBA has the greatest 
restriction on protégé eligibility. SBA protégés must be in the developmental stage of an 
8(a) Program, which means they are either in good standing or should never have 
received an 8(a) contract. Also, their size must be less than half the standard for the 
applicable NAICS code. For DoD eligibility, the protégé must be 8(a) qualified as a SDB, 
WOSB, SDVOSB, HUBZone, or be an employer of disabled persons. The last three, 
DOS, USAID and DHS allow all business to participate as protégés. 
2. Mentor Eligibility 
Mentor eligibility is just as diverse. SBA mentor firms must have two years of 
profits, indicating it is in good financial health, procurement experience and good 
character. The DoD requires that mentor have achieved prime contracting status or have 
graduated from the 8(a) firm status and have at least one active subcontracting plan. As 
mentors go, large and small prime contractors within DOS, USAID and DHS are capable 
of providing developmental assistance to protégés. 
 82 
3. Benefits for Mentors 
Many of the benefits for mentors are also good for protégés. Mentors in the SBA 
program can own up to 40% interest in a protégé firm, which gives them access to small 
business set asides. The DoD offers reimbursement for financial investment as 
developmental assistance costs. Through separately priced line items or separate 
contracts mentors can receive credit toward applicable subcontracting goals. DOS 
proposes evaluation credit for mentors with subcontracting plans. USAID offers the same 
benefits for it mentors. USAID also considers development costs for its mentors in 
determining indirect cost rates. DHS mentors do not receive this luxury. DHS mentors 
receive proposal evaluation and subcontracting plan credit, same as DOS mentors. 
4. Affiliation and Joint Venture 
Creation of a joint venture does not equate to an ongoing affiliation as a mentor-
protégé. Under SBA rules, which apply government wide, a mentor or protégé may enter 
into no more than three ventures over a two-year period or risk losing its mentor-protégé 
status with the SBA. A violation of the three-in-two rule means that the SBA Area Office 
may examine the parties’ overall relationship to determine whether they are generally 
affiliated. In the realm of Mentor-Protégé Programs, a primary mentor being engaged in a 
joint venture with another protégé firm does not make the primary mentor affiliated with 
its joint venture partner. The DoD has an affiliation exemption that may apply, but is not 
always encouraged to the fullest extent. Outside of the SBA, mentors and protégés may 
form joint ventures as small endeavors. Under the SBA guidance, mentors can maintain 
an exempt status as long as they do not enter into a joint venture. There are always 
exceptions to the rule. 
When one mentor enters into a number of joint ventures with another protégé, due 
to being contractually related to the second protégé, an economic dependence may 
eventually be found to affiliate the two. The first protégé, although a peer to the second 
protégé, based on the types of goods and services it provides could remain exempt from a 
joint venture affiliation. Differing interpretations of the policy have resulted in protests of 
the by government contractors. In a recent SBA size appeal decision, the Office of 
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Hearings and Appeals (OHA) confirmed that this exception from the affiliation rules is 
broad, even allowing an 8(a) mentor-protégé joint venture—potentially—to violate the 
so-called “three in two” rule. 
Typically DoD, DOS, USAID and DHS do not promoted JV. Only SBA 
encourages JV for small businesses and 8(a) contracts provide guidance and oversight 
when compared to the group of MPPs. DoD has, however, been able to maintain an 
exemption for mentor assistance to protégés. However, if the SBA has previously 
examined and approved the interactions between the parties—as was the case here—the 
SBA Area Office “should not undercut those approvals to find affiliation unless those 
violations are particularly egregious” (Koprince, 2012). 
5. Multiple Protégés 
Generally SBA does not usually allow more than one protégé at a time, unless 
expressly authorized by SBA. SBA never authorizes more than three protégés at a time. 
Each of the other four agencies authorizes mentors to have multiple protégés as well. 
However, DoD, DOS, USAID and DHS do not restrict the number. 
6. Multiple Mentors 
Under its MPP, the SBA reserves the authority to approve a second mentor, 
primarily when the second mentor relationship pertains to an unrelated, secondary 
NAICS code. When the protégé needs expertise that the primary mentor, it can be 
authorized to seek out a mentor that possesses the knowledge. Lastly, SBA can approve a 
second relationship as long as it does not compete or conflict with the assistance from the 
first relationship. The DoD does not allow multiple mentors, but the DOS, USAID and 
DHS do. 
7. Reporting 
 SBA: Protégé must annually report on developmental assistance in annual 
8(a) business plan update. Mentors must annually certify financial health 
and good character. 
 DoD: Semi-annual progress reports, and annual post-completion reports 
on employment and revenue statistics for two years following completion. 
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 DOS: Annual progress report, evaluation at end of agreement and any 
contract under it. 
 USAID: Separately prepared, annual progress reports, and annual post-
completion reports on employment and revenue statistics for each of the 
two years following completion. 
 DHS: Midterm briefing, joint midterm written progress report, and 
separate lessons learned report at end of agreement. 
Having conducted a comparison of the five indicated agencies with current MPPs, 
the best practices indicate that require the greatest review are joint ventures, benefits for 
the protégé, as a subcontractor, and affiliation are three areas that require more discussion 
and exploration. Adequate restraint exists for determining that protégé and mentor 
eligibility, benefits to mentors and reporting are being used. The oversight of multiple 
protégés and mentors is an indication that the agencies above are effective at 
implementing this best practice. The next step in this paper will be to assess the Afghan 
Mentorship Program and compare its best practices to those of this section. The purpose 
of the comparison is to identify areas of improvement, which will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapter. 
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V. CASE STUDY: THE AMP EXPERIENCE 
A. TASK 
The task provided by the COMISAF COIN guidance was to of make contracting 
commanders business. The task to enact a counterinsurgency effect for the mission 
commander through implementation of contingency contracting largely fell on deaf ears. 
Through a series of five small business initiatives, AMP utilized the best practices 
to achieve the objective. They are identified as Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan 
(ABBA), Afghan Mentorship Program, Joint Venture Program, Vendor Tournaments and 
the Craftsman Program. Although AMP was originally intended to benefit the local 
Bagram business community, word spread quickly, as vendors from around Afghanistan 
lined up to participate. 
I gave priority to creative, innovative approaches to meeting the intent of 
the COMISAF policy, I wouldn’t say that I mandated that every office 
have a Mentor-Protégé Program, every office had to have a program 
where we were actually expanding our vendor base and maturing that 
vendor base, I’d say mentor/protégé was just one approach to doing it. 
(Personal communication with former CENTCOM Contracting 
Commander, October 2013) 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the AMP was to development and implemented a small business 
training model at Bagram Regional Contracting Center to expand the vendor base to meet 
the Regional Command East (RC East). 
In October 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Maine, United States Air Force 
(USAF) contracting officer and BRCC Chief, developed a concept for a small business 
outreach program to identify Afghan businesses that make products in Afghanistan and 
broaden the utilize of the 886 Afghan First Policy. In the form of a Sole Source, 886 set-
aside contracts, ABBA was initiated and 47 Afghan businesses, in a 150 kilometer radius, 
were identified as potential vendors for 886 consideration. From that outcropping came 
AMP and Major Walter H. Dunn III, U.S. Army, designated as the BRCC COIN 
contracting officer worked with LtCol. Maine to refine AMP into a small business 
 86 
training program. In early February 2011, the first series of briefs on AMP were given to 
BG Camille Nichols, CENTCOM Contracting commander and Deputy Commanding 
General for Support BG Warren Phipps of the 101st ID in RC-East. After further 
refinement and execution AMP was expanded within BRCC to include a Mentor-Protégé 
Program, called the Joint Venture program, which teamed some of the small Afghan 
businesses that were identified through ABBA and trained under AMP. These small 
businesses were paired with larger Afghan businesses or other national companies 
possessing the skills necessary to mentor their new protégé. On either account the joint 
ventures helped to develop a robust subcontractor base in the Bagram RC-East region. 
The intent of AMP was to establish a baseline, unity of contracting effort within the 
Regional Command East task force commander’s area of operation at Bagram. 
The challenge of COIN contracting was to make contingency contracting in a 
contingency environment a non-lethal force multiplier for the taskforce commander. COL 
William Fuller, the Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan at the time understood that 
the AMP initiatives could provide an active metric for the correlation of better buying 
and COIN contracting. With the permission of MG Camille Nichols, AMP was launched. 
The overarching effect was to correlate contracting activities, account for contract 
revenues and target insurgent activity in a regional area by linking money paid to local 
contractors to insurgent activity. In concept, the non-lethal COIN capability AMP could 
provide would be invaluable. 
By conducting vendor fairs and small business outreach programs, identifying 
new vendors and potential contractors, the acquisition professional has the best chance of 
finding better people to engage in better business practices. Local talent on the verge of 
entering the competitive marketplace can receive the actions of contingency contracting 
activities that implemented programs for the purpose of exploiting objectives written into 
the counterinsurgency directive intended to contribute as a non-lethal force. The 
COMISAF’s COIN guidance placed the responsibility of achieving eleven key tasks on 
the shoulders of task force and unit commanders. 
In July 2011, the Afghan Mentorship Program concluded a six month proof of 
concept at Bagram Regional Contracting Center, where AMP was initially developed in 
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concept by BRCC chief LtCol. Christopher Maine, U.S. Air Force and refined and 
executed by Major Walter H. Dunn III, U.S. Army, with the blessing of then Senior 
Contracting Official–Afghanistan COL William Fuller. 
Colonel Fuller has since co-authored an article with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 
D. Ficklin and Captain Christopher T. Stein, both USAF, entitled “Contracting as 
counterinsurgency: the economic path to victory in Afghanistan.” Published by Defense 
AT&L in May–June 2011, COL Fuller extols the value of successful efforts to locally 
source most of the services and construction requirements needed to accelerate the share 
of our commodities buying, putting money back into Afghan market. 
Factories in Kabul make mattresses, desks, and chairs that are less 
expensive and contracting efforts provide an invaluable opportunity to 
empower Afghan businesses and create enduring political and economic 
change in Afghanistan. Economic success depends upon not just 
individual contracting officers pursuing innovative acquisition strategies, 
but also a collaborative whole-of-government commitment from all 
stakeholders. (Fuller, Ficklin, & Stein, 2011) 
In August 2010, regional contracting offices were singing a significantly different 
tune, as the NATO led International Security Assistance Force in the South and located at 
Kandahar Air Base, prepared to transition authority to the U.S./USFOR-A COMISAF. 
The NATO Maintenance Supply Agency, at that time was responsible for logistic and life 
support contracting requirements associated with all NATO-led ISAF in the southern 
region. Efforts to track and maintain financial accountability of local national contract 
vendors were virtually non-existent. 
As U.S. public law applies to U.S. contracting authorities, Section 886 of Public 
Law 110–181, published in FY 2008 of the National Defense Authorization Act, went 
greatly ignored at the Kandahar Regional Contracting Center. Created to provide 
economic opportunities for Afghan companies, the Afghan First Program was intended to 
create business opportunities for Afghan vendors and jobs for Afghan citizens. While 
promote economic development and conditions for stability, this set-aside program was 
primarily meant for small economic infusement projects that could accomplish combatant 
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Commander’s Emergency Response Program counterinsurgency objectives covered in 
Handbook 9–27, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapon System, dated April 2009. 
The Center for Army Lessons Learned publication was intended to employ 
commanders with key lessons to value money as a valuable weapons system, 
empowering them with the knowledge that money and contracting in a COIN 
environment are vital elements of combat power. Leaders were challenged to understand 
fund programs and how to leverage money used in contracting to impact their operations, 
effectively retooling contracting as a shaping force on the battlefield. Where brigades 
often lacked internal resource management and contracting expertise, a proactive leader 
could leverage the financial management and administrative knowledge of the 
contracting authority in his combat environment, while reducing the burdensome 
responsibility of interdicting potential fraud, waste and abuse in a COIN environment. 
According to the CALL commander’s MAAWS handbook, the proactive leader can 
achieve critical operational success and be a good steward of taxpayer dollars. 
In October 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Maine had an idea of how to initiate 
movement on the COIN COMISAF guidance. But he realized that he would need a better 
snapshot of the local economy and what/who he would be working with. Starting with the 
concept of purchasing building materials produced in Afghanistan by Afghan business, 
LtCol Maine initiated a vendor fair to reach out to small businesses surrounding Bagram 
Air Base. Appropriately named Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan, the ABBA 
initiative was intended in the form of a contract to identify and utilize these businesses 
for CERP projects. Awarded to an independent Afghan businessman, the contract 
required that the contractor find as many Afghan manufacturers as possible, within a 150 
kilometer radius around BRCC. The ABBA contract yielded the first 42 potential 
vendors. 
ABBA would lay unutilized for four months. In January 2011, MAJ Walter Dunn, 
previously the commodities chief at Kandahar RCC, was hand-selected by COL Fuller to 
head the Bagram COIN contracting effort. The SCO-A wanted to get a handle on this 
new COIN contracting guidance and COL Fuller identified MAJ Dunn as “our man” to 
assume responsibility for all planning, training and integration of COIN contracting at 
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Bagram. Pitched to BG Camille Nichols, the CENTCOM JTS Contracting Commander, 
this would be a test bed of a concept and was going to be developed and implemented at 
Bagram. 
In the first 30 days of the COIN contracting program, MAJ Dunn, assisted by 
Lieutenant Colonel Maine, wrote, developed and initiated a small business development 
program for the local vendor market surrounding Bagram. During the six (6) month proof 
of concept period, the manager recruited and trained eighty-four (84) new Bagram 
Afghan vendors, expanding the local business economy. Having awarded twenty-five 
(25) Afghan first, 886, contracts, MAJ Dunn turned his focus toward woman-owned 
Afghan business development. 
The small business training model at Bagram Regional Contracting Center had 
become a COIN contracting success story. After the departure of Lieutenant Colonel 
Maine, a new U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Greg Mazul replaced him. Having 
arrived on short notice, he elevated the success of the BRCC COIN contracting program 
to the attention of BG Casey Blake, USAF. BG Blake having assumed command as the 
SCO-A in June 2011 was briefed on the success of the renamed Afghan Mentorship 
Program. Encompassing not only the ABBA initiative, AMP now included four other 
initiatives that fell under the umbrella of this small business development program. They 
were the namesake—Afghan Mentorship Program, initiative for vendor tournaments, the 
joint venture initiative and the craftsman initiative. Each initiative had a goal, concept 
and action. The SCO-A, BG Blake, saw AMP as the answer to the COIN contracting 
directive. Adopting it as the standard, he took the small business development model and 
distributed as a guide throughout the RCCs in Afghanistan. 
C. SUMMARY 
BG Casey Blake took these concepts in a basic form and intended to make them 
the SCO-A COIN contracting standard. In a 2011 article, published by Army AL&T 
Magazine, MAJ Christopher L. Center, extols the success of the Afghan Mentorship 
Program as a method for synchronizing four objectives: 1) bolster the efforts of 
stakeholders in the warfighter 2) contingency contracting communities enabling ISAF to 
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3) execute COIN operations which are 4) nested in the Afghan First (Section 886) 
Program (Center, 2011). 
1. Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan 
Goal: Identify and utilize building materials Afghan produced for CERP projects; 
use an 886 Afghan First clause in each contracting to redirect supply purchases and 
contracting funds to the local economy. 
Concept: Purchasing building materials produced in Afghanistan will create jobs 
and additional manufacturing possibilities. Contract awarded to canvass 150 kilometer 
radius around Bagram AB. Identified forty-two (42) Afghan manufactures, twenty-seven 
(27) found to employ trained personnel with certifications equal to European safety 
standards. 
Action: The contractor was able to consolidate information, product brochures, 
price lists, pictures and samples; information will be utilized to bond Afghan building 
materials and labor with the units Command Emergency Response Program. 
2. Afghan Mentorship Program 
Goal: Educate and provide information to Afghan vendors so that they may 
competitively win contracts and provide superior performance. 
Concept: Conduct weekly vendor training in small learning groups to effectively 
and efficiently imparting common business practices when doing business with the U.S. 
government. 
Action: BRCC will host weekly sessions, ability to track completion and entry 
into vendor tournament, provides flexibility for us and target audiences. 
3. Vendor Tournaments 
Goal: Develop a “Top Tier” vendor database of performers for award of Blanket 
Purchase Agreements (BPAs). 
Concept:  Pools of vendor competition at four (4) differing dollar thresholds. 
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Action: First vendor tournament conducted 10 Sep 10. At each level, three 
vendors were invited to participate in bidding. Losing bidders receive debriefing. Based 
on positive performance, winners were allowed to move into the next higher dollar pool. 
Vendors continued to advance through each pool until they reached Pool IV. These are 
identified as “Top Tier” and become eligible for BPAs and more demanding contracts. A 
losing bid or bad performance will move a vendor down to next lower pool. Three 
consecutive losses result in a vendor being found non-competitive. 
4. Joint Ventures 
Goal: To guide contractors into teaming arrangements allowing technology 
transfer. 
Concept: Afghan companies that do not have technical expertise to provide 
“Western Standard” goods and services are encouraged to team with international 
companies who have expertise for supervision, training and development of experience 
that has documented performance. 
Action: Ample competition among Afghan companies that have the ability to 
meet U.S. and European specifications provide an alternative to costly prime vendors 
with the benefit of more economic opportunity for the Afghan people. 
5. Craftsman Program 
Goal: Develop Afghan contractor base trained and certified in accordance with 
NEC 2008 and European Safety Standards and serve as a cost effective option to 
expensive prime contractors. 
Concept: Prime vendors, certified skilled craftsmen, engineers and specialists are 
encouraged to hire Afghan tradesmen apprentices, teach and mentor small businesses and 
develop subcontractors as a viable economic alternative to Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program and third-country national (TCN) labor. 
Action: Certified, subcontractors hired a COIN-centric cost-efficient labor force 
for electrical, plumbing, construction and other trades usually awarded to costly non-
Afghan international firms. 
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D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Assumptions 
a. Knowledge of Contracting 
The reader has a rudimentary knowledge and understanding of contracting in a 
contingency environment. 
b. Contingency Contracting 
The United States government will continue to use contingency, also known as 
expeditionary contracting as the primary means to support emergency and combat 
support operations throughout the global area of operation for the foreseeable future. 
c. Contingency Contracting Officers 
During a declared contingency operation, either deployed to a hostile combat zone 
or humanitarian and disaster relief area, the term contingency contracting officers will 
only refer to commissioned officers and enlisted personnel of the Department of Defense. 
d. Development of Contingency Contracting Guidance 
Developed over what could be considered a long period of time, the contingency 
contracting guidance used today evolved out of a need to win the hearts and minds of the 
populations that we liberated. In a 2011 article, “No More “Mad Money”: Salvaging the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” author Heidi Osterhout, Major, U.S. Air 
Force, exposes the origins of and all things CERP. Maj Osterhout paints a picture of 
success in the transitional stage of the war in Iraq, success, problems with management 
and transparency, and project sustainability. Efforts to battle cultures of fraud and 
corruption are drawn to similar conclusion in Iraq and Afghanistan. For all the work to 
police it, the success of CERP as seen from the eyes of the commanders using it only 
increased the magnitude of funding and failures. 
I can write a book on misuse of CERP and how not to do that again as 
well as Afghan infrastructure funds. And again, I don’t criticize the 
Brigade Commanders because they were under tremendous pressure with 
all that money  coming in that Congress pushed our way in term of budget 
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authority, to use it through CERP or AIF. The problem was we never had 
the oversight and what I mean by “oversight” is we never had the 
surveillance in place to do that because all of the CORs (contracting 
officer representatives) came out of the maneuver force and if I have a 
security-dependent environment. (Personal communication with SCO-A, 
October 2013) 
Ryan D. Yamaki-Taylor, a Naval Postgraduate School student and special 
operations officer, is the first individual to attempt to tie COIN contracting, MAAWS-A 
and CERP together in an effort to discern what went wrong through his 2011 thesis 
entitled, Shoot, move, communicate, purchase: How United States special forces can 
better employ money as a weapon system. Although not addressed in depth previously, 
Yamaki-Taylor endeavors to analyze historical friction areas experienced by CORs, 
caused by contracting officer guidance and special operations task force (SOTF) 
employment at the task force level and below. The impact of the COMISAF guidance on 
COIN contracting in Afghanistan was identified as having a correlational impact on the 
performance effectiveness of United States Special Forces (USSF), as it relates to the 
commander’s MAAWS-A guidance. By employing a modified version of the Yoder 
three-tier model for optimal planning and execution for contingency contracting, the 
author suggests that many of the historical frictions can be reduced or eliminated. 
e. Contingency Contracting Core Competencies 
Developed by CMDR (retired) Cory Yoder, former naval supply officer, the 
Yoder three-tier model consists of basic contracting officer core competencies and 
functions of personnel. Used to assess the current operational contracting environment, it 
can assist with determining the appropriate level of contingency contracting support 
necessary. Based on the existing support capabilities, the senior contracting official can 
determine the appropriate contingency contracting officer necessary based on the 
combined, joint or operational command structure. Each level within the Yoder model 
provides the senior acquisition professional with a guide for assigning individuals with 
the appropriate level of contracting education and experience to meet the challenges of a 
combined, joint or operational command structure. For the purpose of facilitating 
contracting awards based on operational requirements, the command must to weigh the 
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pros and cons of contingency contracting at each level. At the first level or tier-one is the 
ordering officer, next at tier-two is the leveraging contracting office and at tier-three is 
the integrated planner/executor. 
The ordering officer’s responsibility at Level I is to execute basic simplified 
acquisitions, in the form of orders, conduct and complete training in accordance with 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Contracting (CON) 234. The ordering officer is 
also Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Certified CON Level I 
or II and should be a junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers or General Schedule (GS) 
civilian, 1102 in the grade of GS7–9. The benefit of the ordering officer (tier-one) is the 
acquisition capability of simple buys under the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) 
amount with no need of integration with operational units. This can be seen as a 
disadvantage, as the ordering officer is not involved with the operational or logistical 
planning at the unit level and has no broad liaison function, which could be useful in the 
case of unforeseen and emerging requirements after execution. 
At the second tier is the leveraging officer, who is a small economy specialist 
capable of leveraging local markets, helping to reduce material “push and pull” and 
educating and training individuals at the DAU CON 234 level. Leveraging officers are 
DAWIA CON Level II or III certified, should be a senior enlisted, possibly a junior to 
mid-grade officer or a GS civilian 1102 (GS11 or higher). The leveraging officer is better 
at planning localized operations, can facilitate integration and provides the commander 
with more operational capability. One drawback to the leveraging officer is that they do 
not function as a planned theater integrator and thus provide no liaising capacity to the 
attached command. In addition, although highly proficient at contracting, the leveraging 
officer may perform local operations to optimize logistical support, but at a detriment to 
theater operations. 
The integrated planner/executor or tier-three is a senior officer (O6+) or senior 
1102 civilian/GS-13 or higher. Conducting acquisition planning at the highest joint 
levels, the individual is integrated at the G/J4 and G/J5. Involved with the creation and 
execution of operational plans (OPLANs), this officer provides direction for the 
contingency contracting officer (CCO) strategy two levels down, and links all operations 
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to the strategic theater objective of the combatant command (COCOM). This individual 
is highly educated, having earned both military and civilian graduate degrees. Certified at 
DAWIA Level III in contracting, the individual also has high DAWIA certifications in 
multiple disciplines. The integrated planner/executor performs operational and theater 
analysis, integrates results into OPLAN, and is the conduit between the COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater contracting operations. This individual coordinates theater 
objectives with best approach to contracted support and can achieve broader national 
security goals through effective distribution of national assets. There are no drawbacks to 
this tier system, as an integrated planner allows the combatant commander to focus on the 
operational and strategic mission. He or she orchestrates planning, communication, 
coordination, and exercises with nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and private 
voluntary organization (PVOs) in theater. 
The author, Yamaki-Taylor, ultimately came to the conclusion that a change in 
rank at the position of the Leveraging Contracting Officer (tier-two), along with timely 
integration of this senior, more competent contracting professional, would help or reduce 
frictions in the USSF contingency contracting process. Still the question remains, why is 
contingency contracting so important to counterinsurgency, when a COIN contracting 
directive was issued by the COMISAF commander? We can begin to understand its 
importance by understanding the contracting guidance. 
2. Limitations 
a. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance 
Intent of the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance was to achieve the 
following: 
 Afghan Mentorship Program has continued to be implemented. 
 Potential intelligence gathering value of AMP exploited. 
 Proof of concept has been codified and refined to meet changing economic 
conditions. 
 Afghan first (886) local vendor goals have been achieved. 
 Afghan vendor base has continued to expand, yielding increased savings. 
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 Local economies near or around RCC are diverse and self-sustaining. 
 AMP refined and more pliable, other small business programs developed 
 COIN contracting program is centrally managed, increased C2. 
 Limitations 
 Command and Control—Standardization has limited programs ability to 
meet RCC immediate need. 
 Information is located in the military theater of war. 
 Classification/Restrictions prevent information sharing. 
 Lessons learned are not passed on. 
 Contracting officer experience level. 
 Combatant Commander’s knowledge/understanding of program. 
b. COIN Guidance One Task at a Time 
The first task was to understand the role of contracting in counterinsurgency 
operations. Not a difficult first step, as early customer education, expectation 
management and contract management training at the regional contracting centers were 
abundantly available. The challenge was time. With so many competing constraints, unit 
commanders and staff had very little time to receive the necessary contract management 
training. 
The second challenge was to train and hire Afghans first, according to the Section 
886 Policy, which is not a typical function of a combatant force. As units collocated and 
established bases of operation in localized population areas, they were able to know who 
they were buying from, purchasing Afghan products and building Afghan capacity. This 
was the third and perhaps most important challenge addressed to all commanders, 
contracting personnel, military personnel and civilians of NATO ISAF and USFOR-A. 
The COMISAF’s COIN contracting guidance was a set of tasks that challenged the 
acquisition process at every level. Aimed at contingency contracting professionals, trying 
to understand the fourth task, the role of contracting in counterinsurgency was a complex 




professionals in the RCC focused purchasing on Afghan products. An organizational 
policy of decentralized execution was essential for CENTCOM contracting to build 
Afghan capacity, at all levels. 
Heavily influenced by 886, achieving task five, knowing whom you are buying 
from was exceptionally difficult. Based on the volume of contracting requirements 
streaming out of the regional JARBs and JFUBs, the tide of rubber-stamped requirements 
posed a direct challenge to the exercise of responsible contracting practices. At any given 
time, a contracting officer with an RCC could be expected to have 30–40 pending 
contracting actions. 
The sixth, seventh and eighth tasks of integration of contracting into intelligence, 
plans and operations, consulting with local leadership and developing intelligence from 
contracting actions might have been the straw that broke the contracting officers back. 
Integration of contracting into Intelligence is something that must be coordinated for and 
accomplished at the tactical and operational levels by brigade and task force 
commanders. Contracting authorities are not trained or staffed for such capabilities. 
Consulting and involving local leaders, to develop new partnerships, which also have an 
intelligence value and force multiplying capability, relative to security and stability is 
again a tactical and operational level function. It does provide ample opportunity to 
collect critical information for commander’s decisions. However, it is manpower 
intensive. Soldiers at the smallest unit level, the fire team, are capable of accomplishing 
this challenge. 
The last three challenges, contracting professional must look beyond cost, 
schedule and performance, acting now and getting the message out were wishful 
thinking. To meet the COIN guidance, the COMISAF Commander challenged every 
leader to invest adequate personnel within each organization the task of oversight and 
contract requirement enforcement. It is an expected practice for commanders to accept 
risk in non-critical areas of management when faced with competing critical 
requirements. This is one area that most chose to sacrifice. The COMISAF commander 
issued the order for all of those involved in the acquisition process to act—make this a 
priority now, as many years and millions of dollars went unaccounted for. The last task 
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was to get the word out. The process of telling your success stories and finding 
individuals that will listen was a major challenge for all every involved. Successful 
contingency contracting is not a scorching topic in the information operations arena and 
the competing requirements that consume a contracting activities efforts and assets are 
rarely media worthy. 
c. Personnel Strength 
Finite number of acquisition professionals in the CENTCOM contracting AOR. 
d. Institutional Knowledge and Organizational Experience 
The legacy of institutional knowledge was insufficient do aptly apply best 
practices, which were incomplete in the areas of expeditionary and contingency 
contracting experience within the organization. Factor in scant pre-deployment 
qualification standards, which were supposed to be mandatory, coupled with a joint 
operational contracting environment and you have the potential for oversight failure. In 
addition, by factoring in varying, service orientation tour lengths that inhibit contracting 
continuity, the chances for instituting acceptable operational competence within the 
organization is further diminished. The intent here is to provide an adequate picture of the 
institutional knowledge and operational experience expected to implement the COIN 
contracting guidance, as many other corrective actions as recommended by the many 
reports were just out of reach. 
This thesis explores the Afghan Mentorship Program, consisting of five initiatives 
that effectively managed these deficiencies and achieved integration and implementation 
of the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance. 
E. AFGHANS BUILDING A BETTER AFGHANISTAN 
The Bagram Regional Contracting Center was the first contingency contracting 
office to conduct an extensive market research campaign. Known as the Afghans 
Building a Better Afghanistan initiative, the Bagram Regional Contingency Contracting 
Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Maine, envisioned a way to broaden the 
distribution of economic opportunity in the Eastern region around Bagram. He approved 
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a solicitation and contract award focused on identifying Afghan businesses within a 150 
kilometer radius that produced or imported products for the Afghan market. Lieutenant 
Colonel Maine saw that implementation of the 886 Afghan First Policy would require a 
ground-up, rather than top-down application if it was going to be successful. Also rooted 
in local Afghan business, would be a catalog, which was the product and deliverable of 
that ABBA contract award. In the name of extensive market research, the Afghan 
company to which the contract was awarded executed its survey and was able to find and 
identify forty-seven (47) local Afghan businesses that either produced products in 
Afghanistan or imported and assembled products within the 150 kilometer radius form of 
a contract that would be awarded to a company for conducting a of found of the Bagram. 
For the purpose of broadening the financial and economic base in the region 
around Bagram, the ABBA initiative, Afghans Building a Better Afghanistan, was 
instituted. Through a proposed solicitation clause, a copy of which is provided in Figure 
7, numbered 952.211–0001, the Bagram Regional Contracting Center, sought wider 
implementation of the Afghan first 886 initiative. In its most refined form, 952.211–
0001—an Afghan Manufacturing Requirement was forcing mechanism for larger 
Afghan-owned businesses to use local Afghan products (Department of the Army [DOA], 
2010). The ABBA clause sought an alternative to time, schedule and performance by 
providing RCC contingency contracting officers the latitude to direct businesses 
competing for government contracts to use Afghan made products. Although it was 
approved in concept by the CENTCOM Contracting Commander, BG Camille Nichols, 
the ABBA clause would not be formally approved and adopted by the subsequent 
Commander, Admiral Nicolas Kalathas. 
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Figure 7.  Proposed Clause 952.211–0001—Afghan Manufacturing Requirement (Sep 
2010) (from DOA, 2010) 
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F. AFGHAN MENTORSHIP PROGRAM 
AMP effectively and efficiently provides information to Afghan vendors so that 
they may compete for and win requirements contracts, while providing superior 
performance. AMP training sessions, as listed in Figure 8, include ethical behavior, fair 
market, solicitations, legitimate offers, commodities, services and construction 
(Department of the Army [DOA], 2011).  
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Figure 8.  Initial Authorization and Schedule of Afghan Mentorship Program at Bagram 
Regional Contracting Center (from DOA, 2011) 
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G. VENDOR TOURNAMENTS 
Vendor tournaments increase the available vendor base supporting BRCC with 
competent contractors and, in so doing, provide greater opportunities for Afghan 
companies. 
Goal: To increase the available vendor base supporting BRCC with competent 
contractors and in doing so, provide greater opportunities for Afghan companies. 
Background: Bagram RCC’s vendor database consists of approximately 120 
contractors, of which 20 have active Blanket Purchase Agreements. BPAs cover the 
majority of commodities ordered, including the most frequent, such as phone cards and 
printer cartridges. 
Premise: Communication, competition and opportunities used together will create 
more competent vendors, spread wealth and provide better service to BRCC. 
Process: 
1. Create Access based tool to track new vendors, and competitive wins—
Done 
2. Design competition bracket, pools and rules for tournament—Done 
3. Validate new vendors, JCCS, SPOT—Ongoing 
4. Implement—First VT done 10 Sept 2010 
5. Monitor, report 
Rules: 
1. Contractor must be registered and in good or neutral standing 
2. Requests for Quotes will be categorized into four pools; 
a. Pool I: $1–$25,000—General 
b. Pool II: $25,001–$50,000 
c. Pool III: $50,001–$100,000 
d. Pool IV: >$100,000 
3. KO will invite 3+ vendors to bid (minimum 3) from general contractor 
population, which can be seen in Figure 9, the winner earns the award and 
upon satisfactory performance may enter and advance to next higher pool. 
Update Vendor Tournament database (BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 
2011). 
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4. Losing contractors from competition will be debriefed on “why” they lost. 
Price, not compliant, late, etc. Vendor Tournament database updated with 
reason for loss and the loss will be annotated. 
5. Each contractor will be allowed 3 opportunities to compete and win an 
award. Upon 3 losses, contractor will be categorized non-competitive and 
ineligible for future Vendor Tournament competitions, unless General 
Pool is exhausted. 
6. As Vendor Tournament progresses, Pools II–IV, as denoted by Figure 10, 
will become populated with winning, competitive contractors. In order to 
advance to the next Pool, a win must be secured in the current pool. Three 
losses in a Pool (II–IV) will result in a demotion to the next lower pool 
(BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011). 
7. Once a contractor has successfully reached Pool IV, he has demonstrated 
competitiveness, and the ability to meet the Governments needs on a 
recurring basis; these contractors are “top tier” and will be eligible for 
future BPA’s and more demanding contracts. 
8. Program will grow and adapt as we become more experienced, flexibility 
is key. 
Vendor Tier Pools: 
Tier I: Contracts under $25K—Four awards in the last 60 days 
 
Figure 9.  Tier I Vendor Competition Pool < $25K  
(from BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011) 
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Tier II: Contracts between $25K–$50K 
 
Figure 10.  Tier II Vendor Competition Pool $25–50K 
(from BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011) 
Tier III and IV Vendor Competition Pools follow the same concept. 
Tier III $50K–$100K 
Tier IV >$100K 
A total of 84 new Afghan business participated in the AMP training proram. Of 
those that completed the training, 27 successfully submitted proposals that resulted in the 
award of contracts that allowed them to continue to advace through the vendor 
tournament competition pools. The proof of concept for this initiative was achieved with 
the successful advancement of three vendors through all four tiers and each receiving 
contracts awarded in excess of $250K. 
During the vendor tournament competition process, 24 Afghan woman-owned 
businesses, pictured in Figure 11, were also trained by Major Walter Dunn through the 
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AMP program and a Shura or day inviting Bagram’s women-owned business owners held 
on July 7, 2011 (BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011). The BRCC Chief, LtCol Greg 
Mazul, U.S. Air Force, was the presiding guest speaker. LtCol Mazul is now retired and a 
professor of Contract Management for Defense Acquisition University, Capital Northeast 
Region. 
 
Figure 11.  Bagram Air Field Afghan Women-owned Business Shura Held July 7, 2011 
H. JOINT VENTURE AND PARTNERING PROGRAM 
Goal: Utilize DFARS 225–7700 Section 886 to the maximum extent possible, and 
if necessary through the use of Joint Venture agreements, bring the required level of 
expertise. This will enable technical migration to Afghan firms, encouraging economic 
development. 
Examine each requirement, specifically services and construction and gauge 
expertise available through the Afghan marketplace. This can be done through 
coordination with Peace Dividend Trust, local chamber of commerce or utilizing existing 
vendor database and contacts. 
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If Afghan companies can be identified with the potential to perform, but lack 
technical expertise, KO can engage and mentor those companies on the technique of Joint 
Venture. 
Outcome: Technical competency of Afghan companies  
Progress to date: Awarded $50M concrete pad MAC to two Afghan Joint 
Ventures (AJVs) 
Award Pending for Theater Wells, one AJV, two Afghan companies 
Acquisition Strategy for Concrete B-Huts, mentoring in progress—Possible AJV 
I. CRAFTSMAN PROGRAM 
The final initiative, pictured in Figure 12, is the Craftsman Program which 
developed as a solution to reduce our dependence on the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011). LOGCAP is a U.S. Army peacetime 
initiative used to plan for the incorporation of civilian contractors in wartime and other 
contingency operations (Lucius & Riley, 2011). 
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Figure 12.  Craftsman Initiative–AMP Training Presentation 
(from BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011) 
Army Materiel Command serves as the program manager for LOGCAP logistic 
contract support and in Afghanistan the program included support for 59 forward 
operating bases (FOBs) with a combined supported population of over 70,000 military 
service members, coalition forces, and Department of Defense civilians and contractors, 
all geographically dispersed throughout the country. Although these are pre-surge figures, 
it is estimated that at the peak of the surge, there were more than 140,000 persons 
receiving support under LOGCAP. On a monthly basis, just in the northern half of 
Afghanistan, LOGCAP provided operations and maintenance support to over 1,500 non-
tactical vehicles, 1,800 generators, 7,500 facilities, processing more than 150,000 bags of 
laundry, using over 42 million gallons of water, 19 million gallons of fuel and providing 
over 4 million meals at 40 dining facilities. We were completely dependent on LOGCAP 
(Lucius & Riley, 2011). 
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In an effort to reduce the amount that was spent on these types of cost contracts, 
an initiative to develop mentor-protégé relationships was undertaken. With the LOGCAP 
III and IV program, we began paying prime LOGCAP vendors to run training skills 
programs for small companies in order to establish longer-term partnerships, develop 
businesses that could perform at a reasonable cost, and eventually transition those support 
functions from the prime to the capable subcontractors. It was KBR in Iraq, and 
DynCorps and eventually Fluor in Afghanistan. There was some transitioning of basic 
LOGCAP functions in 2010–2011 (Barkley, 2011). But according to one senior 
contracting official, the concept to “use LOGCAP to get off of LOGCAP” never fully 
materialized (personal communication with former CENTCOM Contracting Commander, 
October 2013). Going on to say “at the time that I left—we just didn’t get that matured 
very far, it was very, very difficult to modify” and “because it was a cost contract, we 
were obviously paying their costs.” 
Within the Regional Command–East located at Bagram Airbase, the COIN 
contracting officer developed an initiative that leveraged the existing relationship of the 
LOGCAP IV contractor, Fluor and the Korean Vocational Training Center (KVTC). 
Established by the Korean International Cooperation Agency at Bagram Air Base, Fluor 
had partnered with the KOICA. At no additional cost to Fluor it provided tools and 
resources to KVTC, assisting with 800 hour training courses in five skill areas. In return, 
the KVTC provided relatively qualified students from the local area as a renewed labor 
force for Fluor. The cost of tools and materials would be passed onto the government 
under the LOGCAP contract.  The Craftsman Program was introduced as a vendor 
development program and missing alternative that married successful KVTC participants 
with economic opportunities to establish and development new Afghan-owned 
businesses. The BRCC COIN officer began working with the director and staff of KVTC. 
Their mission was to provide new skills and techniques for the young generation in 
Parwan and Kapisa provinces by focusing training in five key areas: electrical 
installation, welding, automotive repair, CAD/computer science and the constructions 
trades. 
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 As the KVTC training center focused its educational investment on 80–120 
trainees per class, like the ones below in Figure 13, the COIN contracting officer worked 
with USAID, DOS and other NGOs to assist new graduates with microgrants and capital 
to start businesses in any of the five key areas (BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011). 
Thus providing young Afghan entrepreneurs with an opportunity to contribute to the 
stability of the local economy, expand the local vendor base and in theory, drive down 
cost by increasing competition. 
 
Figure 13.  Korean Vocational Training Center and COIN Contracting Presentation 
(from BRCC COIN Contracting Brief, 2011) 
By developing training and certifications programs in automotive repair, welding, 
computer science, electrical and the construction trades, KVTC was at the forefront of 
evolving Afghanistan’s best future talent. In conjunction with the assistance of the KVTC 
director and staff, the intent of the Craftsman Program (CP) would be to identify new 
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vocational graduates and guide them through the possibility of starting their own Afghan 
businesses. Those with a strong entrepreneurial spirit and aspirations of taking on the 
challenge of rebuilding their country would receive an excellent opportunity to benefit 
from the first four AMP initiatives. As an addition to AMP, CP was introduced as means 
to grow the local vendor base. 
Focused on providing a trained and skillful new generation of Afghan trades men, 
KVTC had been extremely successful in helping to develop new employees for prime 
LOGCAP contractors. With CP it appeared that there was a possibility to leverage Fluor, 
DynCorps, Sodexo and other international subprime vendors to reduce ISAF and NATO 
dependence on LOGCAP. Establishment of these new Afghan businesses would be vital 
to meeting the increased ISAF-NATO surge demands. More importantly, this mentor-
protégé initiative would be essential for the future of ANA and ANP operational 
requirements, as the possibility of establishing long-term financially viable opportunities 
could, provide stability for the Afghan economy through enduring local business 
opportunities. 
The immediate impact of eight new businesses that had successfully completed all 
five initiatives was apparent, if not for a moment. These young idealistic entrepreneurs 
entered the local vendor base, expanding local competition pool and increasing supplies 
for basic commodities. The increased supply did cause a momentary fluctuation in the 
cost of goods and services around the Bagram area, which drove down factors of 
constraint. This can be attributed to the deflation of some, but not all, local prices of 
supply. However, based on the emphases of contracting integration cells and the 
directional support of the new SCO-A, the overall success of the tradesman program and 
AMP as an effective Mentor-Protégé Program would go unrealized. As a test case, AMP 
provided immediate success and a host of untapped potential regarding the development 
and successful execute of Afghan businesses. Time, talent and maturation of these 
tradesmen and craftsman would help assist in the development of a Mentor-Protégé 
Program that could of future benefit in Afghanistan and other unforeseen contingency 
operations. 
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Through mentor-protégé partnering programs and joint ventures between large 
and small Afghan companies, international third nation businesses, agency and non-
governmental organizations like the DOS, USAID, Afghan First and Peace Dividend 
Trust are provided an opportunity to provide micro loans assistance. The Craftsmen 
program was also intended to assist combatant commanders with CERP Projects in the 
form of basic construction for schools, Afghan National Army and police bases, medical 
clinics/hospitals and water wells. Joint venture programs of the past have successfully 
teamed small Afghan businesses with larger mentors to produce boots in a new shoe 
factory, uniforms for the ANP and furniture, such as mattresses for the ANA (Rhyne, 
2011 & Butler, 2012). 
J. CONCLUSION ON AMP 
The Afghan Mentorship Program was a partial success. As a pilot program it did 
accomplish the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance by focusing on effects-based 
contracting. It was responsive to the needs of RC-East operational contracting support. In 
the areas of contractor payment and fiscal accountability, AMP was unable to achieve the 
objective of financial transparency. The AMP program was unable to accomplish this 
because of three inhibitors: time, personnel and regional limitations of program. 
The length of time that AMP operated was definitely a factor in its limited 
success. For six months, from mid-January 2011 until August 2011, new Afghan 
businesses were taught, coached and mentored through the process of doing business 
with the U.S. government. In a seven-month period, AMP was able to effectively train 84 
vendors Afghan vendors, 24 of which were women-owned. Three were able to 
successfully graduate through the vendor tournament pools at each threshold and be 
determined as fully qualified for awards of contracts above $100K. Each of these 
graduates had established, tracked and evaluated successful past performance. The 
conclusion is that given more time, AMP would have continued to produce responsive, 
best qualified vendors for performance of government contracts and excellent protégé 
and future mentor businesses in Afghanistan. 
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Operated by one U.S. Army major, with the assistance of four commodities, two 
service contracting officers, and two Afghan local hires as translators, AMP was resource 
constrained. All aspects of AMP were voluntary, to include contracting officer 
participation. There was no formal guidance or policy from CENTCOM Contracting 
Command mandating contract solicitation identification for potential AMP participants. 
Submission of proposals from AMP tournament participants were frequently in Dari or 
Pashto and required tedious translation. Absent an operational budget, pooling 
instructional materials, solicitations and communications, resources consumed a 
considerable amount of time. 
The AMP program was operated out of the Bagram Regional Contracting Center 
at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Having been a former Soviet airfield, the village of 
Bagram had an existing vendor market, which now catered to the U.S. and defense 
contractor population. This was beneficial to establishing vendor classifications by type 
and size. Their dependence on non-Afghan revenue was an inhibitor in that it was 
difficult to find goods that met the 886 Policy classification. With the focus being to 
prepare future Afghan business owners to transition to a majority Afghan-based 
economy, they would have to focus on Afghan-centric demand for goods and services. 
Economically, the local Afghan market around Bagram could support local vendors, but 
not in regions beyond 150 kilometers. Therefore, the AMP model was not readily 
exportable to other regional contracting offices for implementation. Given enough time to 
work through localized and regional economic/business councils, a solution may have 
been found. 
K. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The purpose of this comparative analysis of Mentor-Protégé Programs and the 
Afghan Mentorship Program, the results of which can be seen in Figure 14, is to 
determine the best practices of existing business development models for future 
applications. One thing to consider is that all MPPs compared are aligned under the FAR 
part 15 and SBA rules for 8(a) businesses CONUS. The assessment of AMP is in a 
contingency environment and not subject to the same scrutiny as the MPPs. Having 
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identified this, establishment of evaluation criteria, as seen in Figure 17, have been 
applied in both cases to yield best practices, which may be applicable to future 
expeditionary and operational contingency contracting support. 
This comparative analysis is not an attempt to establish a one-size-fits-all model 
for MPPs. In the interest time and the necessity of future exploration, the task of 
integrating contracting as a COIN function and the complexity of expeditionary and 
contingency contracting planning and execution will be minimal. However, by critiquing 
the advantages and disadvantages of MPPs compared to AMP, a greater understanding of 
existing best practices have identified a methodology for future study of small business 
endeavors, the benefits of like MPPs, not previously identified and a way to establish 
greater fiscal accountability and business transparency as identified as needed by the 
reports referenced within this paper. While no tool is perfect, AMP was program that 
helped to expand local vendor markets, reduced barriers to entry, provided vendor 
oversight through mentor-protégé and joint venture partnerships, and increased the 
number and dollar value of contracts awarded at BRCC. 
The advantages and disadvantages identified in this section were derived from the 
literature review, interviews and comparative analysis of each of the Mentor-Protégé 
Programs studied. Many of these criteria deemed advantages and disadvantages come 
directly from agency MPP handbooks, manuals, joint publications, DA pamphlets, GAO 




Figure 14.  MPPs versus AMP Comparative Analysis 
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1. Evaluation Criteria 
 Vendor registration through Central Contractor Registration (CCR) and 
JCCS 
 MPP Selection Authority, either agency appointed or KO 
 Fraud and corruption safeguards facilitate fiscal transparency 
 Management of both supply and personnel 
 Accounting practices 
 Incentives for investment from mentor in protégé firms 
 Affiliation of joint ventures/partnering 
 Number of mentors to protégé limitations 
 Number of protégés to mentor limitations 
 Performance evaluations 
 Payment, advanced or progress  
 Termination authority  
 Policy and best practices 
2. Agency Mentor-Protégé Programs 
a. Advantages 
SBA compliant MPPs provide established business practices to new and 
disadvantaged small businesses. Those business practices embody sound elements of a 
mature management function. Responsive accounting oversight by the mentor imparts 
practiced fiscal accountability by the protégé. 
Cost reimbursement up to 1 million dollars, protégé subcontractor credit and 
protégé investment and partial ownership provide adequate mentor financial motivation 
for stateside programs. A modest investment in a young 8(a) protégé business by a 
mentor’s could yield a 10–40% stake in future multinational business. This also gains the 
mentor access to small business set-aside awards and graduated participation as the 
protégé grows. 
Certain MPPs offer allow for multiple protégés and multiple mentor relationships 
to develop in order to facilitate development of protégé knowledge, best practices and 
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achieve the possible performance prior to the MPP performance review. Many of which 
are annual for contracts that have little to no dollar limitations. This makes MPP contract 
award oversight difficult, but manageable. Many of the disadvantages are manageable as 
well. 
Protégés are generally SBA certified and fully qualified to register as participants 
in the 8(a) Program or other socioeconomic categories (with some exceptions). The 
System for Award Management (SAM) serves as a registration one-stop shop for official 
U.S. government systems and consolidates the capabilities of other agencies like 
CCR/FedReg, Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA), and 
Excluded Parties List System (EPLS). It does not however, act as a check and validation 
tool for exclusion; the Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) does provide 
assistance. 
For SBA MPPs, the approval is retained with the Government Contracting 
Business Development program manager and at the DoD, the Military Department 
(MILDEP) retains this selection authority. MPP is a volunteer program in all five 
agencies. 
To safeguard requiring activities and taxpayers from fraudulent contractors, each 
of the five agencies have some form of semiannual and annual performance reviews. 
These reviews meet SBA and OSBP standards. In many cases of construction and 
delivery of high dollar goods and services, agencies require contract bidders to put up 
bonds, such as bid bonds, performance bonds or payment bonds to secure a part of the 
value of the contract about to be entered into with the government. Contracting officer 
representatives and those with certifying authority can also assist with fraud prevention.  
Mentors using an established management practice that emphasizes good business 
practices and develops leadership skills for its employees will likely impart these 
practices on a protégé company. The same would apply for mentors with robust 
accounting programs. Their assistance to protégés in the area of accounting can help to 
establish best industry practices for a protégé lacking accounting skills. A significant 
incentive for a mentor to invest in a protégé is partial ownership of a promising protégé 
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business. SBA allows mentors to invest for partial ownership up to 40% of a protégé 
business. The DoD only allows for 10% ownership. The remaining three agencies do not 
participate in this practice. Anther incentive is cost reimbursement credit for mentors 
investing up to $1 million in a protégé. Because of the MPP relationship, mentors may 
also benefit from the 886 set-aside policy; under the SBA, MPP mentors may own up to 
40% of a protégé firm as an investment. The DOS, USAID and DHS do not allow mentor 
ownership investment in protégés. 
The SBA allows protégés to have up to two mentors to balance capabilities 
deficits. The DoD has an allowance of one mentor per protégé. The DOS, USAID and 
DHS are relatively unrestricted in this practice. For mentors, the SBA only allows one 
protégé per mentor. Yet the DoD, DOS, USAID and DHS have no restrictions on how 
many protégés mentors may have. 
The process of reviewing the MPP agreements is a semiannual and annual 
appraisal intended to provide oversight on the performance of government contracts and 
identify marked past performance improvements and degraded performance in 
evaluations, which are entered and stored in the government database Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). As contract awardees perform as prime or 
subcontractor, mentors and protégés can be paid in the form of advanced payment when a 
small business does not retain the capital for required labor or supplies on a contract. 
Sometimes the payments are made for skilled personnel or special materials. In these 
cases progress and partial payments are sometimes made available. If a mentor or protégé 
fails to uphold the terms of the agreement, it can be terminated by the program director or 
approval authority, whomever has the final approval. 
b. Disadvantages 
There are similar characteristics that make MPPs beneficial for stateside contract 
award, but inhibit their transportability. Some SDBs, of which several categories of 
disadvantaged business, have limited function in terms of special needs employment 
credit. They are not functional OCONUS. Although the Trading with the Enemies Act, 
Public Law No. 65–91 and DFARS Annex I–Policy and Procedures for DoD pilot MPPs 
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attempt to protect American businesses, these policies and guides are only enforceable in 
an expeditionary, CONUS capacity where a vendor base is mature.  
CONUS based contracting support is operational and sustainment oriented, thus 
requiring extensive acquisition lead times, which in turn, reduce their flexibility. Coupled 
with formal termination protest and appeal procedures, the prospect of terminating a MPP 
becomes time and cost intensive. Without adequate subcontractor data and plans, it 
becomes difficult to determine fiscal transparency. There is limited contractor vetting and 
validation when vendors are allowed to self-register as with CCR. 
These MPP elements, identified for the purpose of research and discourse, are 
stark advantages and disadvantages exposed through literature review and interviews. 
Further research of AMP will be necessary continue this comparative analysis. 
A disadvantage of the MPP registration process is the self-registration aspect of 
CCR/SAM. There is no bureaucratic burden that checks the process of vendor vetting. 
Without some form of vetting there is no way of knowing if a contract has been awarded 
to a contractor with enemy ties. This tool is primarily designed for a mature procurement 
environment, but does not facilitate transparency and vendor accountability in the 
contingent environment. 
For agencies like the DOS, USAID and DHS there is no selection or approval 
authority overseeing the mentor-protégé selection process. The task of countering fraud 
and corruption is a reactionary effort. A contractor caught engaging in corruption or 
defrauding the government has typically committed this type of criminal activity to the 
extent that the action had become egregious or offensive. There are government agencies 
that specialize in fraud investigation, which interdict or deter these types of activities. But 
the process of fraud and corruption detection is typically a none-governmental best 
practice. 
Another disadvantage of the MPPs is that there are little to no government 
resources dedicated to management training programs for small businesses (Section 7(j) 
programs limited to 8(a) firms). Although some agencies offer limited mentor financial 
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investment credit, most agency MPP programs do not allow partial ownership 
investment. These actually provide a disincentive to invest in protégés. 
Standard practices across government remain inconsistent with regard to 
inconsistent mentor to protégé ratios. Those protégés involved in MPP programs with no 
regulation have a marked advantage over those working with the DoD and SBA. A 
similar lack of standard best practices exists for mentors having multiple protégés. Only 
the SBA restricts mentors to one protégé. For mentors that choose to partner outside of 
the SBA, standard practices across the government are good. 
As far as annual and semiannual evaluation reports, it is a DoD requirement and 
the program manager (PM), KO and COR must certify the report. Limited oversight of 
payment problems under the delayed payment legislation, Section 1334 of the Small 
Business Jobs Act of 2010 consistently creates financial challenges that affect the 
contractor’s ability to perform. This is when the lack of forensic accounting is most 
apparent. Without payment, small businesses are forced into a serious situation that could 
bring legal action. In a MPP situation, if the protégé defaults on a contracted obligation, it 
could adversely impact the mentor. Termination for default often brings litigation. 
3. Afghan Mentorship Program 
a. Advantages 
Starting with its transportability, AMP is an OCONUS MPP model that could not 
be readily duplicated, as indicated be several interview quotes. The process of training 
new small Afghan vendors and instilling best management and accounting practices had 
to be trusted to established mentors. The process of continued coach fell back on the 
AMP program manager and Afghan business assistants. 
Vendor tournaments, the 886 Policy, and the Afghan First Policy ensured that 
adequate competition and contracts for operations needs were awarded among the local 
Afghan companies. Joint Venturing through AMP ensure that prime Afghan vendors had 
access to potential subcontractors and those subcontractors would be paid. Mentor firms 
were encouraged to invest without limit in protégés with agreement from the protégé that 
access to financial accounts for forensics accountability would yield greater intelligence 
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value and confidence in their ability to perform. In reality, unrestricted access to AMP 
trained vendors provided RC-East G2 and G8 Cells unrestricted fiscal accountability. 
Trust in mentor-protégé performance was important; however, the full termination 
authority by the program manager mitigate risk and scoped financial losses from potential 
contract defaults to less than $25K per contract, based on the vendor pool thresholds. The 
craftsman initiative gave the AMP program a renewed source of entrepreneurial talent as 
the process of developing new sources of business intelligence beamed. Although the 
Craftsman initiative was short-lived, after JCCS vendor vetting, twenty-four Afghan 
female business owners were able to receive AMP training, of which four competed and 
won procurement contracts from BRCC. 
The AMP program was celebrated as a success and that success has been 
documented. But every story has two sides. 
b. Disadvantages 
One of the disadvantages of AMP was that is have a limited SB development 
function. This was one successful contingency contracting MPP administered out of the 
second largest regional contracting centers in Afghanistan. It had a creative and 
experienced acquisition team of professionals participating in the program and a 
dedicated program manager pushing the COIN guidance agenda. The program also had 
the support of the CENTCOM Contracting Commander and SCO-A. 
Mentors did not receive financial reimbursement, credit or incentives other than 
their negotiated MPP arrangement made with their protégés. Protégés were relegated to 
subcontractor status and unable to receive adequate past performance evaluations for 
work complete. CORs overloaded with requirements credited successful past 
performance evaluation to primes and validated invoices, many times, without inspection. 
All issues denoted in the 2013 SIGAR report. 
Invoices paid by electronic funds transfer were submitted multiple times, 
requiring constant oversight and financial screening and reconciliation. In an 
expeditionary environment where time is a luxury and with limited personnel, this type of 
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fiscal accounting bogged down the AMP. The addition of a CRA and no progress 
payments for partial performance relegated the program manager to payment processing 
oversight. 
Centralized policy and decentralized execution allowed an opportunity for the 
creation of AMP. A lack of organizational planning created a void in policy, which 
resulted in the creation of AMP as a MPP model for contingency contracting. Only by 
chronicling this new practice, encouraging institutional knowledge and compiling 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. SUMMARY 
 What did we find in the Literature Review? 
Based on the literature review and the limited resources available on COIN 
contracting prior to 2013, we can deduce that knowledge of how to implement effects-
based contracting into operational planning was restricted to pockets seasoned acquisition 
professionals. Furthermore, that the exiting guidance and policies on the intended use of 
CERP and application of MAAWS in Afghanistan was underdeveloped and inconsistent 
with the intent of JP 4–24, Counterinsurgency. Additionally, for the purpose of 
contracting for effects, was greatly underdeveloped. 
 What are the results of the Comparative Analysis? 
During the comparative analysis of CONUS versus OCONUS Mentor-Protégé 
Programs like AMP, it can be determined that to this point limited study and analysis has 
been conducted on the subject of contingency contracting. For the purpose of this thesis, 
only five CONUS MPPs were identified. Based on the lack of resource material covering 
Mentor-Protégé Programs used in expeditionary, contingency and humanitarian relief 
operations, these CONUS MPPs must be rendered as models of to find beneficial traits 
that will be useful in future crises OCONUS. An acknowledgement that types of 
successful SBA programs have been used OCONUS. Germany, Japan and Korea are 
three countries that were alluded to as having MPP or similar small business program. 
However, the description, nature of the programs and extent of their success were not 
available for analysis during this report. 
For operational support CONUS, there appear to be no less than fourteen 
governmental agencies utilizing Mentor-Protégé Programs similar SBA to assist small 
business and diversify the U.S. acquisition vendor base. These CONUS MPPs need to 
have one set of standards that meet government best practices for continued success. This 
would require establishment of one overarching agency to scrutinize all agency MPPS, 
analyzes self-registration practices and standardizes vendor vetting prior to contract 
award. By determining equitable levels of mentor ownership investment in protégé firms, 
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this overarching agency could incentivize joint partnering programs and encourage equal 
distribution of investment benefits across like industries. Prompt payment processes and 
termination authority for CONUS MPPs must be timely to ensure support for the 
continued success of mentor-protégé relationships.  
Mentor-protégé programs, according to several senior contracting professionals 
interviewed, are purported to be highly regionalized and subject to host nation local 
business laws and customs. According to their experience, this has made collecting 
business assistance and development program data inconclusive and resource intensive. 
The result has been establishment of positions for local nationals whom act as local 
business advisors to U.S. acquisition professionals and local business professionals. The 
process of mentoring both is more of counselor and less as Mentor-Protégé Program 
manager. 
In Afghanistan, the implementation of local Afghan business advisors came into 
practice during the 2010 the troop surge. As the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance 
and effects-based contracting took center stage amid corruption and allegations that 
contractors were funding insurgents, centralized guidance with decentralized execution 
created collateral positions with the regional contracting centers across Afghanistan. The 
COIN contracting officer and Mentor-Protégé Programs absorbed the Afghan business 
advisor position. Contracting reform and successive commands deemed the Afghan 
business advisor a liability, as collusion and corruption between advisor and contractor, 
resulting in rebranding their function. Previously under AMP, the business advisor was 
only a gatekeeper and greeter for the RCC. The position was a local face, training and 
translating training for the Mentor-Protégé Program manager, the COIN contracting 
officer. 
 The contracting “Integration Cell,” like the one mentioned in BG Blake’s, 
Putting contracting on the offensive in Afghanistan, became the new normal. Manpower 
intensive, the integration cell, integrated requirements stakeholder, the program manager, 
local business advisors, contracting officers and contractors in a layered variation of the 
Afghan Mentorship Program. Various RCCs had attempted to develop mentor-protégé 
COIN contracting structures, but few were able to “get after operational” contracting 
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support. The COIN contracting officer position was retitled as the integration cell 
program manager, and re-dedicating the Afghan business advisors, standing up the 
integration cell concept would prove to be a difficult but worthwhile task. One 
unexpected issue was that ABAs were provided liberal interaction with vendors, external 
to the RCC, creating autonomy to negotiate with Afghan businesses, engaging in briary 
and other corrupt activity. 
 What is the Conclusion of the Interviews? 
A series of conclusions can be draw from the interviews conducted with the six 
senior acquisition professionals. Having commanded both in peacetime and combat, each 
interviewee provided a wealth of professional knowledge. Regardless of the timeframe 
and experience, all concluded that wartime contracting is exponentially more difficult 
than contracting in peacetime or for humanitarian operations. Whether at brigade, 
division or theater combatant command levels, each attempted to assess the overall 
experience levels within their organization, provide guidance that supported the 
warfighters contracting support needs and issue contingency contracting policy that met 
the intent of federal acquisitions regulations. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In this section, I will conclude my research by referring back to the research 
questions stated in Chapter II. I assessed the following primary research questions: 
 What should be the place of mentor-protégé models in COIN contracting 
doctrine? 
Based on my interviews with some of the most senior leadership in contracting, I 
was able to identify the mentor-protégé models and the utilization small business 
programs is an essential part of building oversight for the establishment of contract 
accountability. This in turn facilitates economic stability during the building of key 
infrastructure and establishment of initial security capacity.  Several lessons learned from 
the interviewees indicate that contracting must remain an element of COIN operations 
and the use of MPPs must be a part of contingency contract policy and organizational 
training to address the complex needs future operational support. Addressing these 
lessons learned better facilitates counterinsurgency contracting and is the bridge to 
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increased reliance on expeditionary and contingency contracting in either CONUS or 
deployed OCONUS environments. 
Through the comparative analysis of five Mentor-Protégé Programs, I was able to 
assess the secondary research question: 
 What are the forms of Mentor-Protégé Programs that exist and list the 
incentives for small and large businesses to participate in such a program? 
The complexity of acquisition support for enduring military operations is a 
labyrinth to which there is an inevitable end. To spite the similarities between disaster 
and emergency relief contracting and expeditionary, wartime contingency contracting, 
there is no single contracting model, policy or tool that exists as a cure-all. The 
challenges of a Mentor-Protégé Program in war are similar to those in peace. Where so 
many key determining factors are driven by cost, schedule and performance, the 
acquisition professional is challenged to look beyond these three for a methodology to 
provide for the economic stability of a region, help build the capacity of local vendors 
and provide a secure means of purchasing and acquisitions for supported forces. 
In terms of due diligence, contract solicitation, award and performance, visa vie 
delivery, there is no difference between sustainment contracting performed stateside and 
contingency contracting executed in an expeditionary environment. The acquisition 
professional, at every level is charged with the legal, moral and ethical obligation of 
taxpayer dollars. It is the contracting officer’s responsibility to act in best interest of the 
government. Ultimately, in the case of organizational knowledge, command policy and 
oversight, as indicated in Iraq, failure at any level compounds fiscal responsibility. 
Incentives for small and large businesses to participate in Mentor-Protégé 
Programs include management and accounting oversight, development of better business 
practices, cost reimbursements for mentor capital investments and preferential contract 
awards for hiring team partners. Expanded networking capabilities for the protégé help to 
expand the mentor-protégé revenue streams and expand the potential of future profits. A 
partnership between mentor-protégés firms can be extremely beneficial. 
Reflected in a conversation with a retired contracting official, the common 
misconception within CENTCOM contracting was that “we believe that by putting the 
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right people in the right places” we would be able to accomplish our contracting support 
mission, negating the excessive workload and operational tempo of combat (personal 
conversation with former CENTCOM Contracting Commander). In spite of the 
limitations of organizational experience and restricted contracting oversight, the bridge 
too far was the perception that contracting could successfully deliver needed operational 
support ten times out of ten. There were staffing and manpower shortages throughout 
regional contracting centers that forced the abandonment or shrinkage of successful pilot 
mentor-protégé and partnering programs. 
 Was AMP effective in achieving the COIN objectives, establishing 
doctrine and best practices? 
The answer to the third research question does not have a definitive answer. The 
reason that there is no short answer is because each of AMPs initiatives were able to 
achieve the objectives of the COMISAF COIN contracting guidance. However, AMP 
was not implemented at a high enough level or for a significant duration that would have 
allowed for a conclusive answer to this question. Given its limited range of execution and 
the nominal resources allocated for the COIN program, the scope of AMPs success was 
very effective. The joint venturing, vendor tournaments and craftsman program were 
elements of AMP that achieved a positive economic impact in and around Bagram and 
RC-East. But that is as far as it went. For AMP to have the ability to establish doctrine 
and best practices on contingency contracting it would have had to have been resourced 
and implemented for the Afghan theater of operation. AMP established a process model 
to achieve a means. 
Ultimately, abandonment of these programs compounded the competition for 
resources during solicitation and contract award. The evacuation of Mentor-Protégé 
Programs, which provided a cursory level of built-in contract oversight, resulted in an 
increased layer of risk, elevating the failure ratio for the RCCs. A conclusion denoted in 
the Quarterly 2013 SIGAR Contracting in Afghanistan Report dated 30 October 2013. 
The report claims that failure of COR oversight on a construction contract awarded by 
BRCC in June 2011, resulted in a structural failure of the Joint Center in Parwan (JCIP) 
courthouse building. After inspection of the courthouse in May 2013, the contract was 
terminated for convenience, but later receded and terminated for default five months later 
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in October 2013. Nowhere in the SIGAR Contracting in Afghanistan Report, does it 
mention the benefits of the integration cell. 
One of the beneficial claims of the integration cell was that it was able to identify 
several important areas for potential development and improvement. These include COR 
tracking and report accounting, construction project and contract status oversight, and 
increased quality of contract surveillance. In all, the integration cell was able to confirm 
the SIGAR report on contract administration. The recommendations of the SIGAR report 
was that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Secretary of State 
identify the reasons poor oversight occurred and establish processes to ensure this 
problem does not reoccur (Sopko, 2013). 
The same report identifies 85,528 DoD-related contractors in Afghanistan. 
Billions of dollars in contracts are split between U.S., Afghan and third-country national 
vendors and these companies employ tens of thousands of contracted employees. Factor 
in the Afghan First Initiative, which mandates award of DoD contract requirements to 
Afghan companies, with the result that it is harder to prosecute reconstruction fraud and 
theft. In an all-too-familiar tone, the report recounts the tale of Donald G. Garst. 
Identified as the central character of a money laundering and corruption scheme, 
Mr. Garst was convicted February 12, 2013 for receiving $210,000 in bribes from Afghan 
vendors. Garst was caught by SIGAR investigators trying to smuggle $150,000 of the 
funds out of Afghanistan. As an employee of AC First, a joint venture between AECOM 
and CACI, two U.S. based defense contractors. Essentially, he was a contractor managing 
contracts, which is an inherently governmental function and typically not authorized by 
the FAR. For his guilty plea he was sentenced to 30 months in jail and a fine of $52,117. 
The remaining $150,000 in cash was forfeited. Just another contracting failure recorded 
in the annals of what not to do. So the question remains, could a Mentor-Protégé Program 
like AMP have made a difference? Many would argue that it would have made no 
difference at all. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 What should been done next? 
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Further study of COIN contracting policies, goals and achieved objectives is 
needed to identify and explore best practices. The economic effects of COIN in diverse, 
regional climates and development of quantifiable statistical measures of effectiveness 
would serve as noteworthy research projects. Additional literary analysis is crucial to the 
identification of unexplored, relevant emergency/disaster relief and contingency 
contracting program. Suggested theses should focus on test cases and programs that 
promote economic stability and financial security for hard hit regions. 
 How would this be accomplished? 
It will be necessary for future researchers to look beyond standard measures of 
effectiveness, such as FY dollar and contract award amounts of a particular program. For 
example, by analyzing and integrating a Gini coefficient map as an overlay and 
developing an annualized statistical flowchart for researches to track and graph 
disturbances in income equity brought on by contracting activities for identified regions. 
By identifying multiple approaches to contingency contracting in divers’ environments, 
COIN contracting is an area of interest. 
 What should we be looking for? 
This is essentially economic trend analysis. In terms of security and stability, we 
should look to identify how to get the best value from contracting contingency 
acquisitions. We need to find ways to answer questions like, “is the region more 
economically solvent, before or after operational contracting support?” “does the local 
economy possess a robust vendor base with an adequate number of companies to prevent 
high levels of resource competition?” and “how do we, as acquisition professionals, 
continue to promote economic diversity and grow the economic capacity of local 
markets?” These are the questions that should be answered by collecting regional 
economic contracting data and overlaying insurgent activities to determine the COIN 
benefit of effects based contracting. This type of research could help to develop methods 
of pattern analysis for modeling future economic development programs that incite 
stability and security in disadvantaged regions. Only through this type of study will we 
find a utilitarian MPP model that is both flexible and can be transported for future 
warfighting needs. 
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APPENDIX A. SEC. 886: ENHANCED AUTHORITY TO 
ACQUIRE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES PRODUCED IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
Figure 15.  Sec. 886. Enhanced Authority to Acquire Products and Services 
Produced in Iraq and Afghanistan (from 10 USC § 2302, 2008) 
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APPENDIX B. DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO 
IMPLEMENT SECTION 854 OF THE JOHN WARNER NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007 
 
Figure 16.  Designation of Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Support) (ADUSD(PS)) to Implement Section 854 of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 (from Young, 2007) 
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APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF FEDERAL MENTOR-
PROTÉGÉ PROGRAMS 
 
Figure 17.  Comparison of Federal Mentor-Protégé Programs (from Pilireo Mazza, 2012) 
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APPPENDIX D. COMISAF’S COUNTERINSURGENCY 
CONTRACTING GUIDANCE 
 
Figure 18.  COMISAF’S Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance 
(from Petraeus, 2010) 
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APPPENDIX D. COMISAF’S COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) 
CONTRACTING GUIDANCE (CONT.) 
 
Figure 18.    COMISAF’S Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance 
(from Petraeus, 2010) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN 
 
Figure 19.  Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008) 
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APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN (CONT.) 
 
Figure 19.   Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN (CONT.) 
 
Figure 19.   Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN (CONT.) 
 
Figure 19.   Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX E. SUBPART 225.77—ACQUISITIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN (CONT.) 
 
Figure 19.   Subpart 225.77—Acquisitions in Support of Operations 
in Iraq or Afghanistan (from 48 CFR Part 225, 2008) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 4205.01 
DOD SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAMS 
 
Figure 20.  Department of Defense Directive 4205.01 DoD Small Business Programs 
(from Lynn, 2009) 
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APPENDIX F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 4205.01 
DoD SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAMS (CONT.) 
 
Figure 20.  Department of Defense Directive 4205.01 DoD Small Business Programs 
(from Lynn, 2009) (cont.) 
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APPENDIX G. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WHAT 
ARE RULES GOVERNING THE SBA’S MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ 
PROGRAM? 
 
Figure 21.  Small Business Administration, What Are the Rules Governing 
the SBA’s Mentor/Protégé Program? (from 13 CFR § 124.520) 
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APPENDIX G. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WHAT 
ARE THE RULES GOVERNING THE SBA’S MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ 
PROGRAM? (CONT.) 
 
Figure 21. Small Business Administration, What are the rules governing the 
SBA’s Mentor/Protégé program? (from 13 CFR § 124.520) 
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APPENDIX G. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WHAT 
ARE THE RULES GOVERNING THE SBA’S MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ 
PROGRAM? (CONT.) 
 
Figure 21.    Small Business Administration, What are the rules governing 
the SBA’s Mentor/Protégé program? (from 13 CFR § 124.520) 
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APPENDIX G. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WHAT 
ARE THE RULES GOVERNING THE SBA’S MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ 
PROGRAM? (CONT.) 
 
Figure 21.    Small Business Administration, What are the rules governing 
the SBA’s Mentor/Protégé program? (from 13 CFR § 124.520) 
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